Infantry

Professional Journal for Infantrymen

July-Sept 1959



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THE COVER

The "straight-leg" Infantryman superimposed on a backdrop of his Airborne brothers is symbolic of the Infantry's continued interest in both ground and air mobility. Today, as always, the doughboy stands ready to employ any and all means of transport to increase his mobility and to enhance his versatility.

The back cover is by Pfc Joseph Giordano.



Infantry

The Professional Journal for Infantrymen

OFFICIAL PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

Vol. 49 Third Quarter Jul-Sep 1959 No. 3

IN THIS ISSUE

Articles

Infantry's Mobility Crisis
Col Francis X. Bradley and Maj Sanford H. Winston 4
Our Number-One Problem: Mobility ... *Brig Gen Stanley R. Larsen* 6
Weight—Nemesis of Mobility ... ... *Capt Harold J. Meyer* 8
The Infantry Battle Group—in the Offense
Lt Col Edwin C. Gibson and Maj E. B. Moore, Jr. 14
Lancero ... ... *Capt Ralph Puckett, Jr and Lt John R. Galvin* 21
Civil Affairs ... ... *Col Karl S. Landstrom* 28
Assault ... ... *Maj Thomas H. Jones* 33
The Soviet Officer Corps ... ... *Maj Philip S. Grant* 42
Communication—in the Infantry Battle Group
Capt Clarance J. Schlafer 48
Some Have It, Some Get It ... ... *Lt Col Gamma Ray* 69

Features

From the Chief of Staff 2
Welcome to the Infantry 13
Pro & Con: Competitive Marksmanship.
It Pays Off ... ... *Lt Col Thomas J. Sharpe* 24
The Price of the Prizes ... ... *Capt James R. Semmens* 25
The Sounding Board
A Point to Ponder ... ... *Capt Chew-Mon Lee* 60
Our "Gimmick" ... ... *Capt William A. Brown* 61
The Role of the NCO ... ... *Sgt Jack F. Holden, Jr* 62
What Are We Doing About It? ... *Lt Col Joseph L. Knowlton* 63
A Staff for the Deputy ... ... *Maj Robert H. Brigham* 63

Departments

The Editor Says 3
Letters to the Editor 3
The Changing Face 40
Why Don't We? 55
Your Infantry Career 56
Quarterly Quiz 65
Quiz Answers 73
What's New for Infantrymen? 74
I Am the Infantry ... *Lt Col Stephen H. White* Back Cover

Published quarterly by the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. Entered as second-class matter June 11, 1948 at the post office, Columbus, Georgia, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: permanent subscription, $2.25 per year; 1 year, $2.50; 2 years, $4.75; 3 years, $7.00. Four copies a year. Foreign subscribers add $.25 yearly for postage. Address subscription applications to BOOK DEPT., U. S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, FT. BENNING, GA.

Dear Infantrymen:

As I assume my duties as Chief of Staff I am aware, not only of the important requirements of the present, but also of the future requirements of our Army and of the security of our Country.

In this era of constantly changing conditions, the future becomes constantly more difficult to predict. Unprecedented technological advances and the intransigency of a militant communist leadership permit less reliance on past experience in determining the essential needs of national security. To avoid incorrect decisions which conceivably could be disastrous, we must rely increasingly on accurate foresight and intrepid thinking.

This is true of our officers and men at all levels of our military structure and particularly of the members of the Infantry.

As Infantrymen, you are an important part of our Army team, and you have a major role—both individually and collectively—in the future of that team. It is vital that your thoughts and decisions stem from the widest possible knowledge of the Infantry and of the Army. Individually, you must keep abreast of organization, weapons and equipment, and tactics—both present and projected. You must be aware of our present capabilities and the extent to which they fall short of our goals. And you must be able to recognize problems, to anticipate changes, and to be prepared for future events before they occur.

Our success demands a high degree of professionalism that cannot be provided solely by duty assignments and service schools. It requires additional, personal effort on your part. I know of no better way for you to contribute to your own growth than by the regular reading of professional journals such as this official publication of the United States Army Infantry School.

I urge that you fully exploit all means of keeping up with changes, new developments, and trends. The knowledge thus acquired can be an important springboard to progressive thought. Exchange your thinking with others so that you can contribute to our advancement by building upon and extending our best ideas.

Of this we can be certain: An Army that is resistant to change is resistant to effectiveness. I am counting on you to provide a full measure of the bold, forward thinking so necessary to our continued progress.

FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF

L. L. LEMNITZER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff



THE EDITOR SAYS

IN the past issues of *Infantry*, many articles have explored the Infanman's requirement for tracked combat vehicles. To a degree, the thinking reflected by these articles was one-sided and a strong case was made for 100 percent mechanization of the Infantry battle group. In addition to these articles, the World-Wide Infantry Conference held last December went on record as favoring a step-by-step progression towards full mechanization.

As a consequence of this heavy emphasis on mechanization, some Infantrymen may be led to believe that the branch is irrevocably committed to a program of mechanization. Nothing could be further from the truth. While Infantry is turning to tracks to gain a degree of battlefield mobility, this step has been taken only because there is nothing better available today.

The Infantry Conference stressed the fact that mechanization is only an interim measure calculated to put us on a par with our potential enemy and to enable the Infantryman to fight more effectively on a nuclear battlefield. The Conference further declared that Infantry will phase into complete battlefield air mobility when industry produces a practical and dependable aerial vehicle with the desired characteristics.

The issue of 100 percent mechanization is by no means closed, nor is the matter of what kind of tracked vehicles best suit Infantry needs. We like to feel that it is never too late to consider new ideas, provided they are good ones. In the interest of promoting constructive and progressive thought, we are presenting two articles: *Infantry's Mobility Crisis*, which starts on the next page, and *Weight—Nemesis of Mobility*, which begins on page 8. Both of these articles depart from the official position of the Infantry School, but nevertheless contain ideas which are worthy of careful study.

Our readers are invited to comment on the problem of mobility so that we can have an exchange of ideas on this subject. Dependent upon length and thought content, comments will be published in Letters to the Editor and the Sounding Board, or as regular articles.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

"Tracks for the Infantry"

Sir:

As an old "4.2" company commander in the 9th Marines, the article on the 4.2 and the M56 really impressed me with its tremendous potential ("Tracks for the Infantry, Part II—Mortar Mobility," by Maj Frederick M. McConnell, January-March issue of *Infantry*).

W. M. TATUM, JR.
Capt, United States Marines
Norfolk, Va.

Sir:

I enjoyed reading your article, "Tracks for the Infantry—Mortar Mobility" . . . . Having been assigned to an Armored Division for nearly six years, I know the advantages of mobility in Infantry units.

In our Infantry battalions, our 81mm mortars are carried in the M59 and the 4.2s are mounted in the M84. This vehicle is a sound and well-tested one, but the maintenance problem is one you cannot imagine unless you have been a company commander and have had the responsibility for 17 of these "iron monsters." I am glad a vehicle such as the M56 has been developed to cut down on this maintenance requirement. . . .

JAMES W. BRICKER
Lt, Infantry
3d Armored Division
Germany

As has probably already come to your attention, M56 modification as a platform for the 4.2-inch mortar and other weapons is no longer an active project, primarily because the M56 lacks a "swimming" capability. It is important that carrier development along the lines of the M56 be vigorously carried forward, for the demand for flexibile, trouble-free tracked mobility is certainly pressing.—Editor.

Another Tent

Sir:

We in the 2d Battle Group . . . noted with great interest the article, "A Tent—for the Modern Battlefield?" by Lt Col Gus W. Schlitzkus (April-June 1959 issue of *Infantry*). . . .

The fact that something is being done to provide commanders and staffs some form of shelter is indeed gratifying. Faced with a similar problem . . . we decided some time ago to do something about it, utilizing TOE equipment presently available to the battle group.

. . . . First we tried a GP tent (medium) by locating it adjacent to a van and trailer, but it was too big, too awkward and inflexible. Our second experiment was a kitchen tent . . . . The additional space it provided was adequate, but the problems of awkwardness and inflexibility were still with us.



Then we turned our attention to "old reliable"—the CP tent, M1945. The results were amazing! By experimenting we found that two (or more) CP tents could be joined in tandem, or side by side. . . . We also found the entrance of one tent fit snugly between the van and trailer, and with a litlte salvage canvas, it was practically waterproof.

So now we had our model command post; our van with trailer and two CP 45s provided us with ample room for briefings . . . while operations continued uninterrupted inside the van and trailer. In addition, we had flexibility. . . .

ROLAND M. GLESZER
Col, Infantry
2d BG, 21st Inf
Hawaii

Photo Flub

Sir:

The title-photo on page 31 of the April-June 1959 issue of *Infantry* really hit me. . . . That AR man in the assault line was not utilizing a sling to free both his hands for work other than carrying his AR.

CHARLES J. HUBBARD
Lt, Infantry
1st BG, 21st Inf
Hawaii

The photo was posed, and our photo supervisor slipped up in not requiring proper use of the AR sling.—Editor.

"Hierarchical Arrangements"

Sir:

One basic reason given . . . for the pentomic structure . . . was that control, communication and span of command were such that five battle group commanders could report directly to the division commander.

But now what is the tendency of organizers? They want a battle group com-

Continued on page 67

Infantry's Mobility Crisis

We stand squarely at a Y in the road. One way is marked "permissible speed 35 miles per hour". The other route is labeled "the sky's the limit".

By Col Francis X. Bradley and Maj Sanford H. Winston

ALTHOUGH much of Infantry's preeminent reputation is derived from its accomplishments in World War II, Infantrymen have been aware for some time that the old, proven tools and techniques are not wholly adaptable to a World War III tactical environment. In searching for new ones, Infantry has eagerly modified the philosophy that governed its operations against Germany and Japan. It has condemned as dated and inadequate the doctrine of a continuous line of ground forces with big buildups and surging advances that characterized combat operations in Europe, the Pacific and Korea.

Infantry concurs without reservation that the future battlefield will be wide, deep, porous—and perhaps nuclear. It subscribes to a concept of fluid, decisive, Sunday-punch offensive operations to be executed speedily at points of our own choosing. It visualizes semi-independent actions by smaller yet more powerful organizations. It supports the precept that combat power comes from a blend of firepower and mobility applied in the proper amount at the right time and place. It seeks hardware and doctrines that will maximize its combat power.

In nuclear weapons, Infantry has the granddaddy of all firepower, available at the movement of a press-to-talk switch. These weapons have advanced the doughboy's versatility to the point where he can have all the firepower he needs at his call or even under his own control. Now comparable battlefield mobility is required to complete a picture of combat power that is virtually limitless in potential.

It is precisely in the area of mobility that Infantry faces a crisis. Figuratively speaking, we now stand squarely at a Y in the road. Needless to add, most of our trip thus far has been made on foot. One road ahead of us is marked *permissible speed 35 miles an hour—beware of obstacles.* The other route is labeled *no restrictions on speed—the sky's the limit.* Which road should Infantry take? Does is gamble on the slower road of ground mobility, the faster road of air mobility, or does it try to travel both? If it chooses ground mobility, does it move forever along the slower route? Or do the two roads again come together?

This article does not attempt to recommend a detailed final solution to this dilemma. Rather, its purpose is to present another point of view, a point of view different—at least in part—from the one generally being advanced. It is offered in the hope that it will foster an exchange of ideas and information so that in the long run our course will lead to true battlefield supremacy.

There is a strong feeling within Infantry that a greater number of tracked vehicles—armored personnel carriers, weapons carriers and cargo vehicles — will solve the mobility problem. Many want complete mechanization to provide every Infantry battle group with the capability of moving in tracked vehicles, preferably its own organic vehicles. This group argues that the nuclear battlefield is no place to have to wait for a taxi. It feels that transportation must be constantly available. Some advocates foresee the later development of an Infantry fighting vehicle.

Unquestionably, increased mechanization — whether complete or almost complete, whether organic or non-organic—does offer many advantages. The principal one is that it could, under some conditions, improve Infantry's tactical mobility fairly soon. But is this the right course for the long run? And how high is the



Which Way Do We Go?

100% Mechanization?
100% Air mobility?
A Blend of Both?

toll? Can we pour our talents, efforts, men and money into 100 percent mechanization now, and then switch in five or six years to something that holds greater promise? Aren't our doctrines and organizations likely to take on a trademark that may turn out to be indelible?

In declaring that armored tracked carriers will provide the battlefield mobility Infantry requires, it may be that we have listened too closely to some of Webster's more colorful adjectives—to some phrases like "true cross-country mobility," overpowering shock action," "semi-independent operations" and similar examples of bold euphony. If Infantry gets complete mechanization, or anything approaching it, we will pay a high price. Initial outlay is just the down payment. Total cost must be measured in coin of another kind: in manpower diverted from combat to logistic tasks, in the cost and weight of fuel and heavy support equipment, and most of all in the ceiling we place on our own combat potential.

Just what can we expect in the way of true cross-country mobility from armored carriers? For the record it must be explained that true cross-country mobility is the battle cry of

the "weather clear, track fast" school of thought. This school employs the rosy operational environment to gather supporters. The scene of combat is always presented as gently rolling, sparsely wooded terrain that extends as far as the electronic eye can see. Multiple columns of sleek, tracked vehicles streak toward the horizon under maximum r.p.m. Naturally, the blue sky is cloudless and the sun seldom sets. Mud? Snow? Mountains? Darkness? Steep river banks? Unfordable streams? Jungles? Swamps? City rubble? Blown-down trees? Dense forests? Defiles? Mines? *Go away, boy, you bother me.*

At this juncture it is appropriate to pause and examine the disappointment of one of the charter members of the "weather clear, track fast" school. In his initial campaigns, he scored a wave of combat successes. These were against relatively immobile foes, and were brought about largely by deep armored penetrations along good road nets. Thus entranced, he succumbed to the illusion that true cross-country mobility was attainable with tracked vehicles. He paid dearly for his error.

When Hitler took off to the east in the summer of 1941, the forecast was "weather clear, track fast." As the German herd of iron steeds raced across the Russian steppes, tankers and truck drivers could not help but notice the little *Panje* horses as they struggled off the road to make room for the onrushing columns. The sight of these small,awkward-looking animals pulling heavily loaded carts drew the disdainful words: "a hundred years behind the times."

A few months later the *Panje* horse was judged quite differently. He came into sudden demand during the muddy season when motor vehicles could not operate and mechanized columns stalled because fuel tanks were bone-dry. *Blitzkreig* turned into *sitzkreig* as the logistical effort sputtered and died. Who effected POL resupply? The *Panje* horses. Who moved heavy guns and ammunition into firing positions? The *Panje* horses. Who evacuated the wounded? The *Panje* horses. When the mud gave way to snow, it was the same story.

During the first months of 1942 some panzer divisions had as many as 2000 horses but scarcely a serviceable motor vehicle. How different might have been the lot of the Germans had transport helicopters been available to pick their troops out of the muck and redeploy them in areas where they could fight. Picture the tactical advantages if *both troops and vehicles* could have been airlifted to sectors where reinforcements were sorely needed.

The point of this episode is obvious: let's not get trapped by the same snare. In the future when the Infantryman fights, he cannot afford to divide his time between mobile combat and static combat. If his carrier cannot take him to points of decision whenever such maneuver is required, it is not in itself a solution to the problem of battlefield mobility, whether in limited or unlimited war.

Reflect for a moment on the 17 limited wars that have been waged since 1945. Some of these have been fought in the mountains of Korea, the hills of Greece, the swamps of Malaya, the rocky islands of Matsu and Quemoy, the jungles of Indo-

Our Number-One Problem: Mobility

THE most important problem which we face in the Infantry today is, by far, the problem of mobility. The way we solve it will determine not only our present effectiveness but our future role as well.

There are any number of possible solutions to this problem and all of them have ardent supporters. Some Infantrymen feel that we must continue to move primarily on foot, others argue for partial or complete mechanization, still others visualize all Infantrymen sweeping over the battlefield in zero-ground pressure air vehicles.

Here at the Infantry School we have our own ideas about mobility. We presented those ideas to the Infantry Conference last December, and the conferees almost unanimously accepted them. We admitted at the time, however, that we did not have all the answers and felt that if we could accurately define our problem we would be taking a most important step. We knew that by fostering an exchange of ideas and stimulating new thoughts, we would move a long way toward a sound solution.

Recent issues of Infantry *have presented some of the views held here at the Infantry School. An unclassified report of the recommendations of the Infantry Conference was included in the Jan-Mar* Infantry.

In the current issue, other points of view are presented, for it is vital that all views be heard. We feel that we must weigh each against the others, choose the best from all of them, combine and refine them, and then take vigorous action to pursue the course which we believe to be right.

We must solve this problem and solve it soon. We must exchange ideas and build upon each other's thoughts. We must develop new operational concepts which maximize advances in weapons and equipment. We must think intrepidly so that American science and industry will have to scramble to get abreast of our new concepts and tactics.

There are many things about which I have doubts, but not about this: There must continue to be a free exchange of thought on all Infantry subjects, and Infantry *magazine should be used as a forum for this exchange. Of this I am also sure: If Infantry is ever through changing, Infantry is through—period.*

Stanley R. Larsen

STANLEY R. LARSEN
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Commandant

nesia, and the rice paddies of Indo-China. Would complete mechanization have been an asset or a hindrance in these environments? And how would complete mechanization have affected our strategic mobility? How quickly could we have moved all of these vehicles plus fuel and heavy support equipment to the areas of combat?

We in the Army have argued that limited war is more likely than general or all-out war. Look around the world at the points of tension. Trace the periphery of the communist empire. Examine the most likely areas of conflict. You will find most of these areas unsuitable for large-scale mechanized operations. You will find these areas a long way from our own shores and any increase in mechanization would multiply the problems of strategic lift and logistic support. Interestingly enough, the area most suitable for mechanized operations—the plains of Europe — is the very area in which the Commander-in-Chief has said there would be no limited war. In other words, if we go for 100 percent mechanization, we prepare, in effect, for the war that the Army feels is least likely to occur.

Another case for complete mechanization has been made on the grounds that it will facilitate exploitation of nuclear fires. Of course it will. With its own ground transport, Infantry will be able to exploit the effects of Honest John and other nuclear weapons of similar range. But who will exploit the Corporal, the Redstone and the Pershing? It is apparent that Infantry has a compelling interest in the target areas of corps and army missiles. Do we intend to forfeit our responsibilities to other arms and services? Armor has some talent for long-range exploitation but this capability is restricted by the range and relatively slow speed of its combat vehicles and by ground obstacles. Heavy mechanized vehicles threaten to impose similar tactical penalties on Infantry.

There is argument that mechanization will improve our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Army. They have carriers, we will have them too. But how about our position vis-a-vis domination of the battlefield? *Do you win by matching your enemy where he is strong or by devising a different means to overcome his strength?*

Partial mechanization of Infantry, as in the ROCID division, is an advancement of no small significance. We have had to pay a price, as we do whenever we adopt heavier vehicles, but for the time being the gain in mobility has been worth it. We have purchased increased range, flexibility and mobility. The rub comes, however, when we try to move from partial mechanization to complete mechanization. Then we burden ourselves with additional heavy vehicles that we can use only in certain areas of the world under certain conditions of weather and terrain. Even in these areas we can hope to employ the vehicles profitably only part of the time. At other times they will be standing idle or will be used to move through areas or along roads where lighter, more economical vehicles would serve better.

Complete mechanization sounds like a plausible goal, and it is quite understandable why some of our planners are pleading for an organic vehicle for every Infantry squad. *But is the price worth it?* Why must these vehicles be organic? So that they are immediately responsive to the will of the commander? Why can't they be apportioned as they are needed? No one battle group or company will need them all the time. Hasn't Artillery, for example, done a pretty fair job of responding to the will of the Infantry commander?

Rather than additional tracked vehicles in our Infantry divisions, we should provide additional Army aircraft. Presently available air vehicles can move our soldiers anywhere in the battle area. They can carry nuclear weapons to support them. They can resupply them as required to inject staying power. They can ferry them to other points on the battlefield where combat power must be applied. Finally, they can pull them out when missions have been accomplished. These aircraft are far from perfect, but they will be improved. Meanwhile, they will continue to have signal shortcomings which should not be glossed over. Vulnerability is indeed a matter for concern. They are noisy, sensitive to weather, require considerable maintenance, and are greedily dependent on an uninterrupted flow of fuel, spare parts and logistic effort.

Infantry is on record as stating that its future is in the air—or to be more accurate, just off the ground. Apparently Infantry is waiting for more sophisticated air vehicles to appear before taking the air mobility plunge. It considers complete mechanization as simply an interim means of attuning to the demands of modern warfare. There are many pitfalls to this position. The most serious one is that the more Infantry travels on the ground, the tighter becomes its tie to ground mobility.

Continued on page 64

Col Francis X. Bradley was commissioned in 1937. During the early part of World War II, he was assigned to the Antiaircraft Artillery School. He was graduated from USACGSC in 1944 and then became Assistant G3, Anitiaircraft Command. Colonel Bradley later served in the IE Division, DA, and from 1949 to 1953 he was an Assistant Secretary of the General Staff, receiving during this period an M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University. Before attending the Army War College in 1958, he served in Berlin as a battalion commander and in the Office of the U. S. Commander. He is now Chief of the Infantry School's Doctrine Publications Office.

Maj Sanford H. Winston, who was commissioned in 1942, has graduated from the Infantry School, the Armor School and the USACGSC. During World War II, he commanded a rifle company of the 136th Infantry in the Pacific. Following the war, he prepared a wartime history of the 33d Infantry Division. He later served at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and after a tour as an advisor at the Turkish Infantry School, he went to Germany where he commanded a battalion of the 102nd Infantry. From 1953 to 1956 he was assigned to the G3 Section, USCONARC. He came to USAIS in 1958 after completing a tour with MAAG, Vietnam, and is now in the Doctrine Publications Office.

WEIGHT

Nemesis of Mobility

"JUST AS THE ARMOR PLATE OF THE TANK NO LONGER JUSTIFIES ITS WEIGHT, ITS LIMITED DEGREE OF MOBILITY NO LONGER JUSTIFIES ITS FUEL CONSUMPTION."

By Capt Harold J. Meyer

GEN NATHAN F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking at the last annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, described the Army's role.

". . . the Army," he said, "should be a compact, mobile, hard-hitting outfit with a minimum of supporting impedimenta. The majority of combat equipment should be capable of movement by air or fast ship. In the past we have paid a lot of attention to protective measures such as heavy armor on tanks and other vehicles. The resulting weight has created mobility and engine-efficiency problems. I believe the emphasis should be on firepower and speed. Let the protection come through those characteristics."

Since they have immediate bearing upon organization and equipment, the concepts General Twining has outlined are of great significance to all ground forces. Though our firepower has undergone a vast increase since World War II, speed and mobility are areas in which—despite the somewhat limited improvements already made—more substantial progress must be achieved if we are going to develop the fighting forces required for our national security.

Obviously, greater mobility demands less weight, and the problem of weight versus mobility gives rise to many questions. Can we, for instance, continue to include relatively immobile heavy weapons and equipment in the combat division? Does reliance upon a World War II type of mobility mean that we have failed to create a flexibility and responsiveness equal to the nuclear and improved non-nuclear firepower now in our hands?

The future small-unit commander is probably going to have low-yield nuclear weapons immediately available for tactical use. Visually guided or homing rockets—carrying either nuclear or other extremely efficient warheads—will replace conventional artillery systems. Firepower will be greatly increased, and it will be effective over far greater ranges. To a large degree, the commander may depend upon this firepower to compensate for the increased width and depth of his tactical dispositions.

Every combat commander will be faced, therefore, with the problem of exploiting this increased firepower. It will be available not only to us, but to our enemies, and victory may be determined by our ability to use our new weapons effectively, and to develop concepts which will permit this. Exploitation, then, becomes one of the commanding requirements of future warfare, and exploitation depends upon advanced mobility.

In effect, weapons of increased power demand an increased mobility to balance that power. To employ these more powerful weapons—and to avoid the destructiveness of similar weapons in the hands of the enemy—our combat forces must be capable of swift and responsive action.

On the other hand, of course, nuclear capabilities must not exclude capabilities for "conventional" war, and vice versa. This dual capability requires a careful coordination between mobility and firepower. Yet it seems clear that, as far as mobility is concerned, the problem is one-sided. It is entirely possible to have too little mobility. It is not possible to have too much.

The type of mobility we now need, in fact, approaches absolute mobility. Never before—certainly not during World War II—have we had it. We must have it now, even at the expense of eliminating items of equipment which merely provide comfort or convenience, or which are limited in their applications. Every piece of equipment must be examined in the light of its contribution to tactical success through mobility.

There are many varieties of equipment which ought to be appraised in this manner. The vehicular category, however, is perhaps the most important, simply because of the weight it involves. Heavy supporting equipment falls in this class—dozers and graders, for instance, and tractors and trailers. Also in this class is the tank.

In many ways the tank is representative of the organizational items whose inclusion in the combat division must now be questioned. It is heavy, it is cumbersome, it requires complex echelons of logistical support and it actually has only a limited mobility.

Mobility was the hallmark of the tank. World War II demonstrated that tank mobility, coupled with imaginative tactics and dynamic leadership, could produce victories—on the World War II battlefield. Tank mobility, measured in speeds of 15 miles per hour on hard surfaces and other favorable terrain, did a creditable job.

But the tank is only "relatively mobile." This is the same as saying it is "relatively immobile." Such limited mobility cannot be tolerated on the contemporary battlefield. It is no longer enough.

Too often we speak of a "high degree of cross-country mobility." We must, instead, learn to speak of mobility in unqualified terms. The division's mobility must not falter at the river bank or the edge of the desert. Arctic ice or the mountains of Tibet should not seriously impair it. Swamp and snow alike must be traversed with whatever speed tactics require.

Besides defeating terrain, that advanced mobility must also defeat distance. If we fail to develop vehicles which are totally independent of cargo

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Capt Harold J. Meyer, author of "The Infantry Needs Mobility — Not Armor," enlisted into the Army in 1943 and graduated from OCS in 1945. He served in Europe until 1946, when he left active duty. In 1948 he returned to the active Army. He has served as Assistant PMST at Kent University and is a graduate of the USAIS Advanced Course. He is now Publications Officer with the School's Weapons Department.

These heavy vehicles available to a direct-support engineer company are considered the minimum necessary to keep a mechanized, tank-supported battle group moving.

This heavily armored combat engineer vehicle (CEV), three of which are in the Infantry division, is considered a must for clearing obstacles and "bunker-busting" while under fire. Weight: over 54 tons. Fuel consumption: over two gallons per mile on good roads.

Three of these 23-ton trucks carry the Infantry division's 114 feet of fixed bridge. A floating bridge company with 730 feet of class 60 bridge (see photo preceding page) requires 60 of these trucks and 2525 gallons of fuel to move 100 miles.

aircraft for long-distance movement, then they must at least be air-droppable or air-landable in a hundred square feet of most types of terrain. In addition, they must place no measurable strain upon the division's logistical organization.

Such advanced mobility would have far-reaching effects. When achieved, we actually would gain effective fighting strength with no over-all increase in manpower.

But this kind of mobility is incompatible with excessive *armor plate*, other sources of *weight* and the *logistical dependence* which weight necessitates.

One of the principal reasons for the dominance of the tank during World War II was its ability to withstand the shock of counterweapons available at that time. The tank could not be penetrated consistently, especially when it was employed in large numbers under a protective umbrella of air support. It achieved and maintained a mobility that was, by the standards of the time, quite significant.

Actually, the tank's capacity to accept hits was, even then, imperfect. Most weapons used against it in World War II—including light weapons—almost invariably caused mechanical difficulties of one sort or another which sometimes seriously impaired the fighting efficiency of the crew.

This fault, however, matched the limitations of the firepower directed against the tank. Antitank weapons were only as mobile as, and often less mobile than, the tank itself. By present standards, their capacity for tank destruction, even when they were on target, was not great.

Since the tank was designed to *accept* hits, as more powerful antitank weapons were developed, the natural response was to pile on more armor plate. Yet, in time, anti-armor weapons were developed which met each successive challenge—such weapons as mines, grenades, rockets, recoilless weapons and missiles; the shaped charge, the proximity fuze, the hom-

FIGHTING VEHICLES OF EXCESSIVE WEIGHT SPAWN A HOST OF EQUALLY HEAVY SUPPORTING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT WHICH IN TURN REQUIRE HEAVY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

ing or visual-guidance mechanism, the nuclear warhead. Today, anti-tank weaponry can destroy the heaviest armor. There remain no mountains of steel to conquer, for all armor plate can be efficiently defeated.

The fact that armor plate is no longer impregnable leads us to the problem of weight. Every increase in tank armor has meant a relative decrease in mobility. Weight is the nemesis of mobility, and if the division is to be agile and responsive, it cannot tolerate excessive weight. That weight was once a good bargain, since it purchased protection. Now that that protection is at best limited, weight has become a very bad bargain indeed.

Tank mobility is not only unsuitable for these reasons, but because it is logistically centered. The supply-base dependence of the tank is perhaps best evidenced by the experience of the Third U.S. Army in the campaign east of the Seine during World War II. The mobility of this, the most mobile of the World War II armies, was seriously curbed when its gasoline supply was restricted to two thousand tons per day. This, Gen Omar N. Bradley points out, "was barely enough to sustain it in an almost totally uncontested advance." Obviously, tanks accounted for only a part of the gasoline demand. The fact remains, however, that the logistical effort required to maintain a single tank in battle is enormous. Gen Bruce C. Clarke has stated that for each mile of an armored division's movement, fifteen hundred gallons of fuel are required.

Whatever improved mobility we achieve in the near future will, of course, be based on the fuel to power

Even the crane used to erect a class 60 bridge is a behemoth. The 36-ton equipment-set eats two gallons of fuel per mile.



Then there are the small gaps to span. This job calls for a specialized and heavy (62 tons) vehicle which drinks gas like a tank.

And when the tank finally gives out this 37-ton tractor-trailer is needed to haul it in for repairs. The Infantry division is weighted down with two of these vehicles.

this mobility. The point is that, just as the armor plate of the tank no longer justifies its weight, its degree of mobility no longer justifies its fuel consumption. And the tank, in addition, requires a large logistical effort of other kinds, for maintenance, repair, supply, and movement over barriers and obstacles.

It is clear that no combat unit is absolutely mobile when it is shackled to a supply base. What we need is a mobile self-sufficiency, independent of a constant supply of vast quantities of POL products, or upon complex echelons of support. We need a mobility which is more efficient than tank mobility—which will get us where we want to go more quickly and dependably, and more economically as far as fuel and supply are concerned.

Advanced mobility can give us a considerable advantage on both the nuclear and non-nuclear battlefield. We can achieve this mobility only if we deliberately and actively seek it—that is, if we destroy the lag between our firepower and our mobility.

More than a decade ago Dr. Vannevar Bush predicted, in view of mobile firepower developments, that the tank would no longer occupy the position of prominence it gained during World War II. The tank was developed to combine the limited firepower then available with the limited mobility which was practicable at that time. Though its lethal effectiveness was limited to hits or near misses, in its day the tank had a formidable effect.

Already the same kind of firepower has, in the interest of advanced mobility, been more effectively exploited in the 90mm gun, M56 "Scorpion." In the M56, the 90mm gun has been divested of armor plate. Its protection comes from its firepower and from mobility. Here is an example of the union of World War II firepower with improved mobility.

The firepower of the 90mm gun, of course, is small compared to some of the other tactical weapons available today. The "Scorpion" is only one small step in the right direction. The next step, obviously, is to combine improved firepower with improved mobility. Both steps leave the tank and tank-like equipment far behind.

It is not to be argued here that on the modern battlefield modern rocket and missile firepower requires a specific means of mobility. Such mobility may come from light tracked vehicles, aircraft, zero ground-pressure vehicles, air-ducted cars, or other vehicles not yet visualized.

Also, it is not my point that the tank is "obsolete." Tank units should be readily available at corps or field army level for use under suitable conditions in both nuclear and non-nuclear combat.

I want only to emphasize that weight is the nemesis of mobility. At division and battle group level we need an advanced mobility which is incompatible with the weight and bulk of heavy weapons and equipment like the tank and its supporting impedimenta.

We have made great strides in firepower. But, as General Twining says, "When I speak of mobility, I am thinking of both rapid movement and fast reaction. . . . Firepower is not much good unless it can be applied quickly and flexibly."

Worth Repeating

"New conditions require . . . new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past." — *MacArthur*

"The same Infantry mounted in armored carriers and teamed with tanks for mobile operations must also be ready to move in aerial vehicles about the battlefield." — *General Maxwell D. Taylor*

"Considering that petroleum products have represented as much as 50 to 75 percent of military supply tonnage in World War II and Korea it is evident that as vehicles are equipped with more powerful motors, as more aircraft and more self-propelled equipment come into use, this aspect of supply will become increasingly important." — *Maj Gen A. T. McNamara*

I am one of those who feel that much remains to be done to lighten our equipment. We talk a lot about it but, in many cases, it seems that much of our equipment like our automobiles is becoming large and more ponderous in our efforts to include every feature known to man. — *General Lyman L. Lemnitzer*



First row, left to right: P. L. Stromberg, G. E. Roesler, C. E. Lytle, R. McDonald, G. H. Dyer, P. J. Elias, T. K. Seybold, T. G. Bolick, D. Markham, H. C. Lynn, J. C. Smith Jr., I. D. Gerhardt, R. R. Moore, R. A. Turner, P. M. Dawkins, R. W. Riordan, J. F. Orndorff, W. Gailey, F. D. Anderson, F. E. Herrera, H. H. Covington, G. F. Harrison, J. F. Milton, J. F. Campbell, A. V. Goodpasture, H. McCracken, T. D. Roberts, R. Q. Gaines, R. F. Bowers. *Second row:* B. D. Faber, M. J. Fletcher, T. H. Fletcher, L. E. Sullenberger, L. V. Hightower, G. P. McLaughlin, S. L. Steinberg, C. L. Boyle, B. Dishman, A. B. Phillips, W. B. Guild, G. E. Day, F. G. Gercz, D. T. LeClere, A. K. Kuschner, P. N. Sper, J. E. Bryer, H. B. Dorshow, W. T. Brown Jr., F. S. Besson III, W. J. Mullen, J. P. Johnson III, J. F. Enright, D. Luedtke, J. E. Williams, W. H. Bechthold. *Third row:* A. Bair, R. M. Novogratz, L. E. Burchell, D. T. Monroe, F. H. Chandler, W. E. Clarke, J. C. Franz, D. M. Duggan, J. S. Dick, J. W. Wheeler, H. T. O'Conner, T. H. White, R. S. Frey, D. L. Roush, S. H. Cummings, D. D. Ingram, W. B. Tully Jr., R. M.Barry. *Fourth row:* T. Boyd III, P. K. Keogh, M. A. Gabel, W. L. Schwartz, M. E. McCahan, R. E. Losey Jr., P. A. Chalmers, J. N. Melroy, D. J. Morrissey, C. E. Getz, M. Z. Santos, P. E. Gibbs, W. F. Train, R. R. Ramsey, D. M. Ludlam, N. H. Rosner, C. E. Lynch, G. Parolini, K. S. Kapp, W. M. Schepps. *Fifth row:* R. T. Boyle, A. C. Houltry, H. Walters, L. Katsavsky, R. Shapiro, R. B. McPeek, J. R. Cox, R. T. Harle, S. H. Yateman, W. R. Lehrfeld, H. J. Stiles, D. H. Fuller, C. H. Groth Jr. *Sixth row:* R. M. Conway, F. J. Redding, T. V. Borlund, M. F. Graven, G. Kadlec, J. E. Weisler, R. G. Shain, S. K. Werbel, M. H. Mamnussen, M. G. Hilliard, G. N. Dorland, C. A. Fannin. *Absent:* D. L. Baker, H. H. Boggs II, E. H. Burba, L. Caruso III, D. E. Fried, M. Isacco, R. B. Johnson, S. Klein, F. V. Malek, T. McInerney, R. J. Meyer, E. A. Netzloff, J. J. O'Brien, J. R. Paschall, J. F. Ray, D. H. Rogers, R. C. Schmidt.

Welcome to the Infantry

We are proud to welcome into our ranks the newly commissioned Regular Army lieutenants from the United States Military Academy's Class of 1959 who have selected Infantry Branch as their career choice. All Infantrymen extend greetings to them, and to the Distinguished Military Graduates of other colleges who now wear crossed rifles.

In selecting Infantry, these young men have made an intelligent choice—they have accepted the challenge of leading the world's finest soldiers. We have every confidence that they bring with them the courage and resourcefulness that have always typified the American Infantry leader.

Nearly all of these young Infantry leaders elected to take both Ranger and Airborne training, though only one of these courses is required. Their voluntary acceptance of a "double dose" of rugged training is in itself evidence of an exceptional interest in their new profession, and, moreover, of the kind of aggressiveness and conviction which the Infantry role requires. It is an important assurance of future Infantry strength.

Among these Infantrymen are many distinguished names, already known in the fellowship of Infantry service. We are pleased that old traditions are being renewed, and we anticipate the creation of many new ones, equally notable.

We are proud of each of these young men. We know that they will find in Infantry an opportunity for singular personal satisfaction.

The Infantry Battle Group – in the Offense

By Maj E. B. Moore, Jr. and Lt Col Edwin C. Gibson

THE FUTURE battlefield is visualized as an area without the lines of entrenchments we have known in the past. There will be no masses of men waiting in reserve, no roads jammed with trucks moving to the front. In fact, there will be no front —only a battle area. Within this battle area, small mobile units will be deployed with intervals and depths measured in miles rather than yards.

As the first step in meeting our requirements for this type of battlefield, the pentomic Infantry division—one of the most dramatic and significant changes in the long evolution of the Army—was adopted.

After two years of field test and evaluation, Department of the Army recently announced a number of changes in the organization and equipment of this division.[1] While these changes do not materially affect doctrine for the employment of the battle group, they do give it a greater combat capability. An analysis of the revised organization (Figure 1) shows considerable improvement in areas which are essential to effective military operations—firepower, surveillance and control.

The fifth rifle company and the new combat support company enhance the battle group's flexibility and increase its ability to strike the necessary balance between dispersion and concentration. While the battle group commander's span of control is increased, compensation is provided by the addition of a deputy battle group commander. Experience with a deputy battle group commander in the Airborne division has shown that this individual will be invaluable to the commander in coping with the problem of control on a porous battlefield. The deputy commander will be prepared at all times to assume command of the battle group in an emergency or to control any of its elements as directed by the battle group commander. In the attack, he will locate himself so that he can establish an alternate command post. To ensure that he will

[1] See "ROCID Changes," April-June 1959 issue of *Infantry*.

have personnel familiar with the situation, certain assistants to members of the battle group staff may accompany him. Other necessary personnel and equipment may be provided by elements of the combat support company headquarters or headquarters company.

Before proceeding to a discussion of offensive tactics, we should consider, briefly, concepts for the employment of the new units. Such concepts may be typical of offensive action on the modern battlefield.

In the new organization, the heavy mortar battery has been replaced by an Infantry unit, the *heavy mortar platoon*. In the attack, this platoon is employed in general support whenever possible to provide the flexibility which can be gained through centralized control of fires. Usually the platoon is positioned so it can support the main attack. If separation of the rifle companies makes centralized control impracticable, the platoon or its sections may be placed in direct support of, or attached to, the attacking companies. The fires of the heavy mortar platoon are integrated with those of the direct-support artillery battalion, and the platoon fire direction center is tied in with the FDC of the direct-support artillery. The heavy mortar platoon accepts missions from the fire direction center of the direct-support artillery battalion in order to integrate the fires of both units more effectively.

The new *assault weapon platoon* (consisting of five squads armed with the SS10 missile) is employed in a variety of ways. These weapons are the principal means of antitank defense for the battle group and there is no hard and fast rule for their employment in the attack. The battle group commander may employ the entire platoon or elements of it in general support or he may attach it by squads to attacking units. Usually, the platoon is employed to provide antitank protection for units which have no attached tanks. One or more squads may be attached to units which have a flank protection mission. In some situations it may be desirable to attach assault weapon squads to one or more of the attacking companies. This is particularly desirable if the enemy is strong in armor or if insufficient tanks have been provided.

In the attack, the new *radar section* is usually employed in general support. However, under conditions of poor visibility, short-range radar teams may be attached to the attacking companies. It also may be desirable to attach short-range radar teams to units which are responsible for screening the flanks. The medium-range teams are retained in general support and employed well forward as required by the situation. The greater range of the medium-range radar enables it to be used during daylight (terrain permitting) as a supplement to visual ground surveillance. Radar teams may be used as a means of vectoring attacking elements during periods of darkness or poor visibility. They may be used to conduct surveillance of critical areas or avenues of approach into the zone of action of the battle group. Radars should be kept as far forward as the tactical situation and terrain will permit.

We should also review basic concepts for several other elements which are organic to or which support the battle group.

The *reconnaissance platoon* performs reconnaissance and provides security for the battle group. In the attack, it usually screens the more dangerous flank while the other flank is screened by elements of a reserve company. Normally, the platoon does not precede the advance when it is expected that a strong enemy defense will be encountered.

The *engineer platoon* is usually retained in general support and employed to assist the advance of the attacking elements. When additional



Figure 1. The organization of the Infantry battle group. A fifth rifle company has been added and the former mortar battery has been replaced by the combat support company.

engineer support is provided, as it normally will be, the battle group engineer platoon is directed to accept missions from the supporting engineer unit. This is done to facilitate control and coordination of engineer effort.

When tanks are attached to the battle group, the commander integrates them into his organization in such a manner as to capitalize on the firepower, mobility, shock-action and control facilities of the armor unit. By cross-attaching tank platoons and Infantry platoons, the commander takes maximum advantage of the tank company headquarters with its excellent control and command capabilities. He thus creates an additional maneuver element which gives greater flexibility and strength to his command. In fluid operations over open terrain of good trafficability, tank-heavy teams often lead. In close terrain or against strong enemy antitank obstacles and weapons, Infantry-heavy teams normally lead. The tank-heavy units are committed when the terrain and enemy situation permit their effective use.

Normally, a divisional field artillery battalion is employed in direct support of a committed battle group. This direct-support battalion obtains additional artillery fires from higher and adjacent units, when such fires are required, and if they are available. The artillery battalion commander is the battle group fire-support coordinator.

Now, let's take a look at some of the tactical concepts for the operations of the battle group in the offense. We shall be concerned with both nuclear and non-nuclear combat. While less dispersion may be required in some non-nuclear situations, the decrease will be small, due to the threat of enemy nuclear employment.

The effective employment of any unit depends upon a proper consideration of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, and the troops and supporting fires available. However, these factors will not be analyzed here, since it is not feasible in a short discussion of this type to cover all



Figure 2. Platoon in the attack—before.



Figure 3. Platoon in the attack—now.

of the possible combinations of factors. In order to present basic doctrine we shall assume that optimum conditions prevail. But keep in mind that the doctrine discussed here cannot be applied as a template on any piece of terrain. Terrain and other factors will modify the application of this doctrine. Each situation must, of course, be analyzed individually.

The concepts presented are based on the weapons, ammunition, and communication and surveillance equipment organic to the new battle group. In addition to these items, the battle group usually can expect to receive other required fire support, mobility means and armor from higher echelons. When such attachments are made, logistical support from the higher echelons must be increased accordingly. For example, when tanks or armored personnel carriers are attached, a proportional share of the logistical support elements from the division trains must be provided.

A discussion of offensive operations logically begins with the rifle platoon, since it is considered the smallest unit which can be effectively employed in offensive action. It is the smallest unit with internal communication for adequate control, and the smallest unit capable of developing a base of fire and a maneuver element. With the addition of greater firepower and intra-platoon communication, the squad has a stronger offensive capability than heretofore. More dispersed formations within the platoon may therefore be possible, since it will not be necessary to mass to the degree formerly required in order to deliver a heavy volume of fire in a specified area.

The rifle platoon normally attacks as part of the company and uses all organic, attached and supporting weapons to neutralize the enemy. In many situations, the platoon will continue to assault from one direction with three rifle squads (Figure 2). With its improved capability for control, however, the platoon is now able to strike the enemy's flanks and rear with greater facility than ever before (Figure 3).

The platoon develops maximum combat power with its organic means on frontages of 460 meters or less. The communication equipment organic to the platoon provides for communication at ranges up to one mile. The weapons organic to the platoon are effective at ranges up to 500 meters. Since it is estimated that a

platoon can sustain itself for approximately 30 minutes without being subject to defeat, mechanized platoons may be separated at distances of 2250 meters and retain a satisfactory reinforcing capability. Platoons so separated are still within range of the organic company mortars, provided the mortars are located near the center of the company zone.

Accepting separation of platoons at distances of 2250 meters, the mechanized company is capable of attacking on frontages of up to 7500 meters (Figure 4). The limiting factor is the range of the 81mm mortar. Communication equipment in the company radio net provides for control at distances of from three to five miles. The portion of the zone actually used will depend upon the mission, the enemy, terrain and combat power available. When adequate combat power in the form of fire support is available from higher echelons, emphasis is placed upon seeking, locating and determining suitable targets by the attacking forces. In situations where such fire support is not available, concentration of elements of the company may become necessary in order to accomplish the mission. The same may be true when attacking in close terrain or when clearance of the zone is required. The disposition of attacking elements over these frontages gives excellent capabilities for the development of nuclear targets. At the same time, dispersion is adequate to reduce the company's vulnerability to enemy nuclear weapons of nominal and subkiloton yields. Yet, the company is not so widely separated that it is unable to concentrate when required.

With the companies so disposed, the battle group, under optimum conditions, can reasonably be expected to conduct offensive operations on frontages up to the range of weapons under its control—15,000 meters. Figure 5 shows the battle group attacking on such a frontage in two columns. It is anticipated that the leading company in each column will be disposed essentially as shown in



Figure 4. Guide frontages for a mechanized company in the attack.

Figure 4, utilizing multiple routes to gain maximum flexibility.

The heavy mortar platoon, in general support, marches well forward in the formation because of its limited range, and the direct-support artillery battalion also moves well forward to provide maximum fire support for the leading elements. The 105mm howitzer battery is placed in the column making the secondary attack, while the battalion (–) marches in the main attack column. Initially, the artillery is in march order and the necessary fire support is furnished by general-support artillery which is in position and within range. Once enemy resistance has been uncovered which requires the employment of artillery with the battle group, elements of the direct-support artillery battalion will be positioned to furnish the required support. Then, to provide for continuous fire support, elements of the fire-support units will displace by echelon so that some supporting weapons are in position and ready to fire at all times. By this disposition, non-nuclear fires are provided for all elements of the battle group. In addition, the companies are mutually supporting with 81mm mortars. Surveillance, provided by both surface and aerial means, ensures security of the advancing elements by screening the flanks and the area between the columns. The force in each column is sufficient to sustain itself for limited periods. In short, this formation provides maximum flexibility, low nuclear vulnerability and excellent capabilities for the development of targets.

In establishing control over his attacking elements, the commander utilizes only those measures which are required to ensure that the operation proceeds in accordance with his plan. The size of the objective assigned to a particular unit depends upon the unit's ability to control the objective once it has been seized. The depth of zones of action depends upon the unit's ability to secure itself and keep lines of communication open. If aerial lines of communication are utilized, then the depth is limited only by the requirement to remain within reinforcing distance. This will vary at each echelon ac-



Figure 5. The weapons available to and reinforcing capabilities of the mechanized battle group allow it to attack on a frontage of 15,000 meters.

cording to the unit's capability for sustained independent action. It is anticipated that the fire-support elements will displace by echelon in a manner which will ensure close and continuous fire support. Once the objective has been seized, only sufficient forces remain thereon to control the area and to ensure its retention against ground or airborne attack. The remaining forces move beyond the objective to provide security and to achieve maximum dispersion of the command. This tactic also tends to deceive the enemy into believing that the attack is continuing.

Now let's examine more closely the employment of the battle group in a two-column attack (Figure 6). Such a formation is indicated when the enemy situation is deteriorating, relatively detailed information of the enemy is available, an adequate road net is present, sufficient fire support is available, and there is a need to keep pressure on the enemy. The axes selected cause the attacking units to converge on the dominating portions of the battle group objective. They are separated as much as is practicable so that an enemy nuclear weapon used on one axis will have minimum effects on the other. Yet, they are not so widely separated that the force on one axis is subject to defeat before the force on another can move to its assistance. Each attacking company is assigned objectives within its capability. No intermediate objectives are selected since their use may slow the operation and cause undue massing of forces. If, as the attack progresses, enemy resistance delays the advance and interferes with accomplishment of the mission, suitable objectives may be assigned.

To facilitate understanding of these basic tactics, it might be well to look at the organization and operations of a battle group in a simple, hypothetical offensive operation (Figure 7).

In this situation, the battle group has been provided with sufficient personnel carriers to mechanize its elements. An engineer company is attached and a self-propelled artillery battalion is in direct support.

Company E, 2d Medium Tank Battalion, makes the main attack on Axis MARY, the best approach to the battle group objective. The objective assigned to this company is the one which is expected to achieve the most decisive result. The main attack is weighted with tanks and priority of fire support.

By making full use of all the control headquarters available to the battle group (a total of six including the tank company) and by providing two of these headquarters with Infantry and tanks, the battle group commander achieves maximum flexibility in the conduct of the attack. In this situation we are assuming that enemy resistance is deteriorating and that the approaches are excellent. Tank-heavy units could be employed advantageously on both axes. However, we have also assumed that insufficient tanks are available for such employment. Therefore, Company E, 2d Med Tank Battalion, less one platoon, forms the nucleus for a tank-heavy team to make the main attack. Company A is provided with a platoon of tanks to increase its com-



Figure 6. Battle group in a two-column attack.



Figure 7. Organization of elements on each axis.

bat capability. Company C, the first rifle company in column on Axis MARY, attaches one rifle platoon to Company E, 2d Med Tank Battalion. In making such cross-attachments, it is desirable that the units exchanging platoons be part of the same column. This is not possible in the case of the tank company but can be followed in the case of the Infantry companies.

To insure adequate fire support, to reduce the length of the columns, and to decrease their vulnerability to enemy nuclear weapons, the fire-support elements are split. The 105mm howitzer battery marches on Axis JO while the remainder of the artillery battalion and the heavy mortar platoon march on Axis MARY. Even though these elements are split as to location, they are retained in general support under centralized control. The range capability of the artillery battalion is such that it can mass its fires to support any portion of the battle group attack. Priority of fires is given the main attack.

Assault weapons have been furnished the force on each axis to provide antitank protection in depth. Assault weapon squads are attached to the elements on Axis JO which are responsible for security missions. The assault weapons platoon (less three squads) is retained in general support and marches on Axis MARY.

The battle group commander's command group marches well forward on Axis MARY where it can best influence the action of the main attack. Included in this group are the S2, S3, FSC and necessary signal personnel. The deputy battle group commander moves on Axis JO. He uses the elements and facilities of the combat support company headquarters to form the nucleus of an alternate command group, which may include the assistant battle group staff officers. This group provides a duplicate command structure in the event one of the command elements is destroyed through enemy action or is unable to control the entire operation. Although the battle group trains are shown with the force on Axis JO, elements of the trains will move on both axes as required to provide the necessary logistical support. The battle group executive officer, S1 and S4 may be found with headquarters company (–), where they can effectively supervise and coordinate the battle group administrative-support system. In an emergency, this group can also control the force on one of the axes, or elements thereof.

The reconnaissance platoon screens the right flank of the battle group



Figure 8. Battle group attacking dismounted.

and Company E, 1st BG, 87th Inf screens the left flank with a reinforced rifle platoon. Company B is responsible for screening the area between the axes and maintaining contact with the forces on Axis MARY. This leaves the leading elements free to focus their attention upon the seizure of the assigned objectives.

Engineers are placed on each axis, with the bulk of the engineers marching on Axis MARY to support the main attack. Engineer reconnaissance detachments march well forward in each column.

In addition, supporting elements of the division aviation company are employed, in conjunction with security echelons, to assist in command and control, for resupply and to assist in medical evacuation.

In developing the plan of fire support, the commander provides for both nuclear and non-nuclear preparatory fires. Scheduled nuclear weapons are planned for use on located enemy positions which will be encountered early by attacking forces, and on enemy reserves which may be able to reinforce forward enemy positions. Non-nuclear fires are closely integrated with the nuclear fires and are scheduled after detonation of the nuclear weapons. On-call fires are also planned on known or suspected targets.

While considerable emphasis is placed today on mechanized operations, this should not be taken to mean that the dismounted attack is a thing of the past. We can still expect to find requirements for dismounted operations—particularly against well organized positions which must be assaulted in width. We should, therefore, consider briefly the conduct of a dismounted attack by the new battle group. As illustrated in Figure 8, the dismounted battle group frequently attacks with three or more companies in the attacking echelon because of the greater opportunity afforded to exploit the effects of nuclear weapons. The size of the reserve is still considerable, and by attacking with a substantial portion of combat power forward, the possibility of finding and exploiting weak spots, which the detonation of nuclear weapons should create, is increased. While plans for the battle group under non-nuclear warfare conditions called for an attack on a narrow front, with a heavy concentration of force in the zone of the main effort, the use of nuclear weapons permits a sizeable reduction in depth and a corresponding increase in the width of the attack formation. Even though dismounted, the battle group nevertheless strives for rapid closing with the enemy and for maximum dispersion consistent with accomplishment of the mission. The control measures most frequently used include zones of action and objectives. Again, the battle group commander imposes only those measures required to insure that the operation is conducted according to his concept.

As the Army continues its effort to obtain a greater combat capability through evolutionary progress, the Infantry—as the basic arm of close combat—steadily approaches the day when it will have a superior differential of sustained, mobile combat power which is capable of delivery at the decisive point in time and space, under any condition of combat.

The recent changes increase the Infantry's versatility. As an organization, the battle group has great internal flexibility in the formation of subgroupings around its rifle companies. With more facility than ever before, it can detach elements, or accept attachments of direct-fire weapons and other units, to accomplish missions formerly considered beyond its day-to-day capabilities.

This is the first of a series of articles on the employment of the reorganized battle group and its subordinate units. The defensive operations of the battle group will appear in the October-November issue of Infantry.

—Editor.

Lt Col Edwin C. Gibson completed OCS in 1943 and received a Regular Army commission in 1947. He served in Europe during World War II with the 157th Infantry. After the war, he joined the staff of the Mountain and Winter Warfare School. He graduated from the Advanced Course at USAIS in 1949, and then became an instructor at the Army Arctic Indoctrination School. He completed the Regular Course at USACGSC in 1952. Colonel Gibson served in Korea prior to his present assignment with the Infantry School's Command and Staff Department.

Maj E. B. Moore was graduated from OCS in 1943. In 1950, he received a Regular Army commission. During World War II, he served with the 260th Infantry in Europe. After the war, he was assistant adjutant of the Manhattan District and, later, of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. In the Korean War, he was assigned to the 179th Infantry, 45th Division. Major Moore has attended the Associate Advanced and Advanced Courses at the Infantry School, and the Command and General Staff College. He is now studying for the M.A. at Syracuse University.

The Lancers of Simon Bolivar once again patrol the passes of the Andes Mountains. The Lanceros, Colombian counterparts of our Rangers, endure a rugged training course that pays off in large dividends.

MIDNIGHT in the Colombian Andes. A twig snaps. The slight noise brings the aggressor troops—waiting in bunkers strung along the slope—to a quiet alert and they ease into position behind their weapons. A whispered command is passed along: *"Esperen, esperen.* Wait."

Below the line of bunkers a small group of dirty, tired, hungry men crawl slowly up the boulder-strewn mountainside. Their leader, sweating and exhausted, makes an error which exposes his men.

"Fuergo!" The aggressors open fire, their rifles and automatic weapons singing the familiar, discordant song of death, the tempo increasing as men in the flank bunkers pour a crossfire over the rocky ledges. Flares light the area, grenades arch down and bounce among the rocks. Machinegunners scream, *"Que vengan!* Come and get it!" It is the end for the patrol of seven Colombian soldiers.

Then from the darkness an instructor steps forward and takes charge of the hapless patrol. He dismisses the leader who erred, appoints a new commander and once again steps back into the shadows to observe. The patrol, now under new guidance, comes to life and moves on, just as spent and just as dirty as before, but with renewed determination to complete the mission.

This patrol was composed of student *Lanceros,* men striving to earn the badge which marks Colombia's newest, toughest and best-trained junior leaders. As a group, these Colombian soldiers symbolize the rebirth of the old tradition of honor and sacrifice which inspired the lancers of Simon Bolivar. It was his small, elite group of Colombian mountain troops whose lances, arrows and determination opened the passes of the Andes for Bolivar's army of liberation. Now at the *Escuela de Lanceros* situated in the foothills of the Andes near the village of Melgar, modern-day Lancers undergo a grueling 11-week course designed to develop the rugged type of small-unit leader the Colombian Army needs and is determined to have.

By Capt Ralph Puckett, Jr. and Lt John R. Galvin

The School of Lancers was established in 1955 and has a mission almost identical to that of the United States Army Ranger Course at Fort Benning: *To develop to the maximum, by practical field training, the potential for military command and leadership of selected company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers throughout the Army in order to improve the leadership and training capabilities of all units.*

The Colombian Army is especially interested in Ranger-type training because of the problems it has in combatting the large numbers of guerrillas and bandits which operate in the wilder areas of Colombia. Bands of these irregulars have long been a continuing menace to the peace and safety of the Colombian people. Wise in the ways of the mountain and jungle, they are extremely difficult to track down and subdue, and the Colombian Army had been achieving little success in quelling them. Specific training in this special type of operation was clearly necessary, and since small units were normally used to combat the marauders the solution was evident: selected company-grade

Rope work on a sheer-faced cliff calls for both courage and skill.

The student Lancero is hardened physically early in the course.

officers and noncommissioned officers would have to be trained to fight the enemy on his own ground, using his own methods. The *Escuela de Lanceros* does this and does it well. The results obtained in actions against the guerrillas by graduates of the first six classes were outstanding—so much so that the Colombian Army now requires all second lieutenants to attend the school.

The underlying principle of Lancero instruction is that to learn, one must do, and that principle is applied to the maximum. From arrival day to graduation, the student Lancero is required to do, do, do. Significantly, this practical application takes place mainly on terrain similar to that which will be met in guerrilla actions—mountain or jungle.

In addition to the accent on doing, the Lancero candidate is subjected to a heavy, unrelenting pressure, both mental and physical. He lives in an atmosphere of continual observation and supervision. Few of his errors in judgment or knowledge go undetected, for not only is he under the scrutiny of instructors, but he must also withstand the critical eye of his fellow candidates, who are required to rate him. Since competition is so strong among the students for the coveted Lancer Badge, no favors can be expected when the ratings are made out.

The program of instruction for these highly motivated young men is divided into three phases. The first of these phases is very similar in subject matter to the Infantry Officer Leader Course at Fort Benning, but there the similarity ends. As soon as he reports for duty, the Lancero candidate is thrown into a rigorous training program. He works 12 hours every day. There is no holiday schedule. He faces daily examinations to make sure he is keeping up with the instruction and, to add to the pressure, there are exacting daily personal inspections. During this first six-week phase, the student receives extensive instruction and practice in the use of Infantry weapons, map reading, methods of instruction, leadership, small-unit tactics, survival, field expedients, forward observation, physical conditioning, troop-leading procedures and combat formations. The basic knowledge and skills which he learns or brushes up on during these initial weeks are vital to his successful completion of the remaining phases.

Without a pause, the Lancero candidate begins the second phase—a three-week period of field exercises, as much like combat as the use of

Capt Ralph Puckett enlisted into the Army in 1943. He was commissioned upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1949. He commanded the Eighth Army Ranger Company during the Korean War, joining the Ranger Department at Fort Benning in 1951. Subsequently, he became a company executive officer, company commander, battalion S4 and commandant of the NCO Academy with the 296th Infantry and the 65th Infantry in Puerto Rico. After duty as Ranger Advisor with the U.S. Army Mission to Colombia, Captain Puckett was assigned to the staff of the USMA Preparatory School, where he is now Assistant Commandant. He is a graduate of the Infantry School's Advanced Course.

Lt John R. Galvin, who graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1954, served as a platoon leader and NCO Academy instructor with the 65th Infantry in Puerto Rico after completing the Ranger Course in 1955. Beginning in 1956, he served as Ranger Advisor with the U.S. Army Mission to Colombia. In 1958, he was assigned to the 501st Infantry, where he is now a company executive officer.

Confidence tests such as this pulley ride are calculated to inject the fear of death into the training.

Patrol work simulates the actual rough-country combat the Lancero may face soon after graduation.

blank ammunition permits. Every other effect is duplicated: the exhaustion, the anxiety, the back-breaking work, the necessity for split-second, sound decisions—even the fear of death is injected into the training. This last effect is obtained in confidence tests which include a pulley ride on a high wire from a 100-foot cliff out over the Sumapaz River and a leap into the same river from a high suspension bridge.

During this second phase, the patrol is used as the training vehicle. This allows realistic situations to be constructed for small-unit actions and thereby increases the effectiveness of the instruction. Such combat situations are recreated in detail, and change from day to day as they would in actuality. Friendly and enemy positions are occupied by veteran troops from the *Battalion Colombia.* Aggressors, who are led by Lancero School graduates, outnumber the students two to one. Most of the troops used as aggressors have fought against the guerrilla bands of the interior and are able to portray the enemy with great accuracy.

The Lancero candidate participates in seven night patrols against these skilled aggressors. Each patrol has a different mission: reconnaissance of an outpost line, attack of an outpost, reconnaissance and demolition of a bridge, reconnaissance of one supply point and attack of another, and an ambush exercise five miles behind enemy lines. For each patrol all students must write and submit a warning order and a patrol order. One of the students is named as leader of the patrol, but the rest must be alert at all times since no one knows who will be ordered to take command when the leader is "killed." This practical instruction is calculated to teach the Lancero candidate to think clearly in difficult situations and to react well under stress. Also, by working with his comrades in overcoming obstacles that would defeat individuals, the student is impressed with the necessity for teamwork in all operations.

The third phase of the course is similar to the second, except that the eight patrols are conducted over longer distances and more difficult terrain. Each patrol must cross rivers, mountains and areas of dense jungle undergrowth. The distance to the objective usually requires more than one night's travel, the patrol holing-up in the daytime and completing the mission during the second or third night. It is during this phase that the student is taught how to operate effectively against guerrillas. He faces a formidable enemy in the aggressors and cannot overlook a detail, either in planning or in execution, if he wishes to accomplish the mission successfully. All of the cards are stacked against him. He must lead well or fail. After a few patrols he finds himself hating his "enemy" and devising ingenious methods of overcoming or eluding him. To the instructor, this tell-tale reaction serves as one indicator that the training is having its effect.

Like his Ranger counterpart, the Lancero must work hard to complete the challenging and demanding course. He must suffer physical discomfort and he must learn through his own errors. In the end he finds that he has increased his forcefulness and assurance and has developed many important qualities of leadership. Most of all he finds that he is imbued with the *will* to fight and win.

Each year the *Escuela de Lanceros* adds 200 of these well-trained, rugged and aggressive junior leaders to Colombian combat units. Through this program the Colombian Army gains much in effective small-unit leadership, but most important, the example set by the Lancero infuses every combat unit with the spirit of the Lancer.

This feature provides an open forum for discussion of both sides of controversial issues.

COMPETITIVE MARKSMANSHIP

It Pays Off!

By Lt Col Thomas J. Sharpe

THE Army Competitive Marksmanship Program, inaugurated in 1954, is designed to preserve, develop and teach marksmanship, the Infantryman's basic skill. Since that time, it has become an essential part of the preparedness training of today's Army. The program encourages high standards of individual marksmanship. It permits the perfection of firing skills and equipment. It promotes national civilian interest and participation in marksmanship activities, with a view toward increasing total preparedness; trains expert instructors and coaches, both for precision marksmanship and trainee programs; and materially increases the prestige of the Army and the Country by providing consistently excellent representation in competitive shooting at all levels.

The program, however, is not without its critics. They claim, among other things, that Competitive Marksmanship is too expensive. They feel it is too limited, and gives too specialized a knowledge of marksmanship to too few soldiers. They even seem to feel that, in the era of Trainfire, marksmanship is somehow outmoded.

It is true that participation in the Competitive Marksmanship activity that attracts the most attention—high-level matches—is limited to a relatively few individuals. These are the most expert of the experts, and a process of elimination has naturally thinned out their ranks. It is important to note, however, that this thinning-out process represents a wide and continuing means of encouraging marksmanship at all levels. At every echelon of command, from company to division to All-Army, the best marksman earn the right to represent their unit at a higher level. In the latest Third Army match, conducted during the month of April at Fort Benning, 60 individuals participated in the automatic rifle matches, 299 participated in the M-1 rifle matches and 200 participated in the pistol matches, nine-tenths of all of these returning to their units on completion of the matches. Multiply these numbers by the number of army areas and overseas commands, and it is apparent that the direct participation in the Army Competitive Marksmanship Program is by no means restricted to "just a few."

Indirect participation, through "tyro" matches for novices and through instruction by direct participants, is very large. In the spring of 1954, for instance, the 82d Airborne Division sent six of its men, members of the Third Army Rifle and Pistol Team, to the national matches. Upon the return of these six men to their parent organization, an intensive tyro program was organized under their supervision. Six competitions were held during a period of eight months. Approximately 1000 men were given instruction in the rifle or pistol, and 600 fired in tyro matches. A three-week training period preceded each of these monthly matches. Statistics compiled at this time indicate that the improvement in scores was at least 25 percent, and sometimes as high as 50 percent. In addition, the Division went on to supply 15 men to the Third Army Team the following year, 1955. Over 80 percent of the men who participated in the tyro instruction and firing came from the Infantry companies of the Division, and the vast majority of them returned to their units.

The immediate effects of Competitive Marksmanship activities of this kind are impressive. As impressive are the longer range effects. Tyro graduates exert a constant and durable effect not only upon general standards of marksmanship, but upon the quality of marksmanship instruction. They have a desirable influence upon unit *esprit*. And, of course, tyro programs encourage and develop the kind of experts who bring credit upon the Army and the Nation.

Such activities operate on a continuing basis. In May of this year the annual Army Championships were held at Fort Benning. At every level participants underwent training designed to perfect their individual performance as marksmen. Many of them are now applying this knowledge as instructors.

It should be emphasized that the "post-graduate" marksmanship training offered by the Competitive Marks-

Continued on page 26

The Price of the Prizes!

By Capt James R. Semmens

COMPETITION in Small Arms, AR 611–10, outlines the purpose behind the Competitive Marksmanship Program in these words: "Competitions are held for the primary purpose of promoting training interest and raising the standard of performance in the use of individual arms, improving firing techniques and equipment by assembling individuals who excel in the use of small arms, and classifying competitors according to merit after firing under prescribed conditions."

The fact is, however, that this program applies only to a selected few within the Army establishment. It benefits almost no one. It has little effect on the average soldier. And it is notoriously expensive.

With these few points in mind, let's look at the Competitive Marksmanship Program to find out for ourselves whether this "sporting event" has any place in the modern Army.

Early in our national history the average male citizen acquired proficiency in the use of small arms in order to protect himself and his family, and to provide food for his table. As our frontiers disappeared, this national excellence in small-arms marksmanship diminished considerably. Today, outside of the Army the art of shooting is losing its prominence in a growing America. There are a large number of tightly knit shooting clubs, and many Americans hunt for pleasure, but with the development of rural areas and the reduction in the necessity for small-arms proficiency, the vast, unorganized shooting skill which once was part of the American tradition no longer exists. As a consequence, within the Army we should be doing everything in our power to increase the shooting ability of our combat rifleman, because he generally will have only the small-arms background we ourselves give him.

Advocates of the Competitive Marksmanship Program claim that it is an integral part of the over-all marksmanship effort. Nothing is further from the truth. As has been the case in the past and will be the case in the future, only a limited number of military personnel are classified as competitive shooters. These rare birds find themselves a niche in the Army establishment at division, corps, or higher headquarters, and there they perch. The pinnacle of the competitive-shooter pyramid is the United States Army Advanced Marksmanship Unit (USAAMU), presently located at Fort Benning. From year to year, as long as they fire well, the marksmen assigned to the Unit do little more than train in the field of competitive shooting and, occasionally, conduct a limited amount of instruction in coaching and firing. Their main efforts—to which all else is secondary—are directed toward winning the annual national matches at Camp Perry, Ohio. There is an international flavor to this competition, and a great deal of ceremony surrounds it. It is questionable, however, whether the shooters who ably represent the Army in such matches are of much value to the over-all marksmanship program.

To exert a large and continuous effect upon the total program, the competitive shooter should, first of all, be trained under the same marksmanship program used for the remainder of the Army. In the past, when the Army trained all its riflemen under the known-distance system of individual marksmanship training, the competitive shooter's training paralleled that of the combat rifleman up to a point. Because of this, the competitive shooter who returned to a unit was able to impart some aspects of his specialized knowledge to the ordinary rifleman he left behind. However, with the adoption of Trainfire I as the standard marksmanship program for the Army, the competitive shooter loses a large part of his value as an instructor. He is not a combat marksman, and because Trainfire I and Competitive Marksmanship training have little in common, has a specialized knowledge of techniques which apply only to known-distance firing.

Second, the competitive shooter must also be a *trained instructor.* The mere fact that a competitive shooter is himself an excellent marksman does not qualify him as an instructor in marksmanship. Admittedly, it is better if an instructor in small arms has a thorough knowledge of external ballistics, the use of optical instruments, coaching and similar information, but this knowledge is secondary to the ability to present basic instructional material in a logical, understandable and interesting manner.

During the conduct of the Small Arms Firing School held in conjunction with the national matches at Camp Perry in 1958, personnel of the USAAMU acted in the capacity of assistant instructors. Some of these men were unfamiliar with the nomenclature of certain parts of the M1 rifle. Obviously these individuals—however well they may represent us in high-level matches—are not equipped to teach trainees such basic information as rifle assembly and disassembly.

Third, the competitive shooter must be made available to a unit during the period that unit is undergoing marksmanship training, and must be placed in a position from which he can influence the ordinary trainee. All too often, competitive shooters cannot be made consistently available during such periods of training because of match commitments or their own training requirements. In addition, many competitive shooters are now acting in capacities which preclude their being used as marksmanship instructors.

Continued on page 27

COMPETITIVE MARKSMANSHIP
It Pays Off! *continued*

manship Program represents the only organized opportunity for exceeding customary unit standards of rifle skill, and thereby creates a general upward pressure upon these standards.

Those who participate in the training discover through proper instruction that private "trade secrets" are largely figments of overactive imaginations. The only secret of good shooting is the application of three basic principles: (1) obtain the steadiest possible position within the time allotted; (2) align the sights correctly on the target; and (3) squeeze or press the trigger without disturbing this sight alignment. Regardless of the target—man, deer, Trainfire silhouette or bull's-eye—these fundamentals must be practiced in order to hit the target. Special equipment used by competitive marksmen, whether spotting scopes or shooting jackets or match-grade ammunition and weapons, has a training-aid function, and marksmanship is by no means dependent upon such equipment. Techniques of marksmanship are as essential to the combat rifleman on the battlefield as to the expert on the range.

Much has been said about the record left by the 44 men of the Advanced Marksmanship Unit at Benning who fired the Trainfire Course last November and December in an effort to obtain information on the relationship between Trainfire and expert marksmanship. Thirty-nine riflemen and five pistol experts were assigned this job. They were unfamiliar with the course and some of the silhouettes were heavily camouflaged. Despite these conditions, the most impressive fact which emerged from the test was that in the initial firing of the course, the overwhelming majority of the targets "missed" *were not fired at because they were not seen.*

After additional instruction, consisting primarily of target detection, these same 44 shooters fired again, 36 of them scoring Expert and eight Sharpshooter. Actually, these marksmen are specialists at marksmanship, not target detection. There is no question, of course, that target detection is an essential element of the general marksmanship program, particularly in the final training stages, before combat firing exercises for the squad and platoon. But without proper basic marksmanship, no soldier will be able to hit his target, regardless of how well he may see it.

The three principles of basic marksmanship apply just as much to Trainfire as to any other kind of firing. If the individual soldier is not well-grounded in these fundamentals, the Trainfire methods may very well be less successful than known-distance methods which are properly taught.

SO FAR I have stressed the broad participation of the Competitive Marksmanship Program, and the great importance of rifle marksmanship. I have mentioned the effect of the program upon all levels of marksmanship instruction. This subject deserves more attention.

For some years, instead of employing expert coaches on our basic training ranges, we let two recruits, one as much of a novice as his partner, "coach" each other. Anyone who knows marksmanship realizes that 90 percent or more of the recruits make exactly the same errors the first few rounds they fire. These errors must be detected and corrected by a competent, trained coach when they occur. If not corrected on the spot, they become habitual, and the rifleman must be retrained if he is ever to achieve any degree of accuracy. Too often assistant instructors stand aloof while a student shoots miss after miss, despite the "instruction" he is getting from the student-coach. The assistant instructor, as he is presently employed by the Weapons Department of the Infantry School, is no instructor at all, but has only the functions of a control NCO. We need real coaches, not "assistant instructors," whose well-shined helmet liners and glossy boots give an appearance of instructional efficiency where such efficiency is very much lacking.

The pupil-and-pupil method still in use at the moment on known-distance ranges has recently been superseded by new directives. Training centers are now required to have at least one trained coach per four students on the firing line during all marksmanship training. Other units must have one trained coach for each student. This is a sound policy and should produce a definite improvement in the quality of marksmanship training.

A large responsibility rests with the coach, both in precision marksmanship and basic instruction. He should be an expert marksman who knows the fine points and has had considerable experience in marksmanship. He must be willing to get down with the student on the firing line. Men who have been through the Competitive Marksmanship Program are ideally suited to teach precision marksmanship, and, particularly, to provide trainees with the expert individual coaching which has distinguished the best combat marksmanship training of the past. Many of these experts have received general instructor training, and specific Trainfire I instructor training might easily be provided. In the latter case, they could be well employed in Trainfire I's preparatory marksmanship training, and in the Trainfire I "corrective platoons" which provide remedial instruction to selected trainees. Most trainees need remedial instruction to bring them up to Expert level.

Continued on page 66

Lt Col Thomas J. Sharpe received a reserve commission in 1940, and in 1941 an RA commission. During World War II, he served as executive officer of G3 in Headquarters, III Corps, in Europe. After the war, he was S2 for the 14th Armored Cavalry of the U. S. Constabulary. In Korea he commanded the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry. Later Colonel Sharpe served in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. A graduate of USACGSC, he now commands the USAAMU.

The Price of the Prizes!

continued

Capt James R. Semmens was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1951. He served as platoon leader with the 112th Infantry, 28th Division, until 1954. After completing the Advanced Course, he was assigned to the Infantry School's Weapons Department as a team chief on the Rifle Committee. Early this year he transferred to the Corps of Engineers and will soon receive a Korean assignment. This is the second article Captain Semmens has contributed to *Infantry*.

Fourth, a sufficiently large number of these competitive shooters must be returned to units to supervise rifle marksmanship training. Under present policy, approximately one third of the members of the USAAMU return to units annually. This policy varies with respect to other marksmanship organizations. The number of competitive shooters returning to units is therefore so small that their effect on the over-all program is rarely felt.

ONE OF the missions of the Competitive Marksmanship Program is to provide training interest. The program does this, but only for the select few who actually qualify as competitive shooters. For the rest of the riflemen who are permanently assigned to a TOE outfit, it has no effect. Once the competitive shooter reaches a division-or-higher match, he disappears from view on these lofty heights. He is, in effect, lost to his unit, and his buddies forget about him. Marksmanship interest as a whole is not encouraged by the isolated fact that one or two men from a unit are capable of shooting well enough to be classified as competitive shooters. Even if these men do return to their unit, without constant practice their prowess soon becomes only a memory.

The fact is that the Competitive Marksmanship Program raises the standards of performance in the use of individual arms only among the marksmen themselves. The vast majority of riflemen continue their normal training and fire their weapons for annual qualification only.

We have said that in order to exert a favorable influence upon the ordinary combat rifleman, the competitive shooter should be trained in combat firing. He should be able to fire his weapon under all conditions with the accuracy upon which his reputation rests.

However, when members of the USAAMU at Fort Benning fired on the realistic new Trainfire I marksmanship course, they scored lower than an Officer Candiate School class which fired under similar conditions. On November 10 and 12, 1958, candidates from OCS Class #2 fired on the Benning Trainfire I Record Firing Range after receiving 51 hours of instruction under the Trainfire I individual marksmanship training program, the standard course presented to both Officer Candiate School and Trainfire Instructor Course classes. On November 14 and 15, 1958, marksmen from the USAAMU fired the same record course, without the benefit of Trainfire I's modern combat training, but with many years of experience in the field of competitive shooting. The members of the USAAMU used match-grade weapons, match ammunition, and a 300-yard battlesight zero (which corresponds very closely to the 250-meter battlesight zero used by the OCS students). A comparison of firing results—which matched scores man for man, order for order, firing point for firing point, and time of firing for time of firing—gives the following results:

Record Firing I (p.m.)

	OCS	AMU
Av. Hits	32.22	31.30
Av. Misses	17.91	15.37
Av. No-Fires	5.85	9.35

Record Firing II (a.m.)

	OCS	AMU
Av. Hits	28.24	24.00
Av. Misses	19.61	19.24
Av. No-Fires	8.25	12.80

The qualification results for both groups are equally revealing.

	OCS	AMU
EXPERT	10	8
SHARPSHOOTER	29	20
MARKSMAN	6	17
BOLO	1	1

Lighting and weather conditions for the days when the two groups fired were not significantly different, with the exception that during the USAAMU's second record firing there was a slight wind of approximately eight miles per hour.

Later, the USAAMU group received the same Trainfire instruction, including target detection, as had the OCS company. With this background, USAAMU tried again and this time fired much more effectively. If soldiers trained under the standard Trainfire I course of individual marksmanship training (only 51 hours) can outshoot some of the best men in the competitive shooting business, then it seems doubtful that any material benefit could be derived from instruction by competitive shooters.

How does the Competitive Marksmanship Program improve firing techniques? The few men engaged in this program possess their own trade secrets which are not as a rule passed on to the average combat rifleman, and many times are of no use under combat conditions. The combat rifleman cannot fire match-grade weapons with match-grade ammunition. He does not have a spotting scope, shooting jacket, or shooting glove. He has to fire under combat conditions in a combat uniform, with an issue rifle and issue ammunition. The techniques of rifle marksmanship which evolve from competitive shooting are rarely, if ever, applicable to the combat rifleman.

Marksmanship techniques which cannot be employed on the battlefield are of no use to the Army. We need soldiers, not merely marksmen —and there's a large difference between the two.

PERHAPS the program might still be tolerated if it were kept within

Continued on page 67



Civil Affairs

What It Means to the Battle Group

By Col Karl S. Landstrom

MOST Infantrymen have a general knowledge of the support provided by Civil Affairs units. From past experience and from schooling, they know that Civil Affairs supports military operations and deals with the relationship between military and civil activities in an area where military forces are present. However, many individuals think of CA as an agency that operates at high echelons—in the communication zone or other rear areas. Few fully understand or appreciate the support which Civil Affairs units can give in the combat zone, down to and including the battle group.

The battle group, now the basic tactical unit of the Army, must be capable of operating with substantial gaps between groups on a battlefield of ever-increasing width and depth. Against an enemy who can use nuclear weapons, airborne and air-landed troops, infiltrators and guerrillas, the battle group must be able to maintain an all-around defense and to establish defensive areas in great depth. Reserve battle groups must often provide division rear-area secur-

CA support of combat operations can free the battle group for combat, while increasing security, collecting intelligence and making use of civilian manpower and materiel.

ity and such security elements must be particularly alert. To successfully accomplish its missions under these conditions, the battle group requires the support of Civil Affairs units.

There are a number of factors which indicate that the battle group needs this support. One of these is the increasing number of civilians and civilian activities which can be expected in the battle group zone or sector of operations. Others are the greater number of injured and helpless civilians who will require medical or other aid, the increased movement of civilians which will be necessitated by the use of nuclear weapons, the greater widths and depths of battle group zones of attack or sectors of defense, and a lesser degree of division control over the details of battle group operations.

CA Operations

The basic objectives of CA operations are: to support military operations; to fulfill obligations arising from treaties, agreements or international law; to support and implement national policies; and to provide for the transfer of responsibility from the military commander to a designated agency of civil government.

The theater commander is responsible for all Civil Affairs activities in the theater. However, CA authority is often delegated to division commanders.

Since battle groups conform to the CA policies and procedures of the division and higher commands, CA units within a division area will support the division commander's combat mission. They will do this by assisting the commander to control and to handle relationships with civilians, refugees and displaced persons; by assisting the technical services to secure labor and supplies; and by furthering our national policies.

CA activities (based on previously prepared plans) should begin as soon as the battle group moves into a new area, and should be carried out concurrently with other activities. Ordinarily, CA activities will consist of measures taken to control civilian affairs in the area. The proper handling of civilian problems will often mean the difference between success and failure of a combat mission. Furthermore, effective civilian control and the resulting cooperation can insure sizeable savings in men and time. Contrary to antiquated concepts of the functions of CA in combat, only those functions essential to the accomplishment of the combat mission are performed.

CA units are trained and prepared to assist the battle group under a wide variety of conditions which may affect its operations. Specifically, the units are trained to help with the control, or if necessary, with the evacuation, of large numbers of refugees or displaced persons who would interfere with troop movements, resupply or combat operations, either in progress or proposed. They can assist when the battle group faces unfavorable governmental conditions such as a breakdown of civil administration, disorganized public safety, civil disturbances or a lack of civilian medical care. They can help when combat operations are affected by unfavorable civil economic conditions such as a lack of food or shelter, and when public facilities such as water or sanitation are disrupted. And they can assist when emergency supplies are needed for civilian consumption, or when civilian labor or supplies are required for military use.

Of these functions, the control of civilians is probably the most important to the battle group commander. It was demonstrated in Korea that refugees, when left unchecked, clog MSRs, interfere with the movement of troops and generally play havoc

When necessary, CA evacuates civilians out of the battle zone. This wounded Alsatian woman and her baby were moved to a place of safety by a CA unit in World War II.

Cooperating with civilian relief organizations, CA fulfills the commander's responsibility under international law. Here, townspeople of Argancy, France, line up for "chow."

with an operation. Preventing such situations is not a difficult task for Civil Affairs units. These units are specially trained to carry out the combat commander's responsibility under international law or agreement for the care and control of refugees and displaced persons. Under CA supervision, such persons are cared for through civilian relief and welfare organizations.

Public safety is another essential function of CA in support of combat operations. As used here, public safety includes police protection, fire fighting, civil defense and traffic control. CA doctrine calls for existing civilian public-safety organizations to be used to the maximum, thus effecting tremendous savings in military manpower.

A special Rockefeller Brothers Fund report on international affairs concludes that "civil defense must be a part of our over-all strategic posture." In a foreign theater of operations, civil defense of the local population becomes a matter of military necessity, and with the appearance of mass-destruction weapons on the battlefield, it becomes a major one. The CA officer and his unit are best suited to relieve the troop commander of many of these time-consuming activities. Also, in this connection, the CA officer is a valuable man to consult if it becomes necessary to plan for the use of nuclear fires in heavily populated areas.

CA units supervise and assist civilian health services to protect the health of the civilians and in turn the health of troops in the area. And, in cooperation with signal and transportation agencies at all echelons, CA aids the military commander in the use of the civilian communication and transportation systems.

Every Infantryman knows how extremely important combat intelligence is to the battle group commander. CA officers work closely with military intelligence, counterintelligence and psychological warfare agencies, and the CA platoon, through its close contacts with civilians in the area, is an excellent source of information. Information can often be provided which is unavailable from other sources.

CA Staffs and Units

CA staff functions are performed at all levels of command. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, who will be provided to the division on an augmentation basis, advises and assists the division commander in all GA matters. Although there should be a CA staff officer in the battle group, none is provided in the present organization. Consequently, the S3[1] has been given primary staff responsibility for the Civil Affairs activities in this unit.

The CA units which support the combat units consist of CA platoons, companies and groups. These units are formed from TOE cellular units and may be changed as required. The cellular units are combat trained and specialist qualified.

The platoon is the smallest CA unit capable of administrative and command functions. The platoon consists only of a platoon commander, administrative officer, platoon sergeant, public safety supervisor and two clerk-typists. However, it is designed as a nucleus around which a larger, more versatile unit may be formed by the addition of service and/or functional teams from TOE 41–500D and 29–500D.

In the past, one or more CA platoons have been attached to, or placed in support of, a division. One platoon normally moves with the division. If another is required and is

[1] The United States Army Infantry School now teaches that the S1 of the battle group is responsible for Civil Affairs. While FM 41-15 states that the G3 will handle this function at division level, the Infantry School feels that this is an error brought about by the increasing importance of Civil Affairs to operations in peacetime. Draft FM 101-5, recently reviewed by the Infantry School, establishes operational groupments in which the G1, G4 and G5 work at one CP and the G2 and G3 at another. This appears to bear out the School's feeling that at echelons in which a G5 section is not established, the G1 (S1) should have Civil Affairs responsibility.

[2] See Footnote 1, above.

available from corps, it may be further attached to, or placed in support of, a battle group. In this role it may be used during combat operations to supervise recurring tasks such as controlling or relocating civilians, collecting refugees and posting curfew proclamations, or to assist in any other required relationship with the civilian population.

When a platoon supports a battle group, the platoon commander functions under the supervision of the S3[2] but he must coordinate with S1 regarding civilians, with S2 concerning intelligence and with S4 for supply and evacuation matters.

Future Doctrine and Support

Doctrine for CA support was formulated before the adoption of our present pentomic organizations and our current tactical concepts for fluid, highly mobile warfare. Nevertheless, the employment of CA platoons in recent field exercises has indicated that CA doctrine and policies are still basically sound. Only minor adjustments may be required to insure adequate CA support.

Potentially, each of the five battle groups in the division needs CA support. It is unlikely, however, that all five battle groups would require the direct support or attachment of a CA platoon simultaneously. Therefore, to preserve flexibility, CA platoons undoubtedly will be held at division or higher level for employment on a priority basis at battle group or comparable level when the need arises.

When the battle group operates in a sparsely populated area, when its zone or sector is narrow or shallow, or when its operations are under close division control, CA support probably will stem indirectly from that given to the division as a whole. However, when it operates in densely populated areas, when its zone or sector is wide or deep, or when it operates independently, direct CA support should be given to the battle group.

Attachment of a small composite CA unit to combined-arms task forces would also appear to be particularly desirable in view of the independent missions which can be anticipated for such units.

Manilla, 1945. Civilian control is among the most important functions CA performs for the battle group. It promotes security and freedom of military movement and action.

Several methods of providing continuing and effective CA support at battle group level have been proposed. These include the temporary detail of two or three men from the platoon supporting the division, a continuous attachment of one or two men from any available source during a current campaign, or the formation of a new unit tailored to support the battle group. Each of these proposals would appear to have some merit. However, when tested in field exercises, the temporary detail of a few men to a battle group from the division's CA platoon was unsuccessful. The personnel detailed were not sufficiently acquainted with the immediate situation of the battle group and their loss to the platoon greatly reduced its ability to perform its primary mission of providing overall support for the division.

The attachment of CA advisors to battle groups was also tried and found to be satisfactory only where operations were relatively simple. This cannot be considered a permanent solution to the support problem.

While no CA units specifically

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CA utilizes local authorities like this Burgermeister to perform a wide variety of administrative and control functions.

designed for battle group support have yet been authorized or tested, this would seem to be a fruitful field for thought and experimentation.

Another means of support for the battle group might be to provide a self-sufficient unit consisting of a CA officer (MOS 8104) and a combination driver-clerk. Specialist personnel in the form of functional teams could then be made available as needed, in the same manner as is now prescribed for larger CA units.

Relationship to Supported Units

The personnel of CA platoons must be combat trained and must possess the highest character and integrity. Both the combat commander and the Nation depend upon them to implement our national policies with reference to civilians in the areas of our operations. They lay the foundation stones upon which our future relationships with the combatant nation rest. They are the commander's primary contact with civilian leaders and the government.

The relationship between the CA unit and the supported combat unit must be close and constant. A sense of cooperation and teamwork must prevail. This can best be developed by the continued attachment of the same CA unit. The personal actions of the combat commander and his troops, as well as those of CA personnel, shape our relationship with the civilian population. The inhabitants of an area closely watch the actions of our troops. In this vital field, the CA unit is our best means of achieving effective contact between the commander and the civilian community.

In both offensive and defensive actions, the battle group can be aided by a favorable attitude among the civilians in its area. Such an attitude will not occur by chance, but must be developed by planning and hard work on the part of the CA officer and his unit. It will require the strong and willing backing of the CA officer by the combat commander.

In some situations, with CA assistance the local area can provide needed facilities, labor, equipment and supplies. And, where conditions permit, local labor sources can often be used for engineer tasks such as repair of roads, bridges or communication systems.

Training for CA Support

Active Army CA units (a part of STRAC), are trained at Fort Gordon, Georgia, where much of the instruction is directed toward the handling and control of displaced persons and refugees. All of the instruction stresses that the primary purpose of CA is to support the combat commander during military operations and that, while occupational duties are important, the first consideration must be winning the war.

Practical aspects of CA activities are taught at the Army War College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Command and General Staff College and at the United States Army Infantry School and other branch schools. Participation in Army maneuvers, CPXs and logistical exercises provides valuable CA training and orientation for both active Army CA units and combat units.

The CA groups and companies of the USAR receive training in CA support of the division. Field training exercises provide the vehicle for this instruction. Under consideration for the future is the attachment of CA companies to National Guard and USAR divisions for annual unit training. Such attachments would add realism to the training of CA units and permit the further familiarization of division and battle group personnel with their responsibilities for Civil Affairs. From such experience the CA support of the Infantry battle group may be further developed.

Civil Affairs is not a new field in our Army. Actually, it is as old as warfare itself. But the importance of its function is not always recognized or understood by the combat commander—particularly at battle group level.

Trained CA units are ready to perform their mission. It is important that you learn to use them now. You will need them in your future combat operations.

Our country calls not for the life of ease, but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease, and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by and will win for themselves the domination of the world. Let us therefore boldly face the life of strife, resolute to do our duty well and manfully; resolute to uphold righteousness by deed and word; resolute to be both honest and brave, to serve high ideals, yet to use practical methods.

President Theodore Roosevelt

Regardless of the sophisticated weapons systems and the varied mobility of the modern army, the ultimate role of the ground combat soldier is to close with the enemy in the . . .

ASSAULT!

By Maj Thomas H. Jones

THE ultimate test, the final challenge of the soldier in combat is the assault. It has been thus throughout military history, though techniques have changed considerably. The ancient Greeks assaulted with the phalanx, a compact body sixteen men deep and armed with 21-foot pikes. The Roman legion employed three lines of maniples, or companies, with combat-tested veterans in the last line because it took men of proven courage to join the fight after observing the slaughter which occurred in the first and second maniples. Gustafus Adolphus wisely incorporated the musket into tactical formations, employing six ranks of musketeers, which closed into three to fire.

As the range and power of weapons have increased, assault formations accordingly have become more widely dispersed. Killing has been done at greater and greater distances with more and more effectiveness. Certainly hand-to-hand combat in ancient days produced fantastic numbers of casualties, but this was due principally to merciless pursuit and the lack of fires to cover withdrawal. In the battle of Cynoscephalae, the Romans under Flaminius suffered seven hundred killed; the opposing army of Philip of Macedon lost eighty thousand. Marius, after the

battle of Aix, surprised the Teutons from behind, killing one hundred thousand and losing only three hundred. At Cannae it was the Romans' turn to die. Hannibal virtually annihilated a splendid Roman army of eighty-seven thousand men, while losing barely six thousand.

However, the proportionately fewer casualties of close combat in modern times does not lessen the conclusiveness or importance of the assault. This critical phase of the attack will always represent the final, decisive act in accomplishing the mission of armed forces—the destruction of the enemy and the seizure of the ground he holds.

Nor is the dismounted assault likely to become obsolete. As Army Chief of Staff, Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer states, "It is true that the Infantryman no longer walks everywhere he goes, but even in this age of wheels and tracks we must rely in the last analysis on the individual mobility of the foot soldier."[1]

Demands on the assaulting soldier are greater today than ever. When men fought shoulder to shoulder, rank behind rank, they sustained, encouraged and supported one another. But as the man and the unit stand more and more isolated amidst the confusion, complexity and horror of battle, the test of courage and character becomes greater.

All footnotes will be found at the end of this article.

War of 1812. Assaults were massed formations.

For all its importance, the assault is probably the least understood of all the phases of attack. A sense of order and system pervades the mind when we think of assembly areas, attack positions, supporting fires and maneuver. Even in fluid operations, when minimum control measures are used and mission-type orders are issued, it is easy to see an orderly pattern of operations.

But the assault is something different. Maneuver during the assault consists of moving straight into the face of a very real and personal foe. Orders are simple: close with and destroy the enemy! Even combat-experienced soldiers are wary—no matter how often they go through it—for the infinite combinations of the enemy, the positions he occupies and the ground he holds determine the nature of each engagement.

It is difficult if not impossible to present a real concept of the assault to men who have never participated in one, for the true feeling, the violent mental impact of the assault, comes only by personal experience in combat. However, in an effort to visualize the assault more clearly, we shall look at what soldiers who have experienced this phase of combat have to say about it. Men who have survived the assault describe it thus:

"When daylight came the men moved out, Lieutenant Wilson out in front, leading. Near the objective an enemy bullet struck his arm, knocking him to the ground. He got up and went on. Another bullet struck him in the arm or chest.

" 'That one bit,' he said, continuing. A second or two later, an-

Maj Thomas H. Jones, author of "Pentomic Company in the Defense" and "Letter to a Troubled Lieutenant," enlisted in the Army in 1943 and was an intelligence scout with the 78th Infantry Division in Europe during World War II. He received an OCS commission in 1945 and was assigned to an AAA battery at Fort Bliss. Later he served as a company commander with the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood. He was then assigned as a platoon leader and company commander with the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea, and in 1953 became a member of the G3 Section of OCAFF. After completing the Advanced Course at USAIS, he joined the Military Advisory Group to Saudi Arabia. He attended the Army Language School and, later, after a tour as an instructor in the Tactical Department of the Infantry School, the Command and General Staff College. Major Jones, a frequent contributor to *Infantry*, is now serving with the Joint United States-Brazil Military Commission.

other bullet struck him in the forehead and killed him.

"Sgt Fred Sugua took charge and was in turn killed within a few minutes. Eventually, the remaining men succeeded in driving the Chinese out of the perimeter."[2]

"On plodded the Infantry—many of them half dazed by the concussion of the German counter-barrage which had already blown many gaps in the lines and left hundreds of limp bodies strewn along the way, some with helmets bashed through the skulls, some doubled up, with blood still dripping from their ears and mouths."[3]

"Our battalion fixes bayonets and charges. Through the tall grass run trip wires. With our own feet we set off thousands of mines—legs and arms turning over in the air and flopping heavily beside us. Terrified shrieking men—running to the rear—one legless man going hand over hand through the tall grass—are there any normal minds left?"[4]

"All my squad leaders were either on line or in front of their men. The wounded were either crawling down the hill, or firing from the position where they had fallen. The walking wounded, of their own accord, continued to attack. Some men were hit as many as three times before they left the hill."[5]

Yes, the assault is a dangerous business and one which we must thoroughly understand—both to minimize danger and to maximize success. For if the assault fails, all has failed.

Our basic assault techniques are not particularly controversial. We strive to deploy fully at the last possible moment, when enemy dispositions are sufficiently clear to allow our assaulting troops to concentrate their full firepower on the enemy. Normally we move into the assault in a line of skirmishers. The distance between men is wide enough to avoid presenting a good target, but close enough to permit the concentration of all their firepower. We strive to follow supporting fires closely—even at the risk of a few casualties—for this contributes to success and in the long run results in fewer killed or wounded. If at all possible, we avoid movement by rushes or by creeping and crawling. Though moving in this manner may sometimes be necessary or desirable, more often it causes our assault to lose momentum, for the earth feels good and there is reluctance to leave its protection when enemy shells await.

We recognize the need for constant fire by an assaulting unit, and we teach battle drill for use when a stubborn enemy position defies supporting and assaulting fires. However, our basic aim is to get the men to move and keep moving until the enemy position is ours and its occupants have been killed or captured. But even the best conceived and conducted assault is doomed unless the higher commander gives it a reasonable chance of success through the proper application of supporting fires, the exploitation of enemy weakness and commitment of adequate assault strength.

While the assault is not as thoroughly covered in military literature as the strategy and tactics which lead to it, nevertheless there are sufficient examples to demonstrate the salient principles and techniques which produce success and the errors which result in failure. Let's examine a few statements which soldiers of the past have made about the assault and discuss some of the lessons they illustrate:

"He got his soldiers across the canal and formed them into two ranks in the murk of the fading day, and it seemed to him that the only possible chance was to keep going without a halt. If his men ever stopped to fire, they were lost. . . . He issued his orders accordingly, his rookies fixed bayonets and forward they went. As they came up through all the human debris of all the previous charges the unwounded men on the ground reached up and tried to hold them back, telling them it was no use to go on. . . . Just then a great sweep of fire lit up the entire

Civil War. Shoulder to shoulder assaults were still massed . . . and bloody.

Spanish American War. Automatic fire first supported the assault.

length of the stone wall (the defenders' position) and farther up the hill and far off to the right and left there were incessant quick flashes from the rebel cannon, and the staff officer was shot down and so was nearly half the division. The men staggered to a halt—as close to the wall . . . as anyone got that day, and it simply was not in them or in any men to get any closer!"[6]

The commander who ordered successive assaults against such a position blundered, but let us not be too hard on him. It is an easy matter to review results and criticize. It is a far different matter to be in the field and know that *one more*, and then *just one more* assault will carry the enemy position and justify the dead from so many attempts. The really great commanders, and there are few, are those whose judgment correctly indicates when to stop and try something else, and when to continue.

This example points out the necessity for continuous movement, for even though the last assault failed, it came closer to success than the previous tries against the Confederate-held stone wall. In former attempts the troops had stopped to fire, and they were torn to bits as they did so. It is also clear in this case that supporting fires were insufficient to weaken the enemy. Consequently the assaulting units faced an insurmountable preponderance of force.

A report of a Korean War action provides a more recent example of the need to keep moving and keep shooting.

"The company assaulted at a steady walk, firing continually. Every time a Chinese soldier would lift his head he would be immediately hit, so heavy and accurate was the assault fire. Lieutenant Hagan said that 'our people were being hit all the way' as they marched through the enemy mortar impact area, but the assaulters continued without pause, realizing that to halt would be suicidal. The only hope for success was to press the attack, and this the company resolutely did."[7]

* * *

When the strength of our assault causes the enemy to panic and run from his position, it may be profitable to continue the assault beyond the objective.

"The action was extremely hot for between one and two hours; the flanking parties had carried their points with great ease, when the front pressed on their breastwork with an ardor and a patience beyond expectation. . . . The fire was so extremely hot . . . that the enemy at once deserted their covers and ran; and in about five minutes their whole camp was in the utmost confusion and disorder, all their battalions were broken in pieces and fled most precipitately; at which instant our whole army pressed after with redoubled ardor, pursued them for a mile, made considerable slaughter among them, and took many prisoners."[8]

This account of the Battle of Bennington in our Revolutionary War portrays the value of unhesitating and relentless pursuit, of rapid continuation of the assault until the enemy is destroyed or the direct limit of advance is reached. To give the foe respite, to allow him to live to kill some other day, is senseless.

* * *

"The valley was soon alive with a multitude of cheering, struggling men advancing in the face of terrific volleys, some halting to fire, some rushing forward, all with eyes intently fixed upon the Spanish blockhouse and entrenchments crowning San Juan Hill."[9]

Here we see movement *and* fire by assaulting troops. Our own fire must cause enemy fire to be ineffective. The volume and accuracy of our fire are all-important. Skill in delivery of assault fire, and rapid changing of clips and magazines, are imperative. Somewhat as an aside, let us beware of glorified accounts of assault describing "cheering men . . . rushing forward, all with eyes intently fixed upon the Spanish blockhouse." Men move forward basically because of discipline or pride, or because it's as good a direction to move in as any. Of course, their eyes should be fixed on their specific objective.

* * *

"All the way up the hill, rifle grenadiers of the first and third platoons fired grenades at the German machinegun positions. . . . The riflemen also opened up, and the Germans replied with hand grenades and machinegun fire. Unable to see specific targets, the men of Company C directed area fire at the crest. When Company C reached the top of Hill 109 . . . the enemy withdrew down the northeast slope."[10]

Often, assaulting troops will experience difficulty in locating definite targets. Inexperienced men tend to withhold fire under these circumstances—usually a fatal mistake. Each man must deliver steady fire at likely enemy positions, or even at completely unsuspicious ground in the area of advance. Provided fire is continuous, the enemy often won't know whether you see him or not, and he will either stay down or fire hurriedly and inaccurately.

☼ ☼ ☼

"The flamethrower teams and Mallard's third platoon moved out at once. An enemy bullet pierced the pressure tank on one flamethrower, making it useless. The other two operators, however, succeeded in reaching the area controlled by North Korean grenadiers. Crawling almost to the crest of the ridge, the two operators pointed the flamethrower nozzles up and discharged the tanks so that the burning jelly fell on the reverse slope of the ridge, forcing the enemy out."[11]

Flamethrowers are invaluable weapons in the assault, particularly against a well dug-in enemy.[12] Need must be anticipated, and operators and flamethrowers must be readied for commitment. In this example, an unusual technique of indirect flamethrower fire was used—but it worked.

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Another frequently useful item in the assault is the grenade.

"The lieutenant hurled a grenade at the emplacement. A Red soldier attempted to pick it up to throw it back when a squad leader killed him. Another grenade silenced the weapon . . . . During this assault, the CCF laid down a mortar barrage and opened up with a shower of hand grenades from the reverse slope . . . . The Americans countered with a grenade barrage of their own. The platoon tossed all the grenades they carried, and when the supply was exhausted others were taken from the enemy dead."[13]

"The riflemen were now doing the job that only they could do—closing with the enemy, destroying him by personal encounter. They had all been well supplied with grenades. Companies A and C were now into the edges of their first objectives and were using white phosphorus and fragmentation grenades in the trenches and pillboxes. The Chinese resisted stubbornly and gave no breathing space to the riflemen. If fire was stopped on any embrasure, either a grenade came out or a weapon appeared and opened fire."[14]

"The squads, throwing grenades into the bunker, killed eleven Chinese, checked the bunker, then moved past it. . . . The trenches joined another bunker about fifteen yards away. The two squads began throwing grenades at the second bunker. At this point, the third squad maneuvered to the rear of the bunker. The enemy tried to get out the rear exit, but seeing the men on guard, dove back inside. Lieutenant Johnson killed them with a grenade thrown into the bunker."[15]

The last example points up the advantages of envelopment, where this is possible. The assault line must frequently break down into small teams, usually squads, each cracking a stubborn point in the enemy defense.

Also to be considered is the use of improvised explosive charges in assaults against bunker-fortified areas. Satchel charges, pole charges, "beehives" and other similar devices may be used to good effect.

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"Throughout past operations, the tank unit commanders complained that the Infantry units would not permit the tanks to fire as close to the attacking Infantry as the tank

World War I. Assaults followed the linear pattern of the past.

commander would have liked. . . . When the tanks were forced to lift their fires, they sat helplessly and watched friendly Infantry receive machinegun and grenade casualties from enemy positions which could have been taken under tank fire at no danger to friendly Infantry."[16]

Obviously, the lesson here is to get as much help as possible for the longest possible time. Recoilless rifles as well as tanks can fire with great accuracy only a few yards forward of assaulting troops. One man in each assaulting platoon could have a colored marking panel on his back, so the position of friendly troops would be clearly visible to supporting tanks and other weapons. Also, colored smoke grenades can be used to mark areas where tank and other direct supporting fire is desired.

☼ ☼ ☼

"As the men investigated the enemy trench, Eakes saw a Chinese soldier lying on his back, his eyes closed, his hands grasping an automatic rifle.

" 'Is he dead?' Eakes said.

" 'Yeah, he's dead,' Conway said.

"The Chinese started to sit up, made a move to fire.

" 'He isn't dead,' Eakes said and shot him."[17]

This trick is as old as warfare itself. Be suspicious of a "dead" body, and if in doubt, hit it with another round.

☼ ☼ ☼

Sometimes things happen which make the assault go easier.

"McClenaghan, seeing a Chinese stick his head out of the bunker, had a ROK soldier coax the enemy out. Eight came out and surrendered and were joined by four from another position. Had they desired to do so, they could have defended for a long time."[18]

In another case a company had the job of cracking bunkers of the German Siegfried Line. Tiring of this casualty-producing task, a persuasive German-speaking American soldier picked up a captured phone and spoke to the troops in the unassaulted bunkers. He succeeded in convincing some of them that it was stupid to defend a lost cause, and they surrendered.

But in most cases the enemy can't be convinced. He has to be killed.

☼ ☼ ☼

Perhaps the most important principle is one which has not been directly demonstrated but which pervades all the examples cited. It is simply this—*the contest between the assaulter and the defender is as much—if not more—a clash of wills as a clash of arms.* No great secret, perhaps, but a point that must be driven and driven hard into the mind of the Infantry soldier.

Will and superiority of spirit are vital factors in close combat. We have seen the great disparity in casualties between victor and vanquished in the ancient battles. This occurred when the will of one combatant was broken and it is as true today as it was then. The defender gives way more often and more readily to psychological impacts than he does to the physical impact of the assault.

Will and superior determination become evident in various ways. Noise, speed, resoluteness play a part in it.

"Across the open plain, shaken by the blast of many guns, there rose the high, unearthly keen of the rebel yell.

"That yell, 'that hellish yell,' a Michigan soldier called it—appears to have been an actual power in battle, worth many regiments to the Confederacy. . . .

"A spine-chilling thing, the rebel yell. Not for nothing did old Stonewall himself, grimmest of all America's soldiers, call it 'the sweetest music I ever heard.' "[19]

"The rebels who had broken the Michigan Regiment were coming up the hill. O'Rorke jumped off his horse, tossed the reins to his orderly, called out: 'This way, boys!' and ran down the slope toward the enemy, his men at his heels. . . . The men went in with unloaded weapons. They did not stop to fix bayonets, they did not even club their empty muskets: they simply ran straight at their foes, and the only weight their charge had was the weight of their running bodies. Perhaps the mere appearance of fresh troops was enough for the moment. The Confederates wavered and drew back. . . ."[20]

World War II. Marching fire was introduced into the assault.

"Yet the gallant Virginians marched steadily forward through the storm of shot and shell that burst upon their devoted ranks, with a gallantry that has never been surpassed. As they approached the ridge their lines were torn by musketry as by a deadly hail. Yet with unfaltering courage the brave fellows broke into the double quick, and with an irresistible charge broke into the Federal lines and drove everything before them. . . ."[21]

"The first platoon was brought up and charged the hill from the right side. Members of the platoon had fixed bayonets and charged the hill with assault fire, screaming and yell-

Korea. Assaults at times became an individual affair.

ing. . . . Two succeeding hills were taken in a similar manner. . . . In each action, when the charge was made with fixed bayonets and assault fire, most of the enemy would run."[22]

Colonel Ardant Du Picq, whose *Battle Studies* is probably the finest exposition on the importance of will in war, has written, "The moral impulse which animates the attacker is everything. The moral impulse lies in the perception by the enemy of the resolution which animates you."

Some of the points brought out in these extracts from history are worthy of particular emphasis. Complete and intelligent use of supporting fires, for just as long as possible, is of the utmost importance. It is criminal for weapons to remain idle when their fires could save lives and contribute to success. Proper physical conditioning (plus, of course, courage) enables the Infantryman to close with the enemy rapidly and aggressively—an essential of successful assault. The need for continuous fire by assaulting troops, even though no specific targets are apparent, is paramount to prevent well-aimed fire by the defender. Enemy defenses should be analyzed to determine the quantities of grenades, flamethrowers and demolitions required, and the need for these items must be balanced intelligently against the need for a light load for the assaulter.

Above all stands the necessity for strong leadership at squad and platoon level—leadership evidenced not only at the moment of the assault, but leadership which has engendered confidence, loyalty and esprit throughout the days, weeks and months preceding the action. It takes a special kind of man to inspire (or if necessary drive) other men to move toward what they may consider to be certain death or disablement. Experienced Infantrymen understand and are effective when leaders control the assault from behind. But there are times when squad, platoon, and even higher leaders must move in front of their men and say, "Follow Me!"

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[1]See "We Still May Walk," October 1957 *Infantry*.

[2]Capt Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea*, Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1954.

[3]Thomas R. Cowenlock with Guy Murchie Jr., *Soldiers of Darkness*, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1937.

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]Training Bulletin No. 8, 16 Nov 1951, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.

[6]Bruce Catton, *Glory Road*, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday & Co., 1952.

[7]Training Bulletin No. 3, 21 May 1953, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.

[8]J. F. C. Fuller, *Decisive Battles of the U.S.A.*, London, Harper & Brothers, quoted *Moore's Diary*, Vol I, p. 480, extracted from Pennsylvania Evening Post, 4 Sept 1777.

[9]*Ibid.*

[10]Historical Division, *Small Unit Actions*, Washington, D. C., War Department, 4 Apr 1956.

[11]*Op. Cit.* Gugeler.

[12]See "Flame for the Infantry," July-September 1958 issue of *Infantry*.

[13]*Op. Cit.* TB No. 8, 1951.

[14]Training Bulletin No. 4, 24 May 1952, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]*Op. Cit.* TB No. 4, 1952.

[17]*Op. Cit.* TB No. 3, 1953.

[18]*Op. Cit.* TB No. 3, 1953.

[19]*Op. Cit.* Catton.

[20]*Op. Cit.* Catton.

[21]*Op. Cit.* Fuller.

[22]*Op. Cit.* TB No. 8, 1951.

BACK ISSUES OF INFANTRY AVAILABLE

The Book Department has a few back issues of *Infantry* which are available for $.25 each on a first-come-first-served basis. Three of these issues, July and October 1957 and January 1958, contain a total of more than 120 pages of valuable material on the ROCID organization.

Some issues have been completely sold out but small quantities of the following are available: April, July 1952; April July 1953; April 1954; April, July, October 1955; January, April, July and October 1956; July, October 1957; and January, April-June 1958.

Also available are a few copies of the first three large-format issues. These are available at $.50 per copy. If you are a new subscriber you will want these issues to complete your file of the new, larger *Infantry*.

WRITE: BOOK DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

The Changing Face of THE INFANTRY





Above. Duplexes such as this are representative of some of the older quarters on the post. Of brick and frame construction, they are available to majors and lieutenant colonels.

Left. Junior officers with small families may be quartered in two-story four-unit apartments. One unit is shown here.





Above. Duplexes such as this make up the largest single group of quarters on the post. Authorized for company grade officers, they are found in Custer and Upatoi terraces.

CENTER

Most Infantry officers expect at least one tour at Fort Benning during their careers and information on housing is always useful. File these pages away for the day when those orders arrive. These quarters with scaled floor plans are representative of the bulk of on-post housing at the Infantry Center.

Above. In contrast to the older duplex on the left, the recently completed Capehart duplexes are fully air-conditioned and have automatic dishwashers. These quarters are intended for company grade officers and majors.



Above. Intended for general officers, colonels and lieutenant colonels, these single houses, built during the thirties, are very spacious by modern standards.



Left. Still called student apartments as a carryover from small-army days, these four-unit quarters now house lieutenant colonels, majors and captains on long-tour assignments. Each unit is on a single floor. All post quarters are furnished with a range and refrigerators.

The Soviet Officer Corps

JUST HOW GOOD ARE THE OFFICERS WHO COMMAND THE RED ARMY?

By Maj Philip S. Grant

IN SOME thirty years, the Soviet Union has risen meteorically from the ranks of the third-rate powers to a position of almost absolute authority and domination over a great portion of the world. A large measure of credit for this change must be given to the Red Army. Without this force, backed by a well nigh inexhaustible pool of manpower, it is doubtful that the Soviet nation as it now exists could have been built. To understand this military machine and to evaluate its potentialities, it is necessary to investigate the corps of officers which directs it. Just how good is this officer corps? This is a vital question.

In my opinion, we can evaluate this professional body by examining the broad sources from which the Soviet officers have been drawn, the educational background of these officers and certain characteristics of the Russian people. Quite naturally, each of these areas must be considered in light of the impact which Communist ideology has on every facet of Soviet life.

The bulk of Red Army officers has come from three main sources. The first of these is that group which took part in the revolution and grew with the Communist cause. Initially, this group consisted of a combination of hardbitten revolutionaries with meager educational background, and professional soldiers who were formerly leaders at various levels in the Czar's Imperial Army. These latter men gave a degree of professional competence to the new army. The revolutionaries were generally tough, vicious men who achieved their positions by violence, terror and a measure of individual military ability. Some were corporals one day and regimental commanders the next. For the most part they were of peasant stock and generally displayed no academic brilliance. However, they did display great loyalty and singleness of purpose.

During the revolution and the civil war which followed, many of these men were killed. Others have been disposed of since that time. The purges of 1936 removed many who were competent militarily, but who had aroused the suspicions of the Marxist leaders. Only a few of these original Red Army officers are left, but these few form a firm core of diehard Communists. These men hold the important command positions within the army today. It would be folly not to realize that these leaders are eminently capable in the art of war. These are the men who commanded the regiments, divisions, armies and even fronts in World War II. Those who survived the war, politically and professionally, comprise this firm core of which I speak.

The second broad category of officers is made up of battle-tested and battle-trained junior officers and former noncommissioned officers who fought with the Soviet Army in World War II. These are generally men who proved themselves to be the best combat leaders. The Red Army hierarchy saw to it that only the best were retained. These men were not hamstrung by Party affiliations at the time; their combat ability has been tested; and although they certainly must be politically well-schooled by now, they form a very firm base of battle-bred leaders on which to build an effective army. The men who make up this group form the major part of the field-grade element in the Soviet Army today. They did not undergo extensive training in the art of war prior to actual participation against the Germans. Most of what they learned was learned under fire and under the most extreme conditions. It might be said that this group consists of the natural soldiers.

The Soviet military training system has refined these veterans with education, not only in the military arts, but also in other fields which I shall discuss later. These officers contribute strength to the Soviet officer corps. However, in this segment of the corps there may be a hidden weakness, for many of these men are soldiers first and Communists second. They place high value on military talent and, although they have been trained in Communist ideology, their reaction to the removal of someone such as Marshal Zhukov must be somewhat different from that of the full-fledged Communist. These officers fought on foreign soil and are bound to be aware that all the statements made by their political leaders about the superiority of the Soviet standard of living are not necessarily true. It requires no highly educated man to recognize such things. This group, generally speaking, because of its wartime background and contact with foreign lands, might well question Communist slogans and ideas, and pronouncements about Soviet superiority.

The other major segment of the corps consists of the new blood—young men graduated from the numerous academies and officer candidate schools under the Soviet mili-

The Soviet officer who was battle-trained in World War II forms the broad base of the corps. The older of these men are products of the revolution, the younger of the war itself.

Each generation has its own background and must be regarded in a separate light.

tary education system. Each combat arm and technical service operates a number of these schools, which correspond to our officer candidate schools. For example, the Infantry arm has upwards of 20. Candidates is this part of the education system undergo a tough two to three years of training. Instruction is designed to produce physically tough, competent junior leaders for a particular branch. The candidates are fully schooled in both political and military theory. This theory is put into practice during brief periods of service with units on maneuvers, so that when these men graduate they are fully aware of the practical aspects of their profession.

Half of the officer candidates—actually the more valuable—are graduates of the Suvorov Schools. These are academic institutions established in 1943 to lay the foundation for an officer caste and to provide a means of caring for hundreds of thousands of war orphans. They are good examples of the effort being made by the USSR to develop a first-class military force.

Students enter the Suvorov schools at the age of eight or nine and are taught both academic and military subjects. They lead a strict military life for ten years, after which they are sent to one of the service schools for specialized officer candidate training. Such an education, begun in the formative years as it is, tends to produce highly proficient soldiers.

Today there are about 50 Suvorov schools training orphans, sons of high government dignitaries and sons of military personnel. Every effort is made to treat the students as an elite group. They wear special uniforms and insignia. Quite naturally, they are taught Communist ideology and are thoroughly impressed with the importance of their position in the Communist state. It is certainly a fair evaluation to state that they make a well-trained and indoctrinated group of Communist soldier-officers.

Other sources of officer candidate material for the various branch schools are men who are recommended by the Party and outstanding enlisted men who have finished their compulsory tour of active duty.

As already mentioned, the candidates in these schools receive a thorough and extensive military education. The officer instructors who staff the schools are highly competent and specially selected. Although the students are worked hard, they receive special treatment. Their quarters, rations and clothing place them above the enlisted ranks and reinforce the concept that they are moving toward a better life.

This is indeed true, for throughout the educational system and in actual practice a distinct effort is made to place officers on a plane apart from and above enlisted men and civilians. The officer has better pay, better food, better living conditions and better clothing. Even within the officer corps, a strict class consciousness exists. The captain is superior to the lieutenant and so on up the line. In short, the "caste system" is officially fostered, strictly adhered to and well established.

These constitute the principal sources from which the Soviets have drawn and are drawing their officer corps. The corps today is distinctly different from the group of elected officers of widely varying experience, education and ability who led the Red Army during and after the revolution.

The Soviets have made great strides in setting up a comprehensive system for schooling the officers of the Red Army. Each branch and service has an advanced school for its own officers, generally the same as our branch schools. However, there are two principal differences between their schools and ours. Whereas our courses extend a maximum of ten months, the courses for the Soviet officers run from two to three years. The second difference is that, on completion of the course, considerable effort is made to place graduates in positions where they may make maximum use of what they have studied.

The next step in Soviet officer education is the Frunze Military Academy. The Frunze Academy may be compared to our Command and General Staff College. It prepares officers for work on division, corps and army staffs. Successful completion of Government examinations is required both for admission and for graduation. The program of instruction is worthy of note (Figure 1). It is obvious from the amount of time devoted to educational subjects that this school assists in the development of officers who will carry into foreign countries

the Party's political banner as well as the military banner.

Finally, there is the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy. This school compares with our United States Army War College. Students are hand-picked and individually confirmed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The curriculum is similar to that of the Frunze Military Academy, except that it deals with higher levels. It is interesting to observe that this course of instruction runs for two years and that, in addition to military subjects, foreign language study continues. Senior field-grade officers attend this school. A one-year refresher course is conducted at this academy for general officers. The officer-student attending this school, as well as the Frunze Academy, can also expect to put into practice what he has learned, immediately after graduation.

These three courses make up the general pattern of higher schooling for the Soviet officer corps, but the training system extends much further than just this formal schooling. As in any army, not all officers measure up mentally for selection for school training. In an effort to improve the men who don't, great stress is placed on correspondence courses and reduced versions of the regular schools. Since promotion and retention in the Soviet Army depend on ability, all officers constantly endeavor to keep pace and many avail themselves of these opportunities.

It should be emphasized that the Soviets feel that even though warfare in the future may see the use of nuclear weapons against civil populations and industry, the task of destroying the enemy's land force will remain the principal one, and this task will fall to the army. It may or may not require the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

SUBJECT	TIME
Tactical Training	30%
Political Training	20%
Military History	20%
Foreign Languages	15%
Staff Functions	10%
Miscellaneous	5%

Figure 1. Frunze Academy program of instruction.

Officer candidates put theory into practice during periods of service with units. Graduates of advanced schools are assigned where they can apply what they have learned.

The first actual military training effort that had to do with nuclear warfare took place in 1953. Since that time, much work has been done in training the Soviet officer in nuclear warfare. The first manuals dealing with nuclear warfare were issued in 1954. In this field of training, the Soviets stress the need for mobility and dispersion, while pointing out that these tactics present excellent chances for decisive action on the part of unit leaders. The offensive attitude is also stressed. In the February 1955 issue of "Military Thought," Marshall Romistrov stated, "In future wars . . . it is very important that military commanders at all levels and ranks be able to make audacious and bold decisions." Thus we see again the need felt by high Soviet military commanders for men with initiative.

Soviet atomic training places emphasis on the fact that an extremely powerful weapon is now available to field commanders, but in the Soviet view, this weapon has not lessened the requirement for a large land army. The Soviet officer is taught that nuclear weapons require refinements and improvements in techniques already practiced, but will not remove the necessity of destroying the enemy's armed forces. From the Soviet officer's point of view, the advent of the tactical nuclear weapon also demands increased skill and initiative on the part of field commanders.

Briefly, this is the general pattern of education and training of the Red Army officer corps, but the study of this group is not complete without a full consideration of the Russian character and how communism conditions Ivan's thoughts and actions. The Russian people are made up of many different ethnic groups. Despite the apparently excellent system of development of the Soviet officer corps, it is in this area that the greatest chink in the Soviet armor may be found. These groups differ in background, language (over 100 of them), traditions and customs, and racial characteristics. Nevertheless there are certain traits which are generally common to all.

Traditionally and factually, the Russian common man has always led a rigorous and difficult life. He has for centuries been under the heel of some monarch or dictator. He has always scraped for his existence. He has always been downtrodden. As a result of this, he is a generally moody and fatalistic individual. He does not expect a great deal from life and, therefore, his initiative is

Tough, well-disciplined noncommissioned officers are a good source of officer material.

weak. On the other hand, his lack of things which make life simpler and easier has accustomed him to subsisting on the bare essentials. This has made him physically tough and better prepares him for the rigorous life of a combat soldier. In addition, since he has lived the greatest part of his life close to the soil, he is better adapted to the combat requirements of patrolling, camouflage, movement over difficult terrain and improvisation. It might be proper to term the American soldier a "city boy" possessed of a minimum of field lore, and to term the Russian a "country boy" with an extensive background of field lore.

Having been led most of his life, it is natural for the Russian to accept authority with little question. Having been subjected to severe demands and few rewards, he is used to strict and inflexible discipline. At the same time, this environment has stifled his ability to express himself or to cope with situations for which he has no previous experience as a guide. His environment also tends to give him an inbred fear of, rather than a respect for, authority.

The Russian boy, when he was growing up, never owned a Model-T Ford. He never tinkered with a "hot-rod." For the most part, his mechanical know-how is limited to what he has been taught by the Army. It is only fair to state, however, that he proved himself quite capable of employing his relatively simple, but effective, equipment against the Germans.

All of this might be summed up by saying that the Russian is a well-disciplined, physically hard, fatalistic, herd-bound man. These characteristics, coupled with his follower type of disposition, make him an excellent soldier in the crowd. They do not necessarily fit him with leadership qualities so necessary in officers. The experiences of World War II point up the dearth of individual initiative in the Soviet officer corps, and there are distinct efforts being made to overcome the lack of this essential quality. The very system, however, which recognizes this deficiency depends a great deal on the lack of this quality in the individuals who serve the system. The contradiction is important to our analysis. Initiative calls for the soldier who has a new idea to advance it, even in the face of opposition or apathy. Yet the Soviet officer has been brought up in a society which scorns deviationists. It would appear that a man encouraged to be conformist throughout his formative years would not suddenly develop a great amount of initiative. This effect of the Communist system on the officer corps is profound.

As has been pointed out, each course of instruction in the military school system includes a good measure of political instruction. Each unit in the Soviet Army has its political officer. This man is greatly feared, and rightly so, for he reports on the general attitude towards political training within each organization through special political channels. He also reports on the political reliability of commanders. This method of requiring one man to inform on another has done much to insure the success of communism. It is an effective control, but it also has bred distrust and fear to such an extent that it tends to stifle initiative even further than the national character of the people already has stifled it. Truly professional soldiers must tremble to witness the removal of Zhukov, the hero of the Soviet people. The Army on one hand seeks to develop thinking leaders. On the other hand the Party tends to stifle any such desire in young men who want to improve their position and remain in favor.

Another apparent contradiction—and quite possibly what might be a significant weakness—lies in the educational system. The Army is striving to improve the educational background of its leaders, yet it is obvious that the more a man is trained to think logically and to seek new knowledge and ideas, the more his intellect

Maj Philip S. Grant graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1944. He was battalion S2 and company executive officer with the 66th Infantry in Europe during World War II. In 1946 he became Assistant Adjutant of the School Troops at Fort Benning. Afterwards he served as regimental S1 and company commander with the 7th Infantry. Later he joined the G2 Section of the 7th Army in Germany. A graduate of the Infantry School's Advanced Course and the Command and General Staff College, Major Grant is now executive officer of the 2d Battle Group, 4th Cavalry, in Korea.

demands that he find *truth*. This fostering of a better educational pattern for the officer corps may in the end produce more difficulties than benefits for the Communist system. Communism is built on lies and half-truths. It flourishes best in the uneducated and in those who have no desire to seek the truth. In the attempt to improve the officer corps the Soviets may well be planting the seeds of communism's destruction.

It is impossible, of course, to predict what the outcome of this educational process will be. To be sure, it has improved the military competence of the Army and will continue to do so. Recent developments would seem to indicate that the Soviet leaders are well aware of the tremendous importance of the Army in maintaining their own positions. The relief of Marshal Zhukov bears this out.

There are two additional points of significance which must be mentioned. The Russian people for centuries have had a deeply rooted religious conviction. Religion has been played down and oppressed by communism, but churches still exist and in the mass of the people there is an inherent belief in God. Going hand-in-hand with this belief is a tremendous love of their homeland. Though they have been oppressed and roughly treated over the years, they do not hesitate to rise to the defense of their homeland. This fact has been amply confirmed by history, as both Napoleon and Adolf Hitler could testify. Were it possible to convince them that they were being liberated from the yoke of communism, the situation might prove different. Currently, the people are told that they are preparing to defend their country against American imperialism, and this propaganda tends to make the Army a loyal and formidable force, since the officer corps is subjected to the same hate-campaign as are the people.

In general, it can be said that the Red Army officer supports the Communist system for several reasons. The constant political indoctrination tends to make him believe that he is preparing to defend his homeland and that communism is a superior form of government. He is afforded extra privileges and plays an authoritative role in the supposedly classless society. He knows nothing now —or at best only a limited amount— of the other forms of government and standards of living throughout the world. But there is some question whether he will continue to support the system when his increased education leads him to seek the truth.

It would appear that the Soviet officer corps over-all is excellent. It is well-educated militarily, well-indoctrinated politically, and it is proud and confident. Its sources of weakness derive from natural characteristics, one of which is lack of initiative. As this obstacle is overcome to secure the attendant military benefits, the ability of the Party to control the army may be reduced. Without full support of the military forces, the Party is in jeopardy. One has but to read the daily papers to see the maneuvering done to retain that control.

It is conceivable that with further development, the Soviet officer corps might rise to full power within the Moscow arena. It is a strong, loyal body of competent military men which demands our respect and continued study.

The Russian is an excellent soldier in the crowd, but may not have the originality and conviction which the best leadership demands.

TITLES FOR FURTHER READING

The Red Army Today, by Louis B. Ely (The Military Service Publishing Company, 1949)

Soviet Military Doctrine, by Raymond L. Garthoff (The Rand Corporation, 1953)

Soviet Arms and Soviet Power, by Augustin Guillaume (Infantry Journal Press, 1949)

The Red Army, by B. H. Liddell-Hart (Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1956)

Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, by Raymond L. Garthoff (F. A. Praeger Company, 1958)

War and the Soviet Union, by Herbert S. Dinerstein (F. A. Praeger Company, 1959)

Communication — in the Inf

By Capt Clarance J. Schlafer

THE LAST issue of *Infantry* discussed the changes in organization and equipment which have been made in the Infantry division after two years of testing and evaluating ROCID.[1] These changes have either required or permitted modifications to be made in the communication systems of the Infantry battle group. Field experience has demonstrated that the communication concepts developed under ROCID are basically sound. Except for revisions required to integrate new units and equipment into the existing systems, the radio and wire nets of the new battle group have been altered very little.

The more significant modifications extend the range of the rifle company command net from one to approximately five miles, employ Infantry radio frequencies rather than Artillery frequencies for mortar fire control, authorize a rifle platoon radio net and provide radios with increased capabilities for certain commanders and staff officers.

It should be pointed out, however, that the communication changes discussed here are based on draft TOEs. When the TOEs are finalized, there may be additional equipment changes. However, it is not expected that these would require any major alterations to the communication systems illustrated here.

No changes are anticipated in the battle group's communication links with division. The battle group will continue to operate in the division's six radio nets.[2] And it will still have

[1] See "ROCID Changes," April-June 1959 issue of *Infantry*, pp 8-12.

Infantry Battle Group

The changes in the organization of the Infantry division have altered and improved the communication capabilities of the battle group and its subordinate units.

12 radio-relay channels to division and 12 channels to adjacent units. As in the past, the radio-relay facilities, the radio-wire integration service, limited maintenance support and message center service will be provided by the battle group area support platoon of the forward communications company.

In addition to two primary nets—the command net and the administrative net—the battle group operates two secondary nets—the liaison net and the surveillance net. The surveillance net is new. It is operated by the radar section of the new combat support company and will be covered in some detail when that unit is discussed. The liaison net remains unchanged. Several minor alterations, however, have been made in the command and administrative nets.

The *command net* (Figure 1) now has one additional station, the fifth rifle company commander. Also, there have been several substitutions. The new deputy battle group commander replaces the executive officer, and the former mortar battery commander and liaison officer are replaced by the heavy mortar platoon leader and liaison officer. The assault gun platoon leader is supplanted by the assault weapon platoon leader.

It will be noted that only individuals directly concerned with the tactical employment of the battle group or its fighting elements are included in the command net. Traffic on this net should therefore be limited primarily to messages which affect tactical employment.

While not shown on the command net diagram, the commanders of appropriate attached or supporting units will also be included in this net.



Figure 1. Battle group command net. Note 1: This radio is operated in the division admin/log net as required. Note 2: This AN/GRR-5 radio monitors the division warning/broadcast net. Note 3: This vehicle is organic to the communication platoon headquarters.

[2] The radio nets of the division are: The CG/command net, the command/operations net, the intelligence/operations net, the air-request net, the warning/broadcast net and the administrative/logistical net.



Figure 2. Battle group administrative net. The assault weapon platoon, not shown here, may enter this net as required.



Figure 3. Battle group wire system. Note 1: This center is operated by the battle group area support platoon. Note 2: Additional wire lines for the page-printing teletypewriter will be laid to the switchboard. Note 3: This unit ties into the battle group system at the nearest switchboard. Asterisks indicate telephones organic to the communication platoon.

The deputy battle group commander has been authorized an AN/VRQ–3 radio,[3] the same type of set issued to the battle group commander. This radio will enable the deputy to assume immediate control of the battle group should the commander become a casualty. It also gives the deputy proper radio equipment for carrying out such assignments as commanding a task force or controlling a portion of the battle group in offensive, defensive or retrograde actions. The battle group executive officer is not authorized a radio by the draft TOE.

The *administrative net* is shown in Figure 2. All stations in this net except the rifle companies now have 10-mile range radios. However, the AN/PRC–10 radios[4] of the rifle companies can be used with the jungle antenna RC–292, which is now authorized to each of these units. This antenna gives the AN/PRC–10 a range comparable to that of the other sets in the net. The administrative net handles those messages which are not appropriate to the command net. Examples of traffic transmitted on this net are requests for ammunition, rations and replacements, and administrative and logistical reports.

The battle group wire system (Figure 3) is essentially the same as it was under ROCID except for the addition of the fifth rifle company and substitutions in stations as pointed out in the discussion of the radio command net. The amount of wire authorized is almost triple that previously allowed and sufficient equipment is available to incorporate all of the major elements of the battle group into the system, to provide test sets for all wire teams and to support additional wire requirements.

The administrative net control station radio and the vehicle in which it is mounted are new additions to the communication platoon. The "other half" of this AN/VRQ–3 can be used to support additional require-



Figure 4. Reconnaissance platoon command net. The AN/PRC-10 radio is used by the rifle squad leader when dismounted.

[3] The AN/VRQ-3 is composed of two 10-mile range receiver-transmitters. It is vehicular- mounted.

[4] The AN/PRC-10 is a three- to five-mile range receiver-transmitter. It can be back-packed.



Figure 5. Heavy mortar platoon radio nets as operated in a platoon position. The two AN/PRC-10 radios shown with each FO team are used to enter the supported rifle company command net and the mortar platoon fire direction net when dismounted.



Figure 7. Non-nuclear fire request channels.

ments of the battle group. It may serve as the battle group command post station in the command net of a task force, or it may be used to enter the command net of a supporting unit.

The battle group communication platoon has been authorized additional wire team equipment so that another motorized wire team (total of four such teams) may be employed by the wire section. However, no additional personnel have been authorized.

Other equipment has been added to the communication platoon to improve still further the efficiency of the communication system. This equipment includes an additional ¾-ton truck and ¾-ton trailer in the message center section for use in conjunction with the shelter S–144/U which houses the cipher machines and the teletype equipment.



Figure 6. Two section position heavy mortar platoon radio nets.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

The headquarters and headquarters company is not a tactical unit and therefore has no company nets as such. However, it provides the personnel to operate the battle group communication system. Also the company commander and three of the platoons in the headquarters and headquarters company—the engineer platoon, supply and maintenance platoon, and the medical platoon — have specific communication requirements and the draft TOE provides for these needs.

The company commander, because his duties are confined to the administrative and logistical support of the headquarters and the elements of his company, is equipped with an AN/VRC–10 radio[5] which he operates in the battle group administrative net. He is also tied into the battle group wire system. This satisfies his communication requirements since he does not control the operations of his subordinate platoons.

The *engineer platoon* leader normally operates his AN/VRC–18 radio[6] in the battle group administrative net. Simultaneously, he can use this set to monitor his platoon net. While he may also use one of the AN/PRC–10 radios which are provided for the platoon net, it may be preferable to give the headquarters AN/PRC–10 to the platoon sergeant.

Should the platoon be placed in support of a rifle company or a task force, the platoon leader may leave the battle group administrative net and enter the command net of the supported unit. Similarly, if one of the engineer squads supports a rifle company, it will use an AN/PRC–10 in the company command net.

The *supply and maintenance platoon* has an AN/VRC–10 radio which the platoon leader operates in the battle group administrative net.

[5] The AN/VRC-10 is a 10-mile range receiver-transmitter. It is vehicular-mounted.

[6] The AN/VRC-18 is a 10-mile range receiver-transmitter and an auxiliary receiver. It is vehicular-mounted.



Figure 8. Heavy mortar platoon wire system for a platoon position. Additional wire is laid between the direct support artillery FDC and the heavy mortar platoon FDC.

Since the supply and maintenance platoon leader will normally be located in the trains area, his radio may be considered the trains-area radio station, though it is not specifically designated as such. Four telephone sets TA–312/PT are authorized for the platoon, along with reel equipment and wire so that a trains-area telephone system may also be employed. This newly authorized equipment will be used to meet the varying requirements of the trains.

The headquarters of the *medical platoon* is now authorized an AN/VRC–18 radio, mounted in a ¼-ton truck. Both this radio and the utility truck are for the use of the battle group surgeon. The surgeon will operate this set in the battle group administrative net. Four AN/PRC–10 radios are provided for the platoon. Two are located in the treatment section and two in the evacuation section. These radios may be employed as the surgeon sees fit. At times they will be used in a platoon net, but more frequently, they will be used to monitor other nets of the battle group so that personnel of the platoon can keep abreast of the tactical situation. Since current doctrine specifies that the platoon must be capable of operating two aid stations, these sets can assist the internal operations of the platoon.

Combat Support Company

Like the platoons of the headquarters and headquarters company, the subordinate units of the combat support company operate directly under battle group control. Consequently, there is no need for a company communication system. Both the company commander and the executive officer are equipped with AN/VRQ–3 radios mounted in ¼-ton trucks, but these radios are intended for operation in battle group nets.

While the company commander generally will operate in the battle group command net, he is not shown in this or other nets because he will enter any net as required. Under current concepts, the commander and headquarters section of this company may be called upon to serve as the nucleus of a task force headquarters, to assist in the establishment of an alternate battle group command post or to supervise rear area security.

The company executive officer normally will operate in the battle group administrative net, since his duties are mainly concerned with the administration, messing, supply and maintenance of the elements of the company. The "other half" of his set can be used to enter the nets of the subordinate units of the company to coordinate administrative and logistical matters.

The three platoons and the radar section of the combat support company have separate communication systems to meet their specific requirements. Since the reconnaissance, heavy mortar and assault weapon platoons work directly under battle group headquarters, the three platoon leaders operate in the battle group command net. The radar section is linked to battle group through the S2, who monitors the surveillance net.

There has been no change in the communication system for the *reconnaissance platoon* (Figure 4). Although no wire system as such exists within this platoon, TA–1/PT telephones have been authorized for the support squad. These phones are used for communication between the observer and the mortar position.

The communication requirements of the *heavy mortar platoon* are similar to those of the former mortar battery. Figure 5 shows the net organization when the mortars are fired from a platoon position, and Figure 6 shows the arrangement when the sections operate separately or in dispersed positions.

The heavy mortar platoon normally will be employed in general support of the battle group.

The forward observers from the mortar platoon may call for fires from the mortar platoon FDC or the FDC of the direct-support field artillery battalion (Figure 7). The mortar platoon forward observer will normally direct his requests for fire to his own FDC, and if the fire direction officer feels that the mission may be more profitably fired by the artillery, he can contact the artillery FDC on his own fire direction net. This will facilitate direct contact between the mortar platoon forward observer and the artillery battalion FDC for adjustment of fire. The artillery battalion FDC operates an AN/VRC–10 on the mortar platoon fire direction net to facilitate this capability.



Figure 9. Heavy mortar platoon wire system for a two-section position.



Figure 10. Assault weapon platoon command net. The two AN/PRC-10 radios in platoon headquarters are for dismounted use.



Figure 11. Battle group surveillance net. Note 1: Light radar teams may enter this net as required. Note 2: This unit enters net when transmitting information to the S2. Note 3: The S2 normally monitors this net with his auxiliary receiver.

A typical fire mission would be processed in this manner: The mortar forward observer calls for fire with his AN/VRC–10 radio over the platoon fire direction net. The mortar platoon FDC receives and acknowledges the mission on its AN/VRC–10 radio, while the artillery battalion FDC merely monitors the transmission. If the mission is to be fired by the artillery, the mortar platoon FDC makes the request to the artillery FDC over the mortar fire direction net. Adjustment of fire is then made directly by the FO of the heavy mortar platoon.

The mortar FDC is also equipped with two AN/VRC–9 (Artillery) radios.[7] Using these sets, the platoon FDC can monitor both fire-request channels of the artillery battalion fire direction net. Consequently, a call for fire from an artillery forward observer will be monitored by the mortar FDC and should the mortar platoon be required to fire the mission, adjustment of the fire is made directly over one of the artillery fire request channels.

This concept of fire support does not preclude the commander's attaching the heavy mortar platoon to a task force or employing it in a separate role if the situation warrants. Should the platoon be employed separately, requests for fire are handled directly by the section or platoon FDC.

The heavy mortar platoon will also be tied into the battle group and the supporting artillery battalion by wire. The artillery is responsible for establishing communication with the battle group. Wire is the primary means of controlling the platoon's firing section. Sufficient wire equipment is available to support the platoon when it operates as a unit or in two sections. (Figures 8 and 9).

The *assault weapon platoon* operates a platoon command net as shown in Figure 10. The platoon leader uses his AN/VRC–18 radio to operate both in this net and in the battle group command net. The platoon sergeant uses the auxiliary receiver of his set as required. He may, for example, enter the administrative net to transmit logistical traffic, while at the same time monitoring the platoon net with his receiver. When the squads are attached to rifle companies, they will leave the platoon net and enter the command net of the company with which they are working. The squads are each issued a TA–1/PT telephone for use in their platoon wire system, or in a company system in the event of attachment. Platoon headquarters has a TA–312/PT telephone and sufficient wire to establish a platoon wire system.

The *radar section* operates the battle group surveillance net as shown in Figure 11. As indicated, the S2 usually will monitor this net with his auxiliary receiver. In addition to operating in the surveillance net, the radar section leader may utilize his second receiver-transmitter in other nets as the situation demands. The light radar squads will use their AN/PRC–10 radios to enter the surveillance net when operating under section control. When attached to a rifle company, the light radar squad will enter the company command net. The counterfire squad may enter the surveillance net when trans-

[7] The AN/VRC-9 is identical to the AN/VRC-10 except that it can be operated only on Artillery-band frequencies.



Figure 12. Rifle company radio nets. The AN/PRC-10 radio shown with the CO is for dismounted use. Note 1: This additional AN/PRC-10 radio is used during displacement. Note 2: The heavy mortar platoon FO enters this net with one of his AN/PRC-10 radios.

mitting information to the S2. Sufficient wire equipment is authorized the section to form a wire system or to tie the light squads into rifle company wire systems.

The communication capabilities of the rifle company have been significantly increased under the new draft TOE. The company commander is now authorized an AN/VRQ–3 radio which enables him to operate in two nets. The article, "ROCID Changes," in the April-June 1959 issue of *Infantry*, states that this permits him to operate simultaneously in both the battle group administrative and command nets. However, this method of employment has been reconsidered. It is now felt that he should operate in his own company net and in the battle group command net.

The range of the rifle company command net (Figure 12) has been increased to the three- to five-mile range of the AN/PRC–10. Since the company headquarters has five of these sets, it is now possible for the executive officer to be included in the command net. Both the company commander and his executive officer may enter the battle group administrative net as required. As shown in the diagram, the heavy mortar observer may enter the command net. While not shown, other attached or



Figure 13. Rifle company wire system. Although the rifle platoons are shown on a party line, separate lines may be laid. Asterisks indicate telephones equipped with the handset-headset H-144.

supporting personnel may also enter it. For example, the artillery FO is equipped with an AN/PRC–10 for this specific purpose.

The company fire direction net remains unchanged. One additional AN/PRC–10 radio has been added to the 81mm mortar section headquarters so that continuous communication can be maintained when the mortars are displaced by echelon.

Additional wire equipment has been added to enhance the company wire system (Figure 13). The SB–22/PT switchboard is part of this new equipment. This board will serve 12 telephones without requiring party lines. More telephones are provided to cover some of the additional requirements imposed on the company by the new tactical concepts. For example, the phones could

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be used to provide wire communication between elements of a rifle platoon on the COPL. It should also be noted that five TA–312/PT telephones with the handset-headset H–144/U have been authorized for the mortar section. Use of the headset will free the hands of the section's personnel and will facilitate making firing computations.

Each of the three rifle platoons is now authorized a platoon net which utilizes one-mile range AN/PRC–6 radios. This net greatly increases and simplifies the control of the platoon and contributes to a more flexible communication system within the company.

At the present time no wire equipment is issued for use within the rifle platoon. However, the platoon leader has a TA1/PT telephone for use in the company wire system.

As mentioned earlier, there may be additional equipment changes when the draft TOEs are finally approved. While the basic systems discussed here are sound and are not expected to change materially, they will be improved in the near future by the incorporation of more advanced equipment.

Field units are requested to write to the Infantry School concerning their experiences with the new organization and equipment. The Communication Department of the School is interested in hearing of any problem areas encountered and in receiving suggestions which will improve our battle group communication capabilities. Only by combining field experience with technical studies and developments will we produce the communication capabilities needed for the command and control of our combat operations.

The emergency switchboard SB–18/GT has recently been modified to remove the luminous dots. The same type switchboard minus the luminous dots will be reissued as the SB–993/GT and will replace all SB–18/GT switchboards shown in this article.—Editor.



WHY DON'T WE?

Perhaps you have an idea for some item or technique that would help the Infantry. Send it to the Editor of INFANTRY. *If it is published you will receive a free one-year subscription.*

. . . produce a combination map board and field desk. When folded for carrying, this item would resemble a thin suitcase. When set up for use, it would stand on four collapsible legs and the two larger sides would swing up to form a table for acetate-covered maps. Small divided shelves inside the case portion would hold items such as grease pencils, thumbtacks, and the like. A thin drawer opening at the end would hold maps and overlay paper. Even in the carrying position the situation map would be visible for reference.

Capt John D. Bethea



Combination field desk-mapboard.

. . . call our rifle companies "Infantry" companies. Use of the word "rifle" is a carry-over from the past. It no longer describes adequately the tremendous combat power now inherent in this unit. Powerful, relatively long-range weapons such as the 81 mm mortar and the 106mm recoilless enable the company to control terrain far beyond the range of effective rifle fire, and give it a far greater potential than is indicated by the "rifle" designation. Also, there is the possibility that even nuclear weapons may be employed at company level. This is further reason for scrapping a name that connotes "limited firepower capability."

"Rifle company" in the past has distinguished this unit from the old heavy weapons company. Now rifles and heavy weapons are combined in a single fighting team. The team should be identified by branch rather than by a single hand-held weapon.

Maj Sanford H. Winston

. . . utilize the "deuce" portion of the standard scoring disk for indicating misses on the known-distance firing range. Although Trainfire I

Continued on page 68

YOUR INFANTRY CAREER

This department provides important information on policies and personnel actions which affect your Infantry career. Material for Regular Army and active duty Reserve officers is furnished by Infantry Branch of the Officers Assignment Division. Similar material for Infantry officers of the USAR is provided by the Army Reserve Branch of the Adjutant General's Office. Information for the enlisted Infantryman is obtained from other Department of the Army agencies.

From Infantry Branch

THIS IS A continuation of the queries received most frequently by Infantry Branch. The last issue of *Infantry* answered questions on military and civilian schooling and specialization. In this issue, answers are provided to questions asked by Infantry officers concerning assignments.

What are the most important considerations in making assignments?

The most important factors which are considered in selecting and assigning Infantry officers are: needs of the service, career needs, and qualifications, experience and preferences of the individual. Of these, the needs of the service are overriding in importance and must be given priority.

How long will I remain in my present assignment?

A single, all-inclusive answer to this question is not practical since reassignment criteria vary according to the grade of the officer, eligibility for overseas service, selection for service schooling and requirements for individual qualifications. The general criteria utilized by Infantry Branch to determine the length of your tour are as follows:

1. If you are overseas, the length of your tour will be as prescribed in AR 614–30.

2. If you are on a *stabilized* assignment in CONUS, the minimum length of your tour will be as prescribed in AR 614–5.

3. If you are on a *non-stabilized* assignment in CONUS and are due for a *long tour,* you will be eligible for shipment after two years on station.

4. If you are on a *stabilized* assignment and are due for a *short tour,* you will be eligible for shipment upon the completion of the minimum prescribed length of your stabilized tour.

5. If you are on a *non-stabilized* assignment and are due for a *short tour,* you will be eligible for shipment upon the completion of 14 months of service in CONUS or one year on station, whichever occurs later.

6. If you are a student on a PCS basis for service or advanced civil schooling and are due for a *short tour,* you will be eligible for shipment upon graduation from your present course of instruction. However, as a civil school graduate it is quite possible that you may be deferred from a *short tour* until you have had a utilization tour following your schooling. Each case is considered on its individual merits, and in light of requirements, at the time you become available.

7. Intra-CONUS PCS movements, other than those to or from service schools, are limited to assignments dictated by the urgent needs of the service or to approved compassionate cases.

What will my job be when I arrive overseas?

Infantry Branch assigns officers to overseas commands to fill requirements for specific MOS positions. However, it is the prerogative of the oversea commander to utilize the officer concerned in any manner he deems appropriate. It is, therefore, impossible to forecast what your actual job will be.

I will retire within two years. Will I be assigned near my selected home of retirement?

Since all assignments must be made to fill valid requirements, your desire to have a terminal tour near your selected home of retirement can be met only if a military requirement exists in the area of your choice. Infantry Branch automatically will attempt to assign you as near as possible to your requested location. When your retirement preference is not met, it is because military considerations have precluded such action.

I am on orders to fill a branch immaterial assignment. Why?

Almost one-half of the positions filled by Infantry officers are other than branch material. To equitably distribute Infantry jobs and ensure proper career development, it is necessary that all officers receive their share of duties that are not strictly Infantry in nature. Your assignment to a branch immaterial job represents a positive effort on the part of Infantry Branch to broaden your experience and qualify you for positions of responsibility at higher levels where knowledge of the functions of other branches is essential.

Is duty in Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico creditable as CONUS or oversea service?

If you are a resident of CONUS, service in Alaska, Hawaii or Puerto Rico is credited as oversea duty. However, if you are a resident of Alaska, Hawaii or Puerto Rico, service within the limits of your state or territory of residence is not considered foreign service, but duty in all other areas outside CONUS will be credited as oversea duty.

I am an obligated tour (two-year) officer. What are my chances of going overseas?

Under present policy you normally will be assigned to oversea commands only if your remaining service is sufficient to allow completion of a normal tour. Therefore, you normally will receive an assignment overseas only to those areas in which the tour length is 18 months or less.

Why are Airborne officers assigned to non-Airborne positions?

There are more officers qualified for Airborne duty than there are authorized spaces involving Airborne duty. As a result, only a portion of those who are Airborne-qualified can be assigned to Airborne units at any given time. One of the missions of the active Army is to prepare for mobilization. This mission dictates the training of a maximum number of Airborne-qualified officers and the rotation of duties so that as many officers as possible will gain this experience.

Civil Schooling in Physical Sciences

Each year a selected group of Infantry officers are sent to civilian universities for postgraduate work in fields of study in which the Army has continuing requirements. The need for officer graduates in the physical sciences is increasing, especially in the fields of nuclear physics, electronics and guided missiles. Consequently, an increased number of Infantry officers will receive training in the physical sciences beginning in 1960. Those officers who possess an undergraduate degree, have completed the Advanced Course and have a good background in mathematics (through calculus) and physics are encouraged to apply under the provisions of AR 350–205. This is a voluntary program and selection is competitive.

What are the criteria for assignment to ROTC duty?

The following general criteria are applied for assignment of Infantry officers to ROTC duty:

1. Sufficient remaining service to complete the normal tour (three years—field grade; two years—company grade).
2. Graduate of a branch advanced course.
3. Four years active commissioned service and appropriate background for the duty.
4. For senior ROTC, a baccalaureate degree.
5. For junior ROTC, a high school diploma, although at least three years of college training is desirable.
6. Approval of the institution to which nominated.
7. Terminal assignments to ROTC are made only to meet priority requirements or where the individual officer is outstandingly qualified for such duty. Repeated assignments are made only where the needs of the service dictate.

I am a reserve officer. Can I be assigned to NG or USAR in my home state?

Provided the requirement exists, you may be assigned to USAR duty in any location to include your home state. However, you are not eligible for duty as a National Guard Advisor in your home state.

I am due to return from overseas shortly and will have less than three years' remaining service prior to retirement. Can I be assigned to reserve component duty as my terminal tour?

Although assignment to a terminal reserve component tour is not precluded, it normally will be made only if you possess qualifications which indicate that such an assignment is in the best interests of the service.

If I go overseas to a short-tour area and am joined by my family after I arrive, am I eligible for a long or short tour when I am again considered for foreign service?

If you are assigned to an area for which the tour of unaccompanied officers is less than 18 months and are

SCHOOL LISTS 1959-1960

The names of Infantry officers who have been selected to attend the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning appear on page 72.

accompanied or joined by your dependents, you are then eligible for a short tour within the purview of AR 614–30. However, if you complete the normal short tour and then are joined by your dependents, you will be considered as having served a short and a long tour consecutively. In accordance with paragraph 2c, AR 614–30, your next oversea tour may be to an area to which dependent travel is not normally authorized.

Are all Infantry officers going overseas for second short tours?

All Infantry officers must expect to serve at least one short tour in company grade, and at least one short tour in field grade in order that service needs be met.

I am working toward a two-year college equivalency so that I can apply for Regular Army. Is it possible for me to remain on station long enough to obtain these credits?

Yes. However, you should write directly to Infantry Branch, OAD, TAGO, stating your desires and including an estimate of the time required to reach your goal. If your retention on station is compatible with requirements, every effort will be made to assist you.

What constitutes a stabilized tour?

Stabilized tours are defined and specified in AR 614–5. These are assignments for which the minimum tour length is established. For company grade officers it is normally 24 months (except for assignment in the Department of the Army, which is 36 months). For field grade, the tour normally is 36 months. Positions in the Department of the Army, USCONARC agencies, faculties of certain schools, AFSWP and other areas are included in this category.

Should I write directly to Infantry Branch if I have a question concerning my career?

Infantry Branch welcomes a personal letter whenever you desire information or have a problem. Your letters and personal visits keep the Branch informed on your personal status and help us in planning assignments. Remember, your fellow Infantryman in Infantry Branch has no crystal ball. He cannot guess what is on your mind nor can he know about your personal difficulties, unless you tell him. You should try to visit Infantry Branch every two or three years. By doing so you can review your file with the aid of Branch personnel and evaluate your record in terms of your entire commissioned service.

What advantage is there in maintaining an up-to-date preference statement in my Branch file?

The Officer Preference Statement (DA Form 483) is one of the most important tools used by the assignment officer in personnel placement. If properly completed, it will indicate your desires with regard to location and type of duty. Further, it gives you an opportunity to have on record any compassionate or semi-compassionate basis for assignment. Whenever service needs permit, Infantry Branch makes every effort to comply with your requests.

Another question which is continually asked of Infantry Branch concerns the computation and importance of the Overall Efficiency Index (OEI). AR 623–105, Section VII, furnishes background on why the OEI is computed, how it is computed, and how it used. The OEI is still being computed yearly and will continue to be until a better system is established to give a more accurate and fair appraisal of an officer's relative efficiency. The 1958 OEIs are now available for review at Infantry Branch. An officer visiting the Branch can check another officer's OEI only if he has been deputized in writing by the other officer to do so.

Officer Efficiency Reports

A recent change in officer efficiency reporting regulations will now require submission of letter-type efficiency reports on all officers withdrawn from their normal rating channels to participate in a field maneuver. Under new procedures established by this change, a letter report, in accordance with paragraph 12, AR 623–105, is to be submitted on each officer who is withdrawn from his normal rating channels for more than 15 but less than 60 duty days to participate in a major maneuver (controlled by a headquarters comparable to a corps or higher). These reports are to be prepared by the individual's immediate supervisor for the period of the maneuver and forwarded by indorsement to the parent organization by the rating officer's immediate supervisor for attachment as an inclosure to his next scheduled efficiency report.

RA Augmentation

Reserve officers who applied for a Regular Army commission under AR 601–100 or Circular 601–12 and were not selected, but who have provided themselves with improved qualifications, are urged to reapply after the required lapse of one year.

The identification of every officer with a particular year group provides advantages to some applicants and disadvantages to others. The 1942 year group is already 900 overstrength and although procurement has not been cut off, the applicants in this year group are faced with intensely keen competition for selection. On the other hand, the 1947 year group is understrength by almost the same number. While no unqualified officer is selected for the Regular Army because of space availability alone, there is obviously greater procurement capability in the latter circumstance.

Many officers who were not selected under Circular 601–26 (Harmony Board) have resubmitted under the new authority and have been selected. Favorable action has been possible in such cases because of revised ceilings on all year groups junior to 1941 and additional reports available to the board for consideration.

To summarize and possibly provide guidance for those officers who have already applied or intend to apply for a Regular Army commission, these points identify themselves:

a. Pursue formal collegiate education through some authorized program and be certain that your record reflects such efforts.

b. Ensure that your personal life and individual standards of integrity are of the highest order.

c. Give full appreciation to the value of your accomplishments at service schools as a measure of your continued potential.

There is no magic formula for favorable action. The officer who has demonstrated outstanding capability and has maintained a dynamic program of development will always be welcome in the Regular Army.

Noncommissioned Officers

E9 Promotions

Initiation of the E9 promotion program has been announced by Department of the Army. In order to permit commanders an adequate degree of selectivity, the time required in grade E8 has been established at four months for this initial allocation only. Time in grade requirement will be increased for subsequent quotas. Other prerequisites for promotion to E9 include: recommendation by the immediate commanding officer and an appointable status; completion of 18 years' active Federal service, at least 10 of which are enlisted service creditable in the computation of basic pay; occupation of a position which may reasonably be expected to be upgraded to E9.

As in the case of promotion to E8, there is a below-the-zone provision for promotion of exceptionally outstanding soldiers to E9. Commanders are authorized to appoint, not exceeding 20 percent of their quotas, individuals who have completed at least 10 years active Federal service and who have 10 years of cumulative enlisted service.

Since the Army began to promote to grade E8 on 1 June 1958, a total of 3300 promotions has been authorized to that grade including the current allocation of 800 for the three-month period ending 30 June 1959.

Enlisted Management Program

The first six months' progress in the Army's Enlisted Management Program reveals that by the end of the Fiscal Year (30 June 1959), Army-wide strength in the enlisted super grades reached 2500 E8s and 800 E9s.

During the first four months of the program, approximately 8200 soldiers in selected critical MOSs received an additional proficiency pay of $30 per month. In March, additional proficiency payments to approximately 5000 soldiers were authorized, and these were followed by approximately 5000 additional payments in April. Eligibility for the March and April payments was determined by procedures established under the provisions of the Enlisted Evaluation System.

Quotas for 5900 promotions to permanent grades E7, E6 and E5 have been announced for Fiscal Year 1959. These are the first permanent enlisted promotions in over eight years.

Other improvements in enlisted career attractiveness are being carried out. They include: continued improvement in manpower quality resulting from pre-induction aptitude screening; long-range progressive development of promotion flow for career soldiers through the NCO and specialist vitalization program; individual name assignment by DA of E8 and E9 personnel; continued operation of the enlisted college training program which by 15 April had placed 149 carefully selected soldiers as full-time students in colleges and universities throughout the country (this number is expected to be increased by 21 during the summer session).

New Top Pay Grades

Top pay grades (E8 and E9), with new titles and insignia for noncommissioned officers and specialists, were introduced into the Army Reserve and National Guard starting in June 1959.

Key leaders, such as first sergeants, sergeants major and technically qualified noncommissioned officers in critical areas, are now authorized these pay grades on a basis similar to that current in the active Army. Selected critical specialist personnel will also be awarded the higher grades.

The titles for noncommissioned officers of these two grades are the same for both the Active and Reserve Components of the Army. An E8 will be known as a master sergeant or first sergeant, and an E9 will be known as a sergeant major.

Initial quotas for 871 Army National Guardsmen and 880 Army Reservists for promotion to E8 were authorized beginning June 1.

With the institution of the two new top grades, changes in insignia and titles among some of the lower grades of noncommissioned officers of the Reserve Components have also become necessary. The present title of master sergeant for enlisted grade E7 will be changed to platoon sergeant or sergeant first class, according to assignment. Enlisted Grade E6, now carrying the title of sergeant first class, will be known as staff sergeant. In the enlisted grade E5, sergeant, the grade insignia will no longer include an arc below the chevrons but it will bring back the old "buck sergeant" insignia traditional to the Army.

THE SOUNDING BOARD

This department gives every soldier an opportunity to "sound off" on a wide variety of subjects. It provides an outlet for thinking which need not conform to doctrine or policy. We are interested in constructive ideas—well-conceived and concisely expressed—which challenge or inform. Articles will be paid for at regular rates.

A Point to Ponder

By Capt Chew-Mon Lee

ACCELERATED scientific and industrial competition is bringing us into an era of atomic plenty. Unfortunately, our armed forces will still be outnumbered in this age. To compensate for our lack of manpower, military leaders and service schools advocate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in ground combat. This is sound thinking, and we of the company level understand and accept the logic of using nuclear weapons whenever possible both in the attack and defense. However, one thing causes us considerable concern. There seems to be a tendency to take for granted the use of nuclear weapons in support of counterattacks to destroy the enemy once he enters our battle area.

It is well that we plan to reduce a penetration by counterattacking with all available forces and fires, including nuclear fires, but too often we fail to remember that if the enemy succeeds in penetrating our position, we will still have individuals and small units actively and effectively resisting the enemy within that penetration. It is likely that in nuclear war, with increased dispersion between units, this will be more common than in the past. The point to ponder, then, is this: what will be the psychological impact on a defending Infantryman—indeed, on any soldier in our Army—when he feels that should his position be overrun, he can expect to be the victim of a friendly nuclear weapon during our counterattack?

Although shot and shell have always been the lot of the Infantry soldier, lately the battlefield environment has changed. In the days of "conventional" wars, when our troops were overrun by the enemy we were able to live and win by having friendly fires fall upon our own positions. While we have never enjoyed being shelled by our own comrades, this at times was a lesser evil than losing a position or being destroyed by the enemy. Our likelihood of weathering non-nuclear fires was reasonably good, since our defending soldier had a measure of cover from shrapnel. The enemy, on the other hand, was more exposed and therefore more vulnerable. But the possibility of surviving a nuclear detonation on top of our position plummets to about zero.

Men have been and will continue to be killed in war, so this is not a question of casualties alone. It is one of motivation. If we use nuclear weapons on our own position, the soldier may feel that if he is not killed by the enemy, his perseverance is likely to be rewarded by death from our weapons. This possibility certainly does not motivate him to linger long in the face of an enemy attack. "The word" will spread, as it inevitably does, and may permeate the ranks with a mistrust and fear of plans made by higher commanders and their staffs. Even the stout-hearted may be discouraged from holding their ground, and the weak will be encouraged to withdraw whenever close contact with the enemy is imminent. In effect, the use of nuclear weapons in support of counterattacks could inflict capital punishment on the dedicated who fight on, while sparing the meek who disengage.

Is there anything we can do to make men willing to accept friendly as well as enemy nuclear detonations on their positions? It is not likely that training will accomplish this. To risk death from enemy action in the normal course of battle is one thing, but to look forward to becoming a sacrifice to our own nuclear fires is another. Few of us go into combat resigned to death. We feel that we have a fighting chance to survive. It is only during the heat of battle that values may change and "the cause" will suddenly overcome the instinct of self-preservation—and this does not happen to every man. We cannot expect to *develop* a feeling of expendability.

One solution is to devise an elastic tactic of giving way to enemy attacks to maintain a buffer distance between belligerents so that nuclear weapons can be fired with relative impunity. But this would tend to destroy the "offensive spirit" which wins wars. Other possibilities may be found in the development of protective measures and devices of such efficacy that the defenders' odds of survival would be enhanced, or in the production of low-yield nuclear weapons of

such accuracy that they will be more partial as to whom they kill. Until these developments materialize, however, we must depend on existing equipment and knowledge, since war has a frustrating habit of coming too soon.

A solution can be found now, while nuclear wars are still being fought on paper and in the classroom. We should discourage overreliance on the use of nuclear weapons to support a counterattack every time the enemy penetrates our map-exercise battle area. Most counterattacks should rely on non-nuclear mortar and artillery fires to assist the destruction of the enemy by aggressive Infantrymen. However, if nuclear shells are used, they should in most cases be fired into the base of the penetration. Besides inflicting casualties on the attacker, this will help cut off enemy reinforcements and will give ample assistance to counterattacking reserves, particularly when non-nuclear fires are massed elsewhere within the penetration. Bursts on the base of a penetration will cause fewer friendly casualties than a nuclear blast within the bulge itself. Men can learn to accept this lesser risk. Certainly there will be situations when a nuclear weapon must be used within the penetration, but such employment should be the exception. We must not forget that the American Infantryman has engaged overwhelming numbers of enemy troops in close combat before, and with the able assistance of his brother artillerymen and tankers, has succeeded in destroying the enemy or driving him from the battle area.

Too heavy a reliance on nuclear weapons within our battle position, by sacrificing our own troops, could destroy the fighting spirit of our most precious commodity—man himself.

Current Infantry School doctrine for counterattacks envisions the use of nuclear weapons, together with the fires of other appropriate weapons, to support such attacks when troop safety permits and other conditions warrant their use. Troop safety is a factor that must always be considered in connection with the employment of nuclear weapons.—Editor.

Capt Chew-Mon Lee enlisted in 1945 and, after graduating from OCS in 1947, received a variety of assignments in Korea on three separate tours of duty there. In 1955 he attended the Associate Advanced Course at Fort Benning. Captain Lee received his present assignment with the U.S. Army Element of the Joint Support Group after completing the Associate Course of the Command and General Staff College in 1948.

Our "Gimmick"

By Capt William A. Brown

WHEN I heard it, I thought at first it was just cocktail conversation . . . but I could recall hearing it too often lately to ignore it.

"What we need is a gimmick for the Infantry. . . . The Air Force has SAC and the Atlas, and the Navy has the Nautilus and Polaris. . . . All the Infantry has to sell is the good old unspectacular doughboy. . . ."

The speaker went on, "What the Infantry needs is a gimmick—something imaginative and glamorous to catch the fancy of the public."

At this point he reached the olive in his martini and his train of thought, as well as his philosophizing, was interrupted.

My listening was also interrupted by the hostess who steered me to some newly arrived guests. Unfortunately, I never did get back to the conversation about "the gimmick."

But I thought about it, and, in retrospect, the idea of a gimmick has bothered me. It has bothered me because I find too many people selling the Infantry short. While I agree that space and missiles are exciting and catch the public's fancy, I also think that no war will ever be resolved without good Infantrymen to take and hold the ground.

I don't like to lean on history to prove my point, but look at any war fought in the past century—particularly in the past decade—and you can't help but recognize that Infantry is the ultimate weapon.

This isn't a press agent's cliche or dramatic prose. It is a plain, unvarnished statement of fact.

In Greece, Indo-China, Korea, Egypt, Lebanon or other recent areas of conflict, Infantry has been the unsung, unspectacular and generally unrecognized arm of decision.

I suppose there's a reason for this lack of recognition. Perhaps it's because there is something basically unpleasant and unglamorous about tired, wet Infantrymen fighting and dying to take a hill or to hold a few feet of ground. I don't know of any way you can "spectacularize" the filth, fear and anguish of the foot soldier's war.

Maybe this is the reason so few men clamor to get into the Infantry . . . or why the foot soldier is somewhat forgotten in the space and missile age. Perhaps it explains why some short-sighted people question the future of the Infantry . . . and why others feel it necessary to look for a gimmick.

Whatever the reason, I hope we have more sense than to sell the Infantry short.

Count the divisions—Infantry divisions—which oppose the Free World and consider the numerous "limited" wars of the past decade. It doesn't take much figuring to determine the importance of Infantry. And so I say, we don't need the spotlight or the headline to perpetuate our future.

We don't need a new gimmick. The weapons of future wars may shoot faster and farther, but our progress —and our victory—will still be measured by the progress and victory of the man on the ground—the Infantryman.

This is our gimmick.

Capt William A. Brown, who graduated from OCS in 1945, served in Japan and Korea before attending the Advanced Course at the Infantry School in 1954. Subsequently, he was assigned as Aide-de-Camp to the United States Commandant in Berlin. Captain Brown graduated from the Regular Course of USACGSC in 1958 and is now Operations-Training Officer in Headquarters, Second United States Army.

The Role of the NCO in Our Changing Army

By Sgt Jack F. Holden, Jr.

NO ONE denies that we have entered a new era; many changes are being made and will continue to be made throughout the Army. How will all this affect the Army's "grassroots" leader—the noncommissioned officer? What must he do to continue his vital role?

It would be wise, first of all, for the NCO to realize that times *are* changing, and that changes have occurred not only in the methods and techniques of his particular branch, but Army-wide, in just as important but possibly less obvious ways.

Primarily, what I am getting at here is that too many NCOs seem obsessed with the past. How often have we heard the NCO remark ruefully, "Back in 1940 things were different." Of course they were—we no longer live in 1940. It will soon be 1960! Many veteran NCOs are dumbfounded because the men of their command don't act like the men of the forties. Let's face it. Times change, and so do men and methods of leading men. It should be recalled that the general educational level of the United States in 1940 was about ninth-grade. Today it stands at nearly twelfth-grade, with a considerably higher percentage of the population having attended or graduated from college.

A common complaint from NCOs of long service is that "the new men are always asking why." That is the essence of service in a democracy and, incidentally, since it is also the mark of an intelligent person who is interested in his job, it generally is a good thing for the Army. This is not to defend the "wise guy." It is to note that as the educational level of the soldier increases, different methods become necessary to lead him effectively. The NCO is now—and will increasingly be—faced with a challenge in leadership unparalleled in Army history.

The clear implication is that if the men under him are better educated, and, as a consequence, probably are able to learn their military skills that much faster, the NCO himself will have to insure that his military knowledge is constantly increasing—that *his* education is not neglected. The Army's current educational program provides unusual opportunities for those who will take the time to help themselves. The day has passed when mere barking and "pulling rank"—however necessary it sometimes is—is accepted as evidence of proficient leadership. Technical competence is now one of the primary qualifications.

A vital precept of which the NCO should be aware is that the Army actually mirrors the nation. As the nation changes, its people change and so do their habits, thoughts and ways of doing things. The NCO's problem of knowing his men is therefore going to become more complex as time goes on. The Army is beginning to receive young men who were raised in the turmoil of World War II and whose behavior has been affected by this early environment. It will not be enough merely to demand a high performance of duty from such men —it will be necessary to analyze their personalities and to discover their motivations. The average squad leader probably knows which of his men is uncooperative, and he knows who the "goldbrick" is. But does he know why the man is a goldbrick or how he can be made into a good soldier? The good squad leader must be sincerely interested in the personal problems of his men and in their individual welfare. For example, he should be interested in finding out why Soldier X doesn't get mail from home. Morale implies consideration —mature consideration, not coddling. Passing men on to the chaplain or medics is the easiest, but not always the best, solution.

Actually, we NCOs will get only the prestige we earn and deserve. In these changing times, it will not suffice merely to "pull duty" and to build a reputation as an "old timer." In addition to the classic virtues, the successful NCO must have greater imagination and knowledge, and he must master the more advanced techniques of leadership. *Let's meet the challenge!*

Sgt Jack F. Holden entered the Army in 1944. He served in Europe and the Pacific during World War II. He is now Public Information NCO at Headquarters, U.S. Army First Arctic Test Center, Fort Churchill, Manitoba.

What Are We Doing About It?

By Lt Col Joseph L. Knowlton

It is impossible these days to escape the impact of criticism and analysis. Almost everything we read contains critical comment on some subject—on clothes, food, crime, foreign and domestic policy, teenagers—the list is infinite. Included on the list is the U.S. Army.

There is much comment on the Army's budget, its weapons, its organization. The reading public, which, of course, includes all military personnel, is constantly presented discussion on such broad matters as missile developments, airlift capabilities and requirement for general or limited war. Most of us in the service, in addition to reading about these things, are actually a part of them and problems they present.

Most of the criticism of the Army seems to be directed at the top of the military establishment. "The Army needs increased strength, more money, faster and better weapons development, more pay, better personnel policies, higher standards of performance," say the news items, and even the soldier himself.

Our military leaders at the highest levels are working to solve these matters in terms of billions of dollars, thousands of men, acres of housing, and millions of man-years of honorable, respected military service.

But what are *we* at the lower echelons doing about it?

Most of us are not in a position to shape the major military policies of the day, but we can help to shape the countless minor ones—which have a definite relationship to the big picture.

Let's examine our own professional standards. Are we, in our individual work, contributing to a better product? Are we demanding and getting a higher caliber performance from our subordinates or do we permit inferior work to go unchecked? Are our military surroundings maintained at the high level commensurate with our profession? Do we honestly furnish guidance and stimulus to our subordinates? Do we impress them with the merits of our profession and do we do it frequently? In positions of leadership, do we actually lead?

These questions apply to squad leaders, to commanders at all levels, to members of staff sections . . . up, down, and across the board.

And let's be honest with ourselves and not fall back on such excuses as the scarcity of funds. Instead, let's supply the necessary supervision, decisions, initiative and determination.

The professional soldier, and the man we want to become a professional soldier, will accept personal hardships if he can hold his head up and be proud of his accomplishments. While these accomplishments are influenced to a large degree by high-level policies, to a greater extent they stem from our everyday jobs.

We are small, but very important, cogs in the vast Army machine. What are *we* doing about it?

A Staff for the Deputy

By Maj Robert H. Brigham

The latest changes in the organization of the battle group have made this unit capable of more effective operation in nuclear, as well as non-nuclear, warfare. The addition of the fifth rifle company not only permits greater flexibility and dispersion, but also allows the commander to form a reserve of decisive strength or to detach a portion of the battle group as a task force without seriously impairing the capabilities of the remainder of the unit. The revamped organization also provides someone to command the reserve or a task force—the deputy commander. But there the trend toward flexibility stops. The deputy has been given no organic staff, and without one it is questionable whether or not he will be properly able to control the forces assigned him.

Assuming that the commander will assign an assistant S3, an officer or NCO of the supply and maintenance platoon, and certain communication personnel to aid the deputy when a task force is formed, the agencies which supply these people under the present set-up can expect to be partially hamstrung most of the time. This is true because the task-force type of operation in any future conflict will probably be the rule rather than the exception. It is doubtful, however, that the battle group, already operating with minimum staff personnel, can afford to be without the services of these men. The division organization provides a separate staff for task forces—the brigade headquarters. Shouldn't the battle group also have the capability of providing the deputy with a small staff?

That capability may already exist without our realizing it, and the creation of such a staff might be accomplished without reducing operating efficiency under normal conditions. In fact, the "second staff" would contribute to the battle group's efficiency in a general situation, while also increasing immeasurably its effectiveness when a task force is employed.

The functions of the deputy's staff in a task-force situation are numerous.

Under standard circumstances, when no task force is detached, and when the deputy is not given command over a strong reserve, there are perhaps two main functions this staff might perform. The first function arises out of the fact that, since under nuclear concepts major emphasis is placed on dispersion of units and headquarters, the clear need exists for an alternate battle group command post. As constituted now, however, the command group cannot effect such dispersion and still operate efficiently. Even if the deputy were removed from the command post location, he could not effectively control the battle group should the CP be destroyed. On the other hand, if the deputy had a small staff and were set up in an alternate command post that was properly tied into the battle group communication system, there would be no question about his ability to take over command effectively and immediately.

Secondly, the deputy's staff could also act as a planning staff for the battle group. It is expected that the battle group will operate in a highly mobile and flexible manner; that it will move great distances and be confronted with many different tactical and logistical situations. Considering the probability of many special-type operations' being assigned within a short period of time, there will be a tremendous need for a great deal of detailed prior planning. It would be extremely difficult for the battle group staff to do this planning and still keep up with the current situation. This planning in large part could be handled by the separate staff under the deputy.

These are just two useful purposes our staff could perform under standard circumstances. Though there are many others, it is already clear that the deputy's staff would not be mere "deadwood" when not employed in a task-force or strong-reserve situation.

Let's decide now how the staff should be organized. It should be small, but with enough men and equipment to get the job done. As a minimum, it should have a combination S2–S3 officer, an officer to handle logistics and administration, and a communication officer or NCO with a small operating section. Only the bare necessities in the way of equipment would be provided. It would also be advisable for the two officers to have NCO assistants so that the staff could operate around the clock. But where can we obtain these people without taking them from the unit staff?

It is quite easy to indicate the need for more people, but it is not always so simple to decide where they should come from—especially when we are attempting to keep our organization "lean and mean." However, one of the suggested solutions to the problem requires only the full utilization of personnel now available in the battle group. In almost every instance, the subordinate units of the combat support company operate independently and look to their parent unit only for administrative and logistical support. In a way, this situation makes the combat support company commander a "near relative" of the headquarters and headquarters company commander. Similarly, other members of this company headquarters are only non-tactically employed. Let's give them a job! The company commander can become our S2 and S3 and the others can fill the remaining roles. All that would then be needed to complete our staff would be the attachment of a few personnel from the communication platoon.

This is one answer to the problem of providing a staff for the deputy commander. There may be others, but the important thing we must remember is that the deputy cannot be expected to "go it alone." He must have staff help and this staff must be continuously operational.

The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily reflect official thinking of the Infantry School.

Continued from page 7

Infantry's Mobility Crisis

The keynote of Infantry effectiveness is versatility. Above all else, this versatility must be maintained. *Britannica* defines versatility as "having an aptitude for new tasks or occupations; many-sided: subject to change; variable; free-swinging or turning; movable in every direction." To maintain its versatility, Infantry must understand that *battlefield mobility is indivisible*. Ground mobility and air mobility cannot be treated as separate entities. Infantry must have *whatever it takes at the time*, whether it be foot movement in jungle warfare, carriers for overland exploitation, or both carriers and aircraft for early link-up type operations.

Much is said in military circles about the need to achieve a mobility differential over the Soviets. Such an advantage could go a long way toward leveling existing Soviet bulges in manpower and materiel, but we cannot sit back and wait for American industry to produce this differential. The time for the wide, deep, porous battlefield is now. The time for the long talked-of capability for semi-independent operations is now.

Mobility is a pressing problem which leaves no room for wishful thinking. The only dependable solution involves the use of materiel already in existence or available in the foreseeable future. Otherwise, we are banking on hopes and dreams. After all, Soviet industry is quite up-to-date in producing machines of war. We should already have learned that to bet on a clear-cut technical superiority is to put a great many eggs in a pretty loosely woven basket.

To be specific, it is suggested that:

We maintain our versatility by not committing the Infantry to a program of 100 percent mechanization.

We become as airminded as possible as quickly as possible. Training Circular 20–1, "Airmobile Operations," is the first step in this direction, but we need many more steps backed by aggressive command support.

With the types of aircraft presently in the Army inventory, we can draw ground mobility and air mobility into better balance—and we can do it right now. This can be done by increasing the number of aircraft available for the deployment of Infantry units over the wide areas of the nuclear battlefield. These aircraft would be committed to the support of Infantry fighting elements in the same way as armored tracked vehicles are committed. All Infantry units would be trained to use both, either separately or in combination.

We make a genuine effort to lighten all of our equipment so that it can be moved by Army aircraft. In this connection we must recognize that any increase in the size, weight, or number of ground vehicles in Infantry units will incur a corresponding loss in tactical air mobility and in strategic air mobility as well.

We bend every effort to develop new concepts which will exploit our tremendous advances in firepower and which will maximize our battlefield mobility capabilities. This will entail a free exchange of thought and a willingness to abandon the old and to try the new.

It is important that we begin this program now and at the same time continue to seek breakthroughs in the development of new vehicles. Throughout history, it has been demonstrated again and again that a revolutionary concept of operations can overcome a superiority in numbers. When we develop a concept which combines the best we have in firepower with the best we have in mobility, the Queen of Battle will rule the wide, deep, porous battlefields of the future.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking of the Infantry School.



QUARTERLY QUIZ

Answer the following questions. Determine whether you are a Bolo, Recruit, Marksman, Sharpshooter or Expert. Each of the questions is worth 10 points.

1. The approved method for purifying a canteen of drinking water in the field is to add one:

a. salt tablet and boil for 30 minutes.

b. halazone tablet and wait 30 minutes.

c. water purification tablet (iodine) and wait 15 minutes.

d. calcium hypochlorite ampule and wait 30 minutes.

2. Normal targets for ground combat units manning the machinegun, caliber .50, HB, M2, mounted for AA fire, are:

a. all hostile aircraft.

b. hostile high-performance aircraft.

c. hostile troop-carrier and liaison aircraft.

d. no hostile aircraft unless attacked or endangered by the aircraft.

3. A complete copy of the Signal Operation Instructions (SOI) is not distributed below:

a. platoon level.

b. company level.

c. battle group level.

d. brigade level.

4. The determination of the degree of risk to friendly troops from a nuclear detonation is the responsibility of the:

a. nuclear weapons employment officer.

b. G2.

c. G3.

d. company commander.

5. What tracked vehicles is the Infantry division battle group authorized and where are they located?

6. The responsibility of the transport aviation unit commander in the conduct of a tactical operation in which he will provide support is to:

a. act as the personal pilot of the commander he supports.

b. act as a technical advisor to the tactical commander.

c. command his unit and ignore the tactical commander.

d. consult the division or corps aviation officer for instruction.

7. In the defense, a forward rifle platoon obtains all-around defense by:

a. withholding a reserve.

b. preparing rifle squad supplementary positions.

c. employing three rifle squads abreast in an irregular line.

d. organizing a perimeter defense.

8. When aiming the 3.5-inch rocket launcher, M20A1B1, at the target moving directly towards you, your point of aim in relation to the target must be at:

a. the center of mass of the target.

b. the bottom center of the target.

c. the top center of the target.

d. the center and right edge of the target.

9. The key to effective management of mass casualties in nuclear warfare is:

a. evacuation of all casualties.

b. efficient sorting of all casualties.

c. conservation of essential medical supplies.

d. knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons.

10. What are the two components of the commander's plan of attack?

Answers on page 73

Continued from page 26

COMPETITIVE MARKSMANSHIP
It Pays Off!

If for no other reason than that it provided trained, competent coaches, the Competitive Marksmanship Program would be paying its way with dividends.

It is true that in the past there has been a noticeable failure to make proper use of the instructional resources which the program provides. Improvement in this situation should be brought about simply by a recognition of the merit and utility of competitive marksmanship.

THE Army Advanced Marksmanship Unit, located at Fort Benning, is, of course, the focus of the Competitive Marksmanship Program. Organized in 1956, shortly after the outset of the program itself, the Unit was formed to provide a centralized cadre for the rifle and pistol teams representing the Army in national competitions. It has been highly successful in performing this mission. It won the National Team Champpionships in 1957 and 1958, and expects to win these honors once more in 1959.

Being somewhat representative of the entire program, the Unit performs instructional missions as well. Since the fall of 1956, it has conducted a number of advanced coaching courses, with increasing effect upon Army-wide marksmanship since that time. In addition, it has conducted courses at training divisions for the improvement of the coaching techniques of cadre personnel. It has also conducted a number of marksmanship clinics for TOE units, notably for the 101st Airborne Division after its reactivation in 1957.

Other aspects of this mission of professional guidance and instruction include the clinics which have been organized from time to time to assist various colleges and universities in the formation of rifle teams and in instruction in rifle marksmanship techniques. The Unit, moreover, assists in the continuing Army program to provide instruction and sometimes facilities for the civilian shooter. A National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice was established by Congress prior to World War I as a part of the National Defense Act. This Act provided the basis for annual national matches in which the best shooting talent of the country would be able to compete on a somewhat equal basis for national laurels. With the exception of a period during World War I, and the years 1942 through 1951, this program has remained active. Congress has given some financial support to it, but the major burden must be borne by the services themselves. No other group or association is able to undertake a task of this magnitude, and perhaps no other is as concerned with encouraging high civilian standards of marksmanship.

As an indicator of the success of this enterprise, the National Rifle Association of America states that, while the number of classified shooters, or those entering tournaments, in 1940 was 19,681, by 1959 this figure had increased almost fivefold to 94,548. The number of matches conducted annually rose from 298 in 1940 to 1585 in 1958. It is apparent that national interest in rifle and pistol marksmanship is definitely on the upswing, and that this trend will considerably increase our general defense preparedness.

The Advanced Marksmanship Unit at Benning has other functions, as well. In conjunction with the Springfield Armory and the Frankford Arsenal, it has done much to improve the performance of the standard service rifle. Criteria are set up for gauging and testing such weapons, and the degree of accuracy which results from these studies is made available to every soldier who properly cares for his rifle. Inaccuracy in the soldier's rifle has been determined frequently to be due to excessive disassembly and cleaning. Many of the rifles used today, with standard ammunition, will not group in the Trainfire silhouette at 300 meters. This condition must be remedied in order to give the soldier confidence in his weapon's performance.

The Unit has worked with commercial manufacturers toward the design and development of new types of weapons, some features of which have been or will be incorporated in future arms. More accurate types of ammunition have been tested and developed with USAAMU's assistance, one of which is the 7.62mm boattail round, which soon will be standard-issue for all weapons chambered for the NATO round.

Despite the great and varied utility of the Competitive Marksmanship Program, a frequent complaint is that the Program is too expensive. During Fiscal Year 1959, the Marksmanship Unit was allotted $189,728 for TDY, travel purposes. But this money supports periods of instruction at other units as well as match participation. The Unit's TA equipment does involve another large figure. This cost, however, has been absorbed over a three-year period. In most cases, the tools and equipment it has purchased will be in service for years to come. Twenty percent of the figure is, in any case, not obtainable, due to fiscal curtailments.

These costs are inconsequential if—as I firmly believe—they buy a high state of proficiency with the rifle for the ordinary rifleman. Confidence in his ability to defend himself and to hit what he sees is an important factor in the soldier's accomplishment of his mission. Marksmanship training will give this confidence, and the proficiency to match it. This proficiency—directly or indirectly, by developing its own professional skill, as well as by testing, teaching and fostering marksmanship—is what the Army Advanced Marksmanship Unit, and the Marksmanship Program as a whole, will achieve.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking of the Infantry School.

Continued from page 27

The Price of the Prizes!

reasonable bounds. But the cost of the Army's competitive shooting program with respect to time and personnel is incredibly large. The shooters and the administrative and detail personnel which support them—clerks, typists, truck drivers and ammunition men—account for thousands upon thousands of man-hours. For example, the national matches at Camp Perry require approximately 2000 support troops. The number of full-time personnel assigned to the USAAMU at Fort Benning would nearly fill one combat company. In view of the small effect of the program, such manpower consumption must be eliminated.

When one begins to calculate the cost of this program in dollars and cents, the figures really become astronomical. The budget for competitive shooting for Fiscal Year 1959 at Benning alone has been set at $2,200,000. Multiply this figure by five and you have a good approximation of the total expenditure within the United States upon Army teams alone. Yet there are also Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force and reserve units in the program.

Specifically the USAAMU teams at Fort Benning have a budget which calls for nearly $190,000 for TDY funds during FY 1959. The cost of their Table of Allowance equipment alone is about $680,000. And what is worse, this "sport" is put on the same first-priority basis for funding and manning in the Army Program System as the training of combat troops.

Taking the national matches at Camp Perry as an indicator, if we figure on an average of $250 per month per man, the wages of the personnel supporting the Perry matches would be in the vicinity of $500,000. Add to this the TDY costs, the cost of shipping the equipment used, the cost of incidental transportation, the cost of ammunition and countless other indirect expenses of the sort, and these matches turn out to be the most expensive "sport" the Army maintains—and yet they are absurdly exclusive as well.

If the Competitive Marksmanship Program fulfilled its purpose—if the program offered greater spectator interest—if it produced better combat riflemen—if it were concerned with perfecting methods of training combat riflemen—then it would have some justification.

As matters stand, however, there are no excuses. It has been evident for a long time that the Competitive Marksmanship Program requires serious reappraisal. Now especially, when we are faced with the necessity of maintaining fighting trim on limited budgets, with limited manpower, this reappraisal is urgently needed.

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LETTERS *(continued from page 3)*

mander, a deputy battle group commander and an executive officer who will divide the five companies among them. Naturally, each will require a staff and the staffs will require headquarters equipment and vehicles. In time, the Infantry division will get back up to 18,000 strength and the battle area will be clogged with vehicles. . . .

Let us not forget one thing . . . as far as organization is concerned—eliminate the hierarchical arrangements as much as possible and let the personality of vital leaders predominate! Unnecessary intervening commanders and staffs suck the lifeblood out of combat units by pursuing their miserable little functions which are delegated to them just to get them out of the hair of higher commanders. . . .

GLENN A. FARRIS
Col, Infantry
PMST
University of Florida

Be assured that the Infantry School opposes any unnecessary complication of lines of command. The deputy battle group commander at times requires a staff of his own but it may be constructed from personnel who are already authorized and who normally perform other duties within the battle group (see "A Staff for the Deputy," page 63).—Editor.

Translation

Sir:

I greatly appreciated the article, "New Basic Weapon for the Infantry," by Maj R. H. Oestreich (January 1958 issue of *Infantry*).

After reading the article, I made up my mind to translate it for the Dutch Army, in order to make it possible for more of us to get some knowledge of your methods of increased firepower for forward units. . . .

G. A. GEERTS
Lt, Infantry
Netherlands Army
Tapijnkazerne, Maastricht
The Netherlands

Lieutenant Geerts' translation project is a beneficial step towards ensuring the fullest practicable exchange of military information between the United States and its allies. Infantry *encourages other allied officers to develop similar projects of their own. Except in the case of previously copyrighted material, we are more than happy to grant reprinting rights.*—Editor.

Kudos

Sir:

I have subscribed to *Infantry* for some years now for a variety of reasons. In my command guidance to my battalion (of another branch) I have suggested that all officers and dayrooms subscribe, after belonging to the Army Association and their branch association. In the first place I feel that *Infantry* fills a void left when the expansion of *Army* to include so many branches forced the . . . coverage above the small-unit tactical level. For that reason I am interested in the individual and small-unit technique articles. New developments in weapons interest me. Controversial articles on small-unit techniques, and even on such levels as the new supply system are of interest. I quoted extensively from "Garrison Supply" (by Capts Chandler Goodnow and Benjamin G. Spivey, in the July-September 1958 issue of *Infantry*) in a recent attempt to revise some aspects of supply here. I find most articles of great personal interest, although I am of another branch. The line of demarcation between us grows slimmer on the nuclear battlefield!

WILLIAM A. KNOWLTON
Lt Col, Armor
1st Bn, 3d Armd Cav Regt
Fort Meade, Md.

We appreciate Colonel Knowlton's remarks and are glad to hear once again that Infantry *is helpful to other members of other branches. We have long intended* Infantry *as a magazine not only for Infantrymen, but for all those who work with Infantry.*—Editor.

Sir:

Infantry is the essential part of my military library. . . .

JOSE M. SOLIA
Rio Piedras
Puerto Rico

Sir:

Infantry . . . has been the answer to an Infantryman's prayer. It is beginning to fill the void left by the demise of the old *Infantry Journal*. I look forward to the day when it is a monthly publication . . . . I have turned into an itinerant peddler of magazines . . . and I expect the total for the battle group in new subscriptions to approximate 100. There are quite a few subscriptions already. . . .

Continued on page 72

Continued from page 55

Why Don't We . . .

will eventually replace the KD ranges, it will be several years before all installations complete the changeover, and even then 50-point KD ranges will still be authorized at each major installation. Many dollars and hours are spent on repairing and replacing the "Maggie's Drawers" now employed. Also, the disk is more effective than the red flag in showing the location of a bullet hole outside the scoring area. Using the disk to mark the unscored hole will aid shooters in bringing the bullet-strike into the bull's-eye.

MSgt O. G. Hibbert

. . . **manufacture a universal field eating utensil.** This item would replace the present mess-kit knife, fork and spoon. It would eliminate the necessity of issuing can openers with field rations since it would combine the features of the present can opener and a puncture-type can opener. Our universal utensil would be slightly more concave than the ordinary spoon and would be made both with tines and with a cutting edge. The cutting edge would simply be a serration similar to that on a steak knife. The utensil would be issued in both a right- and left-handed version.

Capt Alfred A. Alvarez

. . . **develop an individual camouflage net of weather resistant paper.** This net would be about 50 inches square and large enough to cover a one-man foxhole. Simple tie-strings would enable several nets to be joined together for larger positions. The net would be primarily brown on one side and primarily green on the other, and would be small enough when rolled to fit easily into a field jacket pocket. If issued as an expendable item with each case of field rations, the net would be readily available to the soldier and would impose no additional burden on the logistical setup.

Capt John D. Bethea

. . . **develop an Electronic Location Finder ("ELF").** When fractional-yield nuclear weapons in the hands of Infantrymen become commonplace on the battlefield (Davy Crockett, the atomic bazooka, points the way), the problem of pinpointing friendly units and effecting pre-nuclear firing coordination will be a serious one. For example, if a company commander wishes to fire an atomic bazooka he, of course, must warn adjacent units. If it is nighttime, the problem of night blindness will require more distant units to be notified. Conventional means of notification are slow. Some units may not get the word and units may not always be able to report accurate, pinpoint locations.

We need an electronic device that might work something like this: The battle group would have an ELF with an electronic board which could pinpoint the exact location of every company-size unit in the area. The commander of the company desiring to fire a fractional-yield nuclear weapon would transmit a coded radio request to the ELF at battle group, giving the azimuth and distance to the enemy target. The ELF would electronically measure the distance and direction of the sending company's radio beam, thus pinpointing the exact location of the firing unit. Simultaneously, it would transmit a coded flash message requiring all company-size units in the area to transmit, thus enabling the ELF to pinpoint their location. The ELF operator would then plot all locations and determine if the planned shot would affect any of the units. If all units were clear, it would flash a coded "OK-to-fire" to the requesting unit. The ELF would do all of this automatically, electronically, in no more than five minutes and with a minimum chance of human error. Meanwhile, the requesting unit would have the atomic bazooka ready for immediate firing. The speed with which such requests could be processed would prevent the enemy from deciphering and acting upon the strike messages.

Capt William A. Brown



Individual camouflage net.

Universal eating utensil.



If mutual extermination were the object of war, hostile nations could have committed suicide very cheaply long ago. If unlimited force were useable in war, no army, navy nor air force in the world would be necessary today. . . .

General Bruce C. Clarke

By Lt Col Gamma Ray

SOME HAVE IT SOME GET IT!

The ability to lead comes naturally to some men, others acquire it. A number of our great commanders were not born with, but had to learn the techniques of leadership.

"He's a born leader!" Often such a distinction is applied admiringly, if incorrectly, to officers or noncommissioned officers who command their units with skill, drive, enthusiasm and ease. These "natural-born" commanders conduct themselves as if the ability to command a unit successfully were a fundamental and inherited part of their makeup.

But is there such a thing as a "natural" leader? If so, are all other less fortunately endowed officers and NCOs doomed to failure or staff assignment (sometimes regarded as synonymous)? Can "natural" leadership be acquired?

One of our outstanding company commanders, in a regiment which probably was the outstanding regiment in Korea, was an officer who was admired, respected and loved by his men. He demanded and received the best from each of them as individuals and as a team. When his company was on the line, he handled it with a tactical skill which would have warmed the hearts of Benning instructors. And when his company was in reserve, it was a showplace which other companies were directed to emulate. The neatness of his unit in garrison was deep—it wasn't the result of superficialities like whitewashed rocks and swept streets. His arms room reflected orderliness, cleanliness and superior maintenance; his supply room was as meticulously arranged as a top-notch hardware store; his mess was a combination club and restaurant; his records and administration were flawless. And the men imitated the example set by this captain whose military bearing and personal demeanor were exemplary. His first sergeant and platoon leaders spoke of him in terms of reverence. He was impeccable in conduct on and off duty. And to make his accomplishments a little more noteworthy and his tasks a little more difficult, this paragon of officer conduct was a Negro captain commanding an integrated company.

There probably are some men with a natural flair for leadership. One was an artillery battery commander who was a "natural" if there is such a thing. He was big, brawny, a football player while at West Point. He wore almost continually a grin which spread from ear to ear. He was a big man physically and, more important, mentally. He loved people and was intensely interested in everything that happened to his men. But he had a fiercely competitive spirit which made him both an outstanding football player and a superior unit commander. When he suggested something to his men they responded with enthusiasm; when he ordered them to a task, no matter how distasteful, they fell to without grumbling. And with high, good spirits, he would try to make his unit the best at whatever was going: battery tests, messes, inspections, motor maintenance, or jumping out of airplanes. He was the kind of officer whose men would follow wherever he wanted to take them. He exuded confidence. He was "gung-ho," well trained, and well liked by everyone. But his competitive spirit could not stand the stagnation of the post-Korea Army, and he succumbed to the attractions of the outside world where, it is said, brave, intelligent men can progress rapidly, without waiting for "seniority."

Others, often thought of as "naturals," have single-handedly written chapters of combat history. Patton, for example, was simultaneously loved and despised, but he got his job done. Napoleon was a despotical military genius whose ambitions proved his downfall. Alexander was another genius who, at the age of 21, wept when there were no more fields for him to conquer. Eisenhower was a diplomat in uniform who molded millions of men from tens of countries, each with its own

MacArthur had his corncob pipe, Stilwell had his campaign hat, and Gavin had

chauvinistic prides, and gave the world an unprecedented victory. Ridgway was a courageous and offensive-minded commander who turned a pessimistic, unenthusiastic Army into a charging, victorious one. Mackenzie was an Indian fighter who, though a martinet and disciplinarian of almost sadistic intensity, went after his goal with a singleness of purpose without which victory over the elusive Indian was impossible. Grant was a washed-up has-been who, like Ridgway, took a discouraged Army and led it and himself to total victory.

Without equivocation it can be said that these men were great leaders. But were they "naturals?" What did they have in common?

Some of them used personal gimmicks. Patton had his pearl-handled revolvers, highly polished riding boots, and stars on every conceivable part of his uniform. Ridgway had his hand grenade, suspenders and jump boots. Eisenhower had his jacket. Mackenzie had his meticulous uniforms even in the saddle on a long forced march. MacArthur had his gold-encrusted cap and outsized corncob pipe, Stillwell had his campaign hat, and Gavin, even as a major general, had an M-1 rifle for a side-arm. Even a well publicized lieutenant, with a flair for the theatrical, wore a Luxenberg cap in Korea.

Personal gimmicks these men had in common. But gadgets did not make them leaders. What intangibles did they have in common?

They all displayed integrity, resoluteness, confidence (whether they felt it or not), intrepidity, competitiveness, icy nerves, a willingness to gamble (MacArthur's attack at Inchon was a stroke of pure bravado and gambling that broke the back of the North Koreans). But, are these necessarily born and inbred instincts? Can't they be acquired?

There is a general officer in the Army today who exemplifies one type of officer. He would never be mistaken for a "natural." He has analyzed himself and correctly recognized himself for what he is—a hard-to-know, demanding, cold, ambitious, intellectual type who is a brilliant staff officer but who is an unenthusiastic and reluctant commander. He does not care particularly whether the units he commands have an esprit and a bonded unity—provided they get the job done. He is, in short, a "cold jug." He dislikes command duty and suffers through it only because he knows it should be on his record to give it balance. He accepts the limitations of his personality and doesn't attempt to change them—even though he might.

Another extremely successful general officer, and this man would seem to be almost, but not quite, a "natural," figuratively "grinds out leadership." As a young officer, he was handsome, almost offensively military, erect, conceited, unbending, humorless, painfully correct. He was cold and unapproachable. He was completely unsympathetic toward his men. He simply did not understand them. But as he grew older he recognized his shortcomings as a leader and resolved to correct them. He learned the techniques of leadership and followed them slavishly. He retained enough of his coldness to make decisions objectively and unemotionally, something which perhaps the leader with too much of the milk of human kindness might not be able to do. But by learning and applying the techniques of leadership, he has become the outstanding young general in today's Army. He built on what he was born with and succeeded in changing his personality—retaining and improving the good and discarding the imperfect.

So far we've taken a look at some so-called "natural" leaders, at a man who had no flair for leadership and who did not want to do anything about it, and at a man who recognized his leadership deficiencies and who corrected them. This latter example would certainly seem to prove that leadership can be acquired.

There is still another type of leader. This would seem to be the ideal. He is a man who arrived at adulthood with the personality traits which make him seem a "natural" but with the desire and the ability to learn the trade of being an officer. By combining the right personality with his training, he becomes the outstanding leader—a man sought after, promoted and recognized.

There are probably many such men in the Army today. One was a lieutenant early in World War II, but eventually he commanded a battalion of tanks in the North African campaign and was later a combat commander in Patton's march across Europe.

His reputation on the battlefield was such that the Germans recognized his tactics and cringed before him. He was able to inject into his unit his own ruthless drive, energy, enthusiasm, bravado, courage and endurance. He planned his attacks with care and daring. And when he attacked he did so with all the force he could muster. He saved ammunition and gas for his attacks. When he moved out he was ready. He attacked with all guns blazing and aimed at the proper objectives. He was not wasteful of his resources but put them to bear on the points where they could do the most good. His men knew they were ready and were supremely confident of themselves, their commander and their unit.

That same tank commander is now a general officer on the Army staff in the Pentagon, a place considered by some as a labyrinth of frustrations, a mausoleum of lost causes, a graveyard of shattered ideals and driving enthusiasms. But this former commander applies to the multifaceted

rifle for a side-arm, but gimmicks such as these did not make them great leaders.

problems of the Pentagon the same daring and unique approaches that he used in combat. By applying these principles to the Pentagon challenge and by utilizing his leadership and competitive urge, he is able to stand out among the staff officers there as a man to be admired and imitated. He is respected by his superiors for his frank and analytical approach to problems, even though he is often in disagreement with the initial opinions of his bosses. But he has the courage to speak out with confidence and knowledge based on meticulous and sometimes dogged research.

He is loved by his subordinates who know that the guidance they receive from him is not for the sole purpose of performing a paper exercise to join countless files of similar studies, memoranda and fact sheets which are produced daily in the Pentagon with the rapidity of high-speed newspaper presses. His subordinates recognize his guidance for what it is—a fresh, well thought-out approach which has substance and meaning. And he doesn't give them conclusions to their studies. He lets them develop their own answers according to the facts.

Is there or isn't there such a thing as a born leader?

Psychologists seem agreed on one point. Given a man with average intelligence and traits of character which permit him to recognize right from wrong, they feel he can be trained to be a good leader by developing in him the proper amounts of initiative, confidence and magnetism. On the other hand, if a man doesn't want to be a leader and is not willing to recognize and correct deficiencies in personality, no amount of training is going to make him a good leader.

Officers and NCOs break down into two general categories—the so-called "natural" leaders and the rest of us. The "naturals" have acquired their traits either through having inherited them, or by having developed them in their growing-up process. But the point here is that by the time they become officers or NCOs they have acquired the personality traits which call attention to what they are —naturals of one degree or another. The captain mentioned in the first part of this article and the ex-West Point tackle represent this category of individual.

The other broad category is that type who neither through natural instincts nor environment has acquired the traits which make him stand out as a leader. He may know what he is supposed to do with his unit but he gets nothing but disgruntled, half-hearted cooperation when he tries to get the job done. He has arrived at adulthood with no sense of men or leadership. If, however, he wants to do something about it and if he has the innate instincts to be developed, he can be taught leadership. While he might be accused of "grinding it out" he is nonetheless a leader in the truest sense of the word. His men respect him, he has no difficulties in getting the job done, and he can live with himself.

Finally, there is that leader who is the most satisfying of all—the "natural" who doesn't rest on his God-given laurels, but who builds on his character and moves ahead. He polishes himself until, like the tank commander, he becomes a daring, dashing, superior commander on the battlefield, or a wise, patient, enthusiatic, morally irreproachable staff officer, in that most difficult of all leadership situations, the Pentagon.

Leaders are analogous to athletes. There are some athletes with natural coordination. They can play low-70 golf the second time out, they can jump six feet on the track after just having won the basketball game for the Alma Mater. They usually end up as nine-letter men. On the other hand, there are those athletes who are not naturally endowed with graceful coordination but doggedly pursue one sport until they master it. They may be able to knock down the opposing interference on the football field nine times out of ten, but they'll never be able to break 60 on the back nine. And then there are non-athletes so badly coordinated that they have some difficulty even in walking.

With leaders it is the same—some are naturals who can and do master all phases of the art and who rise to great heights. Others are average men who doggedly pursue the art. They, too, can rise high but they may have to settle for less publicity than the former group. There are also the average men who do not want to work at leadership. These are the men who are happiest as staff officers and shoot in the middle 90s. They may be brilliant in that capacity but there they expire. Finally, there are those who are barely able to walk. If they get past the commissioning process it's best to make them junior staff officers for the rest of their careers.

A prime example of the dogged student of leadership is the battalion commander who took over a fairly happy, well-trained unit and in three months had turned it into a griping but somewhat better-trained outfit. Four months later, though, he had a happy, spit-and-polish, superior battalion. How did it happen? The commander recognized his mistakes in leadership; he changed them but not his skyhigh standards. As a result he got what he wanted, and so did his men.

The moral of the story? Leaders may be born that way but they can also be developed. Some have it, some get it.

Continued from page 67

LETTERS

You may be interested to know that 52 of these subscriptions came from one company. The only advertising consisted in showing the latest issue to the man. As we are just now in the small-unit phase of training, the magazine sold itself. . . .

JAMES E. LANDRUM, JR.
Col, Infantry
1st BG, 8th Cav
Korea

We of the 12th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruitment District have read and studied with great interest Brig Gen S.L.A. Marshall's book—excerpts of "Sinai Victory" in the April-June 1959 issue of *Infantry*. . . . We note a fine parallel of its lessons and points to our own objectives . . . in the training of Marine Corps Reservists. . . .

M. J. STYLES
Capt, USMCR
Procurement Aids Branch
12th Reserve District
San Francisco, Cal.

Infantry *receives many letters which testify to its value as reference material. An ideal way to keep your copies for future use is in the special* Infantry *binder pictured on our inside back cover.*—Editor.

Unit History

Sir:

. . . I feel that the historical coverage of Infantry units has been slighted. I would like to suggest . . . a new section . . . concerning the parent Infantry regiments currently listed in the Combat Arms Regimental System. These articles should encompass regular Army, National Guard and Reserve regiments to increase the active and non-active Infantryman's knowledge of and interest in his branch and unit.

This section . . . could be started with an over-all explanation of the purpose of the CARS system, ultimate aims concerning the establishment of permanent home stations of the regimental headquarters, museum, etc., and comment on how far the program has progressed. Articles on each of the regiments might consist of . . . the regimental crest brief explanation of the crest's history and meaning; list of regimental honors; historical . . . item; battle groups now active and where stationed. . . .

DONALD O. CRUTCHLEY
Capt, Infantry
Combined Arms Branch
The Quartermaster School

The type of presentation you propose is already under consideration by Infantry. *We appreciate your suggestions.*—Editor.

SCHOOL LISTS 1959-1960

The following Infantry officers have been selected to attend the Infantry Officer Advanced Courses at the Infantry School during FY 1960.

Class I

CAPTAINS
Aaron, Thomas E.
Adams, Henry L.
Arculis, Sherwin
Atkinson, Robert V.
Bamford, Charles F. 2d
Baumann, Adolph E.
Beelman, Dale C.
Boos, Michael A.
Bradley, James T.
Brawn, Glen E. Jr.
Burgess, Robert L.
Carlson, Gerald J.
Carpenter, Archie E.
Cassidy, John J.
Clark, James
Clark, John R. Jr.
Collier, Thomas W.
Cravens, James O.
Culbertson, Sam R.
Dombrowsky, A. J. Jr.
Evans, John C.
Eyman, Robert F.
Fite, Richard A.
Fleming, Jack R.
Foss, Peter J.
Gary, Robert P.
Gluck, Donald W.
Gray, Paul A.
Hall, Henry R. Jr.
Hamner, Charles T.
Hastings, Wallace H.
Herstrom, Frederick W.
Hinton, John
Hippler, Richard A.
Kearns, Norman D.
Kimball, Albert L.
Kingery, Thomas E.
Larkin, Richard X.
Lowery, Brutus A. Jr.
Martin, David H. Jr.
McGregor, Frank A.
McManus, Richard J.
Mickel, Larry S.
Morrissey, Robert L.
Mundy, Angus M.
Murray, George R. Jr.
Nix, Edward J.
Neville, James C.
Perkins, James I.
Pierce, Robert W.
Price, James E. Jr.
Racheck, Robert A.
Rhiddlehoover, Loyd P.
Rizzo, Paul J.
Sarkesian, Sam C.
Schowalter, Edw. R. Jr.
Sears, Robert L.
Shelton, Mason R.
Shuffstall, Donald C.
Siegert, Robert W. Jr.
Smith, Herbert M. Jr.
Steen, Charles S. Jr.
Stone, Lawrence J.
Swann, H. L. Jr.
Thompson, Edmund A.
Turner, George M.
Underhill, George R.
Underwood, Bibb A.
Volk, Robert H.
Walker, Charles J.
Wardinski, Michael L.
Watson, Elmer E.
Wheeler, Robert J.
Williams, Donald L.
Wiseman, Delter B.
Witherell, John R.
Wyer, Robert M.
Zamparelli, Alfred A.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS
Ades, Leroy P.
Bacon, Willis G.
Bailey, David G.
Bauman, William F.
Bard, John C.
Bell, Robert S.
Berzinec, William E.
Boggs, Joseph C.
Bowen, James E. III
Bradley, William C.
Brogan, Thomas W.
Burnison, George E.
Butler, Don A.
Byrom, Robert
Callinan, William F
Cate, Hugh C. Jr.
Ching, John Y. S
Clapp, Max A.
Cole, David A.
Collins, Ashby F.
Cook, Robert C. Jr.
Corbett, Cleveland
Culver, James V.
Currier, Eugene R.
Davis, Jack C.
DeJarnette, Larry N.
Donahue, James G.
Donnely, Eugene M.
Fischer, Richard F.
Fry, Dudley L. Jr.
Gheen, John W.
Gillard, Robert W.
Goss, Ephriam M.
Greeley, Leonard J. Jr.
Hall, Sayward N. Jr.
Hallmark, Robert C.
Halterman, Harry W.
Hawkins, Laurence R.
Herring, Shelby D.
Holloway, Teddy G.
Huntington, Raymond
Hurless, Bernard F. Jr.
Jessee, William T.
Johnson, Cornell
Jones, Daryl D.
Jones, Richard A.
Joyce, Thomas F. Jr.
King, William W.
Klopp, Charles A.
Kotas, Nicholas S.
Kros, William J.
Larson, Walter R.
Lopes, John F. Jr.
Malone Dandridge M.
Martin, Robert N.
Matson, Hugo W.
Matthews, Lloyd J.
McCusker, George E.
McGuffin, Robert F.
Meloy, Guy S. III
Menetrey, Louis C.
Miller, Richard J.
Mizell, John J. Jr.
Monclava, Irving
Mullen, Gordon R.
Old, William D. II
Panageas, Dan P.
Panton, William E.
Pawlowski, Edward J.
Petty, Howard P.
Pierce, James R.
Pistone, Louis J.
Portteus, Willard L. Jr.
Pritchett, Charles C.
Rapp, Charles M.
Ray, William E.
Reisling, Glenn M. Jr.
Rice, David K.
Schludecker, Otto A.
Schmidt, Herbert R.
Schweikert, Paul Jr.
Serven, Harold M. Jr.
Shelby, Jerry L.
Shiraishi, James T.
Siebert, Frederick J.
Singleton, Russell K. Jr.
Smythe, John D.
Stanberry, Bill M.
Starke, John B.
Stenehjem, George N.
Story, Billy L.
Thompson, William J.
Tobey, Joel M.
Trapp, Lawrence R.
Van Sickle, James P.
Waldrop, Max L.
Ward, Floyd J. Jr.
Warren, Carl W.
Watson, Jack D.
Westmoreland, John H.
Wilson, Robert E.
York, Don J.
Young, Roy J.

Class II

CAPTAINS
Aldridge, George W.
Alves, Manuel A.
Asensio, Manuel J.
Bailey, Vincent P.
Barger, Ferdinand O. Jr
Bauer, James C.
Black, Charles S. Jr.
Bohen, John M.
Boyles, William B.
Brayton, Neal C.
Carmichael, Donald Q.
Carter, Robert H.
Champlin, Allen R.
Chriss, James V.
Coleman, Richard C.
Cook, Robert S.
Cuta, Weston W.
DeHaven, Don L.
Deskis, Anthony J.
Durie, Robert E.
Duskin, Edgar W.
Fitzpatrick, Thomas W.
Fuqua, Harold E.
Garretson, Kenneth C.
Graham, James A. Jr.
Hahn, James R.
Hamilton, Philip W. Jr.
Harris, Charles M.
Haun, Phillip D.
Helmick, Floyd J.
Herndon, James D.
Hill, John G.
Holmes, Robert S.
Kimmel, Robert G.
Knight, Daniel B. Jr.
Kowaleyski, Stanley W.
May, Edwin M. Jr.
McCarey, Guy H. Jr.
McLean, Thomas S.
McMenemy, Alexander
McWhinnie, Hugh
Miller, George W.
Moran, Conrad V.
Morris, John P.
Newton, Robert D.
Nunn, Thomas C.
Pugh, Philip S. III
Reish, Richard D.
Rhodes, Robert H.
Richardson, Wm. F. III
Rockhold, Howard R.
Samisch, Hillel, Jr.
Sampels, John D.
Scalise, Serifino, A.
Schaefer, Richard B.
Severin, Roy R.
Simpson, Robert I. Jr.
Snyder, Howard W.
Spurlock, William W.
Sterling, Norris P. Jr.
Sullivan, Milton D.
Swift, Kenneth R.
Trepagnier, Jules C. Jr.
Turner, James J.
Utzman, Charles D.
Vallese, Blaise H.
Waldman, Francis J. Jr.
Wallis, Charles R.
Weed, Mahlon G.
Whitmore, James F.
Wilder, Bliss W.
Wirth, Paul R.
Withers, Peter C.
Wood, Robert W.
Zuver, Edward L.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS
Alameda, Donald J.
Arduna, Arthur A.
Bailey, William R. Jr.
Banks, Douglas T.
Beasley, Linton C.
Berkey, Ronald R.
Boggs, William L.
Bowers, James M.
Bradbury, Donald K.
Bricker, James W.
Broman, Ralph W.
Buckner, Allen M.
Byrnes, Vincent F. Jr.
Calhoun, George B.
Callahan, Bernard L. J.
Chaney, Otto P. Jr.
Chirio, Michael L. Jr.
Cioffi, William G.
Coffey, Vernon C. Jr.
Comer, Ralph L.
Congleton, Roy E.
Cory, Billy J.
Davis, Bobby J.
Davis, Curtis W. Jr.
Davis, Robley W. Jr.
Delhanty, Raymond A.
Doyle, Francis J.
Fargason, William H.
Farrar, John H. Jr.
Fountain, Charles D.
Fust, John W. Jr.
Garman, Frederick E.
Gazlay, John C.
Ginn, Louis H. III
Guy, George S. Jr.
Haeussler, Rodolfo
Harper, William B.
Hensley, Rayburn K.
Horwedel, Alan T.
Huntley, David L.
Jenkins, William M. Jr.
Jenne, Dale E.
Johnson, Dion
Johnson, Robert H.
Jones, John R.
Jordan, William R.
Junko, Allen L.
Kelly, Edward J.
Kempf, Neil H.
Kourakos, George S.
Landry, Clifford J.
Lecroy, Richard J.
Lodge, Thomas C.
Mackun, Joseph D.
Marrow, James E.
Martin, James R.
Massey, Joseph O. Jr.
McClain, Richard A.
McGreevy, Edgar R.
McGregor, Thomas
McSorley, Lester F.
Miller, Kenneth M.
Mitchell, George W.
Moffett, Norman A.
Murphy, Philip J.
Nugent, Thomas J.
Oliver, Henry M.
Patnode, C. A. Jr.
Pearce, Richard H.
Percy, Francis J.
Perry, William R.
Pfanzelter, Max R.
Potter, Russell C.
Powell, Herbert U.
Purcell, Henry C. III
Qualls, Orbun F. Jr.
Raymond, Robert A.
Rew, Leland C. Jr.
Rice, Harrold E.
Ross, Robert I.
Rumsey, Frank A. Jr.
Schneider, George J.
Schotanus, Merle W.
Scovel, James A.
Seto, Sam C. Jr.
Shea, Eugene A.
Sherron, Gene T.
Simko, Andrew M.
Sims, Roy D.
Smith, Julian H.
Snow, Robert R.
Stein, Albert E.
Stevenson, William J.
Stout, Herald F. Jr.
Sweeney, Kenneth J.
Thorpe, Marion E.
Troutman, Gregory L.
Tunmire, Dana
Vaught, Ralph R.
Ware, Fletcher K. Jr.
Weekly, Ralph E.
Weeks, Robert E.
Welsh, Robert W.
Wenzel, Carl L.
Wise, John E.
Woodyard, John H.
Ziegler, Richard G.



ANSWERS TO QUARTERLY QUIZ *(See page 65)*

1. **c.** Water in issue canteens can be easily disinfected with issued water purification tablets (iodine). One tablet is needed for every quart or canteen full of clear water, though two tablets should be used if the water is muddy or off-color. Replace canteen cap loosely to allow a little leakage. Wait five minutes. Shake thoroughly so a little water leaks out and disinfects the screw threads. Then tighten the canteen cap. Wait 10 minutes before drinking, or adding beverage powders. If water is very cold, wait 20 minutes. Halazone tablets are no longer issued.[1] (Chap 3, Par 57, FM 21–10, May 1957, and directions on label of water purification tablet (iodine) bottle)

2. **c.** Hostile troop-carrier and liaison-type aircraft are normal targets for ground combat units manning the machinegun, caliber .50, HB, M2, mounted for AA fire. Ground combat personnel will not normally engage other types of aircraft unless taken under direct attack. (Chap 10, Sec I, par 146, FM 23–65, December 1955)

3. **c.** Since SOIs contain information that is of particular value to the enemy because it is a means through which additional information can be gathered, complete copies should not be carried to forward areas where they are exposed to capture. Normally, extracts of the SOI are produced for the forward units. (Chap 7, Sec II, par 53a, FM 11–16, August 1958)

4. **d.** When nuclear weapons are employed in proximity to friendly troops, a determination must be made as to the degree of protection (foxholes, tanks, exposed, etc.) which the troops will have at the instant of detonation. A second decision required involves the degree of risk (amounts of thermal radiation, nuclear radiation or blast overpressure which should not be exceeded for troop safety). This determination is a command responsibility. Although it may become a matter of SOP, the CO is still responsible. (Par 59, DA Pamphlet 39–1)

5. The Infantry division battle group is authorized two light tanks and two personnel carriers. The two tanks are organic to the tank section of the reconnaissance platoon, one carrier is organic to the rifle squad and one is organic to the support squad. The reconnaissance platoon is organic to the combat support company, Infantry division battle group. The personnel carriers are used to mobilize the rifle and support squads, and also to transport the radio set AN/VRC–15 organic to each squad. The two tanks are used to provide limited antitank protection, and direct fire support for the reconnaissance platoon. (Pars 7, 8 and 9, Sec III, "Equipment," Table of Organization and Equipment Nr 7–19D (Draft), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Combat Support Company, Infantry Division Battle Group)

2. **b.** When a transport aviation unit is notified that it will support a tactical operation, the commander or designated member of his staff establishes and maintains liaison with the tactical unit it will support. The transport aviation unit commander or his representative acts as a technical advisor to the tactical commander in all matters pertaining to aviation unit organization and employment. (Chap 2, Sec II, par 18, FM 57–35, June 1958)

7. **b.** Supplementary squad positions are selected to provide all-around defense of the platoon area. If the platoon area is penetrated or threatened from the flanks or rear, the platoon leader may adjust his defense by moving men and weapons from the least engaged area into prepared supplementary positions to meet this threat. Normally, the forward rifle platoon does not withhold a reserve. The rifle squads prepare and occupy primary positions, usually on the forward slope of the terrain features being organized, except in reverse slope defense. (Par 138c(4), FM 7–10, January 1959)

8. **b.** The gunner estimates the range and sets the indicator arm at the correct position on the range scale plate, disregarding the speed of the tank. He positions the target on the reticle so that the vertical centerline passes through the center of mass of the target. If the target is moving toward him, he places the selected horizontal range line on the bottom of the target. This compensates for the slow muzzle velocity of the rocket and takes into account the gradual range change. (Par 38(2), FM 23–32, April 1956)

9. **b.** The immediate grouping of wounded according to type and seriousness of injury and likelihood of survival assures allocation of limited medical and evacuation means for the greatest benefit to the largest number of individuals. Sorting also identifies casualties who can temporarily continue their primary duty, care for themselves and others, and participate in rescue operations. (Par 6, TB Med 246, DA, October 1955, and Problem 2309, "Medical Aspects of Nuclear Explosions," Medical Committee, Special Subjects Department, USAIS, January 1959)

10. The commander's plan of attack consists of a scheme of maneuver and a plan of fire. The scheme of maneuver indicates how the maneuver elements (Infantry units, and tanks and other attachments) are to be employed to accomplish the mission. The plan of fire supports the scheme of maneuver and is the commander's decision on the use of all available fires. These two plans are made concurrently since they are interrelated. (Chap 2, Sec II and IV, Advance Sheet, Rifle Company, Infantry Division Battle Group, May 1959)

[1]Question 1 is the corrected version of the question found in the April-June issue of *Infantry*.

WHAT'S NEW FOR INFANTRYMEN

Changes • New Developments • Items of Specific or General Interest to Infantrymen

Cable-Laying System

The Army has developed a system for laying a newly developed multi-channel telephone cable by helicopter at speeds up to 100 miles per hour, five to ten times faster than previous methods. The lightweight telephone cable can carry 96 separate two-way conversations simultaneously.

The system utilizes a compact package which hooks under a standard Army helicopter and carries 10 miles of cable packed in zig-zag fashion to prevent snagging at high pay-out speeds.

Use of this technique will allow the new cable to be laid over bodies of water and impassable terrain. The same technique could be put to civilian use in flood or other disaster areas.

M60 Machinegun

A contract for the first commercial production of the new 7.62mm general purpose M60 machinegun has been awarded. The $2,700,000 contract for 5835 machineguns, with spare parts and manufacturing data, will establish a mobilization base for future production of this newly developed weapon, as well as supplying a portion of the current requirements for this gun.

The M60 will eventually replace the three existing caliber .30 machineguns. It fires the standard 7.62mm NATO cartridge, and can be fired from the shoulder, the hip, a bipod, and a newly developed aluminum tripod.

M14 Rifle Modified

Recent modifications made to the basic M14 rifle permit its use as an automatic rifle combining most of the features of the M15, originally conceived as the automatic weapon, in one design. Modifications include a hinged butt-plate, ventilated upper handguard and provisions for a bipod.

Modified M14 Rifle.

Sugar-Cube Radios

Radios as small as sugar cubes have been successfully developed by using micro-module circuits which are expected to play an increasingly important role in the field of defense electronics.

The micro-module program, underway since April, 1959, marks the beginning of the "cubist" era in electronics. In this new scientific and engineering revolution, the vast range of jobs done by transistors and other electronic parts is being compressed into tiny micro-modules—circuit building-blocks measuring only a third of an inch on each side. This small size can save critical space and weight in future satellite systems and rockets.

The military logistics complex for supporting highly mobile, widely dispersed forces of the modern Army is expected to be simplified by micro-modules. Easy replacement of defective parts in electronic equipment will require fewer skilled repairmen. Material tonnage, transport and storage will be greatly reduced.

Since the program was launched, tests show that the tiny cubes promise to be dependable and long-lived, and to use little power, deliver high performance and greatly simplify repairs. Their simplicity and unitary design make them extremely rugged.

Motor Vehicle Inspections

An idea which may revolutionize methods of inspecting motor vehicles and result in large savings in money and manpower by taking the guess work out of diagnosing engine and electrical troubles is being studied by the Army.

The new method of trouble-shooting engines and electrical systems of both combat and administrative vehicles calls for use of electronic equipment to pinpoint sources of malfunctions and potential breakdowns.

The automatic checkout technique would employ electronic inspection for quick analysis of all parts of a vehicle, including its ignition system, engine, drive and other components. In addition to locating actual disorders and potential trouble spots, regularly scheduled, but sometimes unnecessary, maintenance and servicing would be eliminated if the new system proves workable.

SS11 Antitank Missile.

SS11

France's new antitank missile, the SS11, is shown mounted on Republic Aviation's Alouette II jet helicopter at the missile's unveiling at the World Congress of Flight at Las Vegas, Nevada. The missile, developed by the French with the assistance of the United States Army, is a remote-controlled, guided missile powered by a solid propellant.

The new missile, described as being able to knock out any known type of tank, can be launched from planes or helicopters, as well as from the ground.

M60 Tank

Plans to order 180 of the Army's new diesel-powered 52-ton main battle tanks, the M60, have been announced by the Department of the Army.

The M60 will replace both the present medium 50-ton M48 and the heavy 60-ton M103 tanks, since its new British-made 105mm gun is capable of defeating all known armored vehicles.

In addition to the heavier armament, and the diesel engine which will greatly increase the tank's operational range, the M60 has a simplified fire-control system. Its track and suspension system will be similar to the present medium tank. A crew of four will operate the new tank.

The 750-horsepower Continental diesel engine gives the M60 a speed of 32 miles per hour on hard surfaces and a fuel range of 250 miles. The M60 has three principal advantages over other models: Its 105mm gun outclasses the 90mm gun on current medium tanks; its diesel engine provides 30 to 40 percent more range and presents less fire hazard since the fuel is less volatile; and the increased armament gives additional protection to the four-man crew.

Shillelagh

The Shillelagh, a new lightweight surface-to-surface guided missile system for close-in support of troops, is about ready for full-scale development, the Department of the Army has announced.

The Shillelagh greatly increases firepower against armor, as well as troops and field fortifications. It is expected to be operational in the mid-1960s. Vehicle mounting is one application of this system.

XM410

The XM410, the first of a new family of Army trucks, will soon be tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

The new "intermediate-duty" truck will have approximately 30 percent greater payload-to-vehicle-weight ratio and 50 percent better fuel mileage than the present 2½-ton truck with the XM410 is designed eventually to replace.

Using an aluminum integral body frame, the truck is so constructed that it will float when empty or loaded. An eight cylinder 165-horsepower engine, which eventually will be able to use gasoline, kerosene or diesel fuel, is being utilized. All major components of the 8x8 XM410 will be interchangeable with the proposed 4x4 1-ton and 1½-ton member of the intermediate family. (The term "8x8" indicates that there are eight wheels with power transmitted through all eight wheels.) Greater mobility will be achieved through independent suspension on all wheels.

The weight of the XM410 has been reduced by approximately 5000 pounds from the current weight of the 2½-ton truck. This is in line with the effort to reduce weight to secure better air-transportability and greater fuel mileage.

XM410 Intermediate-Duty Truck.

SD4 Swallow.

"Swallow"

This is the first glimpse of a full-scale mockup of the SD4 Swallow, a jet-propelled all-weather reconnaissance drone. The pilotless Swallow will use infrared detection, radar, photography and other sensory devices to "spy" on enemy battlefield operations.

Multi-Channel Radio

Development of a new mobile multi-channel radio set for use by the U. S. Army in forward area combat communication has been announced by the Department of the Army.

The new tactical radio equipment, designated AN/GRC–53, is one-third smaller than and one-half the weight of field equipment currently performing a similar function.

During a recent demonstration, two Army Signal Corps soldiers set up the entire equipment and had it operating in 24 minutes.

The equipment is housed in a standard Army shelter mounted on a ¾-ton truck, and is designed to give the field forces swift, reliable communication. The set carries its own power supply, antenna equipment and cabling.

The AN/GRC–53 provides 400 radio frequency channels in the band of 50 to 150 megacycles. It can provide simultaneous transmission facilities for 12 traffic channels over distances of up to 20 miles. Twenty-four persons can use the system simultaneously without interference.

The Army's newest radio is rugged and will withstand vehicular movements over rough terrain, as well as parachute drops and helicopter lifts.

Parachute Assembly

A parachute-harness assembly, incorporating a canopy release designed to prevent paratroopers from being dragged by surface winds after landing, has been standardized for use on Army troop-type parachutes.

The canopy release is a safety device to be used only after landing when there is the danger of being dragged. It enables the paratrooper to free the canopy from the parachute-harness in about six seconds.

Procurement of the new harness assembly and canopy release is expected to start shortly.

Conversion to Metrics

The United States Army Infantry School will use the metric system of measurement starting 1 July 1959 in instruction and instructional materials and literature. The USAIS feels that a more liberal use of the metric system will eliminate many problems created by a dual system of measurement. Many operational concepts and doctrines (forward observer procedures, frontages and depths of units, range estimation, etc.) are affected by the range of organic and supporting weapons. It has been necessary to shift constantly between metric and English systems in order to integrate the capabilities and operational employment of these weapons with tactical situations.

Conversion to one system, the metric system, will facilitate standardization within NATO to include weapons, tactics and doctrines. In addition, the conversion should enhance allied training. Also, since the standard map system is expressed in meters, it will eliminate the use of dissimilar terms in linking maps to terrain and vice versa.

The conversion will include field and technical manuals, as well as problems and exercises.

"Chinook"

The Department of the Army has announced that it will negotiate for the development of a new two- to three-ton capacity transport helicopter, the YHC1B, nicknamed the "Chinook."

The "Chinook" will be a tandem-rotor, turbine-powered craft with rear-loading ramp. It eventually will replace the Army's current inventory of obsolete piston-engine transport helicopters. It is expected to carry a maximum of 40 troops.

Army Uniforms

Several uniform and accessory changes have recently been approved and will appear in appropriate regulations.

- A lightweight model of the Army Green fur-felt service cap has been authorized for optional wear by officers. Six manufacturers have been certified by the Quartermaster Quality Control Office to make the caps.
- A service-cap frame with interchangeable Army Blue, Army Green and Army White covers has been authorized for optional wear by officers.

• A short-sleeve tropical worsted shirt has been authorized for optional purchase. It may be worn with long trousers of the same material in accordance with regulations applying to the wear of the short-sleeve cotton shirt.

• The Office of the Quartermaster General has published a modification of the taupe raincoat, shade 179, which will eliminate leaks at the shoulder seams. Directions contained in MWO/QM 32 will be used at post, camp and station level to modify raincoats in stock and in the hands of troops when it has been determined necessary. The modification will be free to the purchaser.

New Training Literature & Films

MANUALS

The following manuals and training literature have recently been printed by Department of the Army and are available to instructors through normay supply channels:

DA Pam 23–2, Hits Count (revision).

FM 7–10, Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Group (new).

The following manuals and training literature have been forwarded to Department of the Army for publication:

ASubjScd 7–3, Weapons and Squad Tactical Training (revision).

ASubjScd 7–11, Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (new).

ASubjScd 7–20, Rifle Squad Tactical Exercise (revision).

ASubjScd 7–113.1, Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist (new).

ASubjScd 21–30, 3.5-inch Rocket Launcher, M20A1 and M20A1B1 (revision).

ATP 7–12, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Division Battle Group (new).

ATP 7–62, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Infantry Division Trains and Infantry Division Band (new).

ATP 20–52, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Replacement Group; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Replacement Battalion and Replacement Company (new).

ATP 29–52, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Airborne Division Support Group (new).

ATT 7–11, Airborne Division Battle Group (new).

ATT 7–62, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Band and Security Section, Infantry Division Trains and Infantry Division Band (new).

ATT 7–168, Pathfinder Team (new).

ATT 57–1, Air Movements (new).

FM 21–75, C1, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling (change).

FM 23–65, C2, Browning Machinegun, Caliber .50, HB, M2 (change).

TC 20–( ), Airmobile Operations (new).

The following field manuals and other training texts are being written or rewritten. Publication may be expected later this year, or early during 1960:

AR 600–73, Standards for Expert Infantryman Badge (revision).

ASubjScd 7–21, Weapons Squad Tactical Exercise (revision).

ASubjScd 7–( ), Assault Gun Platoon Tactical Exercise (new).

ASubjScd 7–( ), Reconnaissance Platoon Tactical Exercise (new).

ASubjScd 21–24, Night Firing and Night Vision (revision).

ATP 7–17, C1, Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Group, Light Weapons Infantryman and Heavy Weapons Infantryman (change).

ATP 57–6, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Division Command and Control Battalion and Administration Company (new).

ATT 7–2–1, Security Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Division (TOE 7–2T) (revision).

ATT 7–17, Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Groups (revision).

ATT 57–6, Security Platoon and Band, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Division Command and Control Battalion (new).

FM 7–10, Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Groups (revision).

FM 7–24, Communication in Infantry and Airborne Divisions (revision).

FM 7–40 w/C1, C2, C3, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Groups (revision).

FM 20–( ), Military Dog Training and Employment (new).

FM 21–5, Military Training (revision).

FM 21–76, C1, Survival (change).

The following manuals and training literature have been submitted to United States Continental Army Command for review and approval:

ASubjScd 7–2, Rifle Squad Tactical Training (revision).

ASubjScd 7–10, Browning Automatic Rifle, Caliber .30, M1918A2 (revision).

ATT 7–52, Security Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Brigade, Separate (new).

FM 22–5, C1, Drill and Ceremonies (change).

FM 23–5, C1, U.S. Rifle Caliber .30, M1 (change).

TRAINING FILMS

The following training films have been approved for release to requesting units:

GF 11–42, Introduction to Telegraph Terminals AN/TCC–20 and AN/TCC–4, 16 minutes.

MF 16–9046, The Power of Resurrection, 62 minutes.

MF 30–8993, Free Europe—Part III—Steps Toward Unity, 33 minutes.

TF 3–2732, Employment of Smoke in Combat Operations, 19 minutes.

TF 3–2733, The Chemical Smoke Generator Company, 18 minutes.

TF 5–2682, Principles of Anchoring Floating Bridges, 33 minutes.

TF 5–2683, The M4T6 Floating Bridge, 33 minutes.

TF 5–2734, Panel Bridge Bailey Type M2—Part IV—Multi-Span Bridges and Panel Crib Piers, 38 minutes.

TF 6–2404, The Corporal Missile—Defueling Proceddure, 25 minutes.

TF 8–2675, Management of Mass Casualties—Part VI—Sorting, 13 minutes.

TF 8–2712, Management of Mass Casualties—Part X—Management of Pscyhological Casualties, 24 minutes.

TF 9–2684, Packing and Adjustment, M135 Truck Wheel Bearings, 7 minutes.

TF 9–2723, Surveillance of Ammunition, 19 minutes.

TF 11–2719, Pole Line Construction—Part VII—Stringing the Wire, 35 minutes.

TF 11–2747, Operation of Field Telephones, 29 minutes.

TF 16–2740, Reputation, 9 minutes.

TF 16–2741, Self-Discipline, 6 minutes.

TF 19–2273, The Search, 7 minutes.

TF 44–2605, Nike Hercules SAM Battery Orientation and Synchronization—Part 1—Leveling, 20 minutes.

TF 44–2629, Nike Ajax System, Missile Tracking Radar, Range Zero Set and Coding Interval Adjustment, 6 minutes.

TF 46–2665, H34 (Choctaw) Flight Maneuvers—Part I—Basic, 22 minutes.

TF 46–2666, H34 (Choctaw) Flight Maneuvers—Part III—Intermediate, 31 minutes.

TF 46–2667, H34 (Choctaw) Flight Maneuvers—Part III—Advanced, 24 minutes.

Monthly List of Instructional Material

Starting with this issue, *Infantry* will list all training literature which has appeared in the United States Army Infantry School's *Monthly List of Instructional Material* during the three preceding months.

The Monthly List, an official publication of the Infantry School, is produced to facilitate the coordination of Infantry doctrine among Army service schools and to offer Infantry School instructional materials to Army agencies which conduct, support or monitor school-type instruction. As the name implies, it is published monthly and includes all significant materials prepared and printed at the School during the preceding calendar month. It is distributed under the provisions of USCONARC Memorandum Number 48, dated 14 October 1958, and each authorized addressee is furnished one gratuitous copy of any item listed which he specifically requests for official use.

We are publishing the items in *The Monthly List* as a service to Infantry readers so they will know what materials are being produced by the Infantry School.

All items which are preceded by an asterisk may be purchased from the Book Department, USAIS, Fort Benning, Ga., at the prices indicated, by anyone who is a member of the U.S. Armed Forces and who so states when ordering. The official military unit or agency address should be included with all such orders since franked mail cannot be sent to a private residence. If a personal address is given, the cost of postage must be inclosed with the order.

The items not marked with an asterisk are produced in limited quantities for resident instruction at the Infantry School and are not available for purchase. However, a unit or agency having a strong *official* need for any of these items may request a gratuitous copy from the Doctrine Publications Office, USAIS, Fort Benning, Ga. Such requests must state the purpose for which the material is needed and must include the official title and unit or agency address of the requester. Properly justified requests will be filled so long as the supply lasts.

Items from the March 1959 Monthly List:

Map and Aerial Photo Reading Fundamentals and Techniques, 2181–USAR (RDT), two hours. A conference covering the fundamentals and techniques of the use and application of the grid magnetic (G–M) angle in the conversion of magnetic to grid azimuth and vice versa. It shows application of the G–M angle, azimuth and scale in polar coordinate, intersection and modified resection problems. The conference covers also the protractor and base direction.

Aerial Photo Reading, 2183–USAR(RDT), four hours. A conference and practical exercise covering the types and uses of aerial photographs. The conference discusses the comparison of an aerial photo to a topographic map, and basic photo interpretation.

**Characteristics and Effects of Nuclear Explosions,* 2400–USAR(ADT), two hours. A conference explaining the appearance and types of nuclear bursts and the physical effects of a nuclear explosion, including a discussion of heat, blast and nuclear radiation and their effects on personnel and equipment. 30¢.

Preventive Maintenance of Commo Equipment. A pamphlet emphasizing the importance of preventive maintenance on communication equipment.

Enemy Indications and Capabilities, 6215–A3. An integrated conference and practical exercise covering the organization and tactical doctrine of the Aggressor rifle division, the determination of enemy indications

and the relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

Graphic Representation, 6304–A2. An integrated conference and practical exercise involving the technique of graphic representation in the preparation of situation maps, operations maps, planning maps and operation overlays.

**Unit Funds,* 6474–12–USAR(RDT), two hours. An integrated conference and practical exercise covering sources of income, and duties of the custodian and the unit fund council. 20¢.

Parachute Operations, 6621–A10. A map exercise covering the planning for and conduct of a parachute operation by an airborne battle group and company.

Assault Transport Operations, 6630–A10. A map exercise covering the planning and execution of an air-landed operation by a ROTAD battle group in active nuclear warfare.

**Battle Group in Night Attack,* 6666–A8–USAR (ADT), eight hours. A terrain exercise covering a company and battle group in the night attack under active nuclear conditions. $1.00.

Battle Group in Desert Operations, 6770–A4. A map exercise covering a mechanized battle group in the attack in desert terrain under active nuclear conditions.

Battle Group in Mountain Operations, 6774–A6. A map exercise covering the planning and conduct of company and battle group mountain operations under active nuclear conditions.

**Company Security Missions, Offensive,* 6832–I4–USAR(ADT), four hours. A conference and map exercise covering the employment of the rifle company as advance, flank and rear guard of a larger force in the offensive. Also described is technique for performing these missions with varying degrees of mobility (including partial and complete helicopter and Infantry-carrier mobility). 75¢.

**Reverse Slope Defense,* 6931–I4–USAR(ADT), four hours. A terrain exercise covering the fundamentals of defensive combat as applied to the elements of a rifle company organized on a reverse slope. Based upon a ground reconnaissance, students are required to plan the organization of ground of the rifle platoons, select positions, and assign missions to the weapons of the weapons platoon and tanks of an attached tank platoon. Students are also required to plan the employment of a defensive position in a counterattack role. 35¢.

**Reserve Rifle Company in Defense,* 6950–I4–USAR (ADT), four hours. A terrain exercise in which the students, acting as weapons platoon leaders and rifle company commanders, apply the fundamentals of defense in the organization of the ground of a reserve rifle company in the position defense and as part of a larger unit conducting the mobile defense. 40¢.

Organization of Artillery, 7205–A2–USAR(ADT), two hours. An integrated conference and display covering the general missions of artillery, the over-all organization of division artillery, and the organization of the mortar battery of the battle group.

Items from the April 1959 Monthly List:

**Map Reading: Fundamentals and Theory,* 2180–USAR (RDT), two hours. A conference covering marginal information, topographic and military symbols, the meaning and application of the UTM grid system, and the use of the graphic scale in measuring distance. 10¢

Battle Group in Position Defense, 6250–A18–USAR (ADT), eighteen hours. A map exercise and problem covering the battle group in defense under both active and non-active nuclear conditions. The problem includes organization of the battle group battle area defense, employment of subordinate elements, troop leading and



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staff section procedures, supply requirements and location of logistical installations.

**Personnel Procedures,* 6445–I3–USAR (RDT), three hours. An integrated conference and practical exercise covering classification, assignment, reassignment, promotion and reduction of enlisted personnel. 45¢.

**Supply and Property,* 6505–A6–USAR (RDT), six hours. A practical exercise covering garrison supply and property accounting procedures. The problem encompasses the principles and types of supplies, determination of supply requirements, and supply economy. 40¢.

**Inspections,* 6515–I1–USAR (RDT), one hour. A conference and problem covering functions of inspections. The problem encompasses the inspection process, programs, types and techniques, 15¢.

**Movement Planning,* 6520–I1–USAR (RDT), one hour. A conference covering the principles of planning which are applicable to all unit movements by all forms of transportation. The problem deals with the planning sequence of troop movement, and loading characteristics of rail, water, truck and air transport equipment. 25¢.

Brigade in Offensive Operations, 6760–A6. A map exercise and problem covering a brigade task force in mobile offensive operations under active nuclear conditions.

**Fire Support Planning,* 7208–A1–USAR (ADT), one hour. A conference and problem on the techniques, terminology and procedures used by the Artillery in developing the fire support plan. 45¢.

Items for the May 1959 Monthly List:

Civil Affairs/Military Government, 2236–USAR (RDT), one and three-quarters hours. An integrated conference and practical exercise covering the mission, function and activities of Civil Affairs units. Also included are staff and unit organization, policies and procedures for the conduct of CA activities, and relationship with civilians as prescribed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Administration of Military Justice, 2237–USAR (RDT), three hours. A conference covering actions by persons having knowledge of an offense, apprehension and restraint of the accused or the suspected, and searches and seizures. Also included is a preliminary inquiry of the commanding officer, including evidentiary matters and selected punitive articles. A practical exercise deals with the administration of military justice.

Administration of Military Justice, 2238–USAR (RDT), three hours. A conference covering actions of the company commander of the accused, including nonpunitive measures, nonjudicial punishments under Article 15, UCMJ, the preference and drafting of charges and preparation of allied papers, and forwarding of charges to the battle group commander for action. A practical exercise deals with the administration of military justice.

Joint Air-Ground Operations, 6331–A2–USAR (RDT), two hours. An integrated conference and practical exercise covering Army requirements for air support, air-ground system, target selection and marking, the ground liaison officer, the air reconnaissance liaison officer and air operations planning.

Airborne Logistics, 6542–I2–USAR (RDT), one and three-quarters hours. An integrated conference and practical exercise on the logistical organization of the Airborne division and its subordinate units, stressing company level operations. Emphasis is placed on special characteristics of logistical support of the Airborne division, including the means of retrieving parachute-dropped supplies.

Mess Administration, 6517–I1–USAR (RDT), one hour. A conference covering unit mess administration, ration requests, field ration issue slips, meal cards, master menus, cash collection sheets and miscellaneous files and records.



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

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Two handsome binders are now available for *Infantry* magazine. Both covers are sturdily constructed of dark-blue, grained leatherette and are richly stamped with gold lettering.

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

I AM THE INFANTRY

I am the Infantry — Queen of Battle! I meet the enemy face to face . . . will to will. For two centuries, I have been the bulwark of our Nation's defense . . . I am the Infantry! Follow me!

Both hardship . . . and glory, I have known. My bleeding feet stained the snow at Valley Forge. I pulled an oar to cross the icy Delaware . . . tasted victory at Yorktown . . . and saw our Nation born.

At New Orleans, I fought beyond the hostile hour . . . discovered the fury of my long rifle . . . and came of age. I am the Infantry!

I pushed westward with the Conestoga . . . and marched with the pioneer across the plains . . . to build outposts for freedom on the wild frontier. Follow me!

With Scott I went to Vera Cruz . . . battled Santa Anna in the mountain passes . . . and climbed the high plateau. I planted our flag in the Plaza of Mexico City.

From Bull Run to Appomattox my blood ran red. I fought for both the Blue and the Grey . . . divided in conflict, I united in peace . . .

I am the Infantry.

I left these shores with the sinking of the Maine . . . led the charge up San Juan Hill . . . and fought the Moro — and disease — in the Philippines. Across the Rio Grande, I chased the bandit, Villa. Follow me!

At Chateau-Thierry, I went over the top. I stood like a rock on the Marne . . . cracked the Hindenburg Line . . . and broke the back of the Hun in the Argonne. I didn't come back until it was "over, over there."

At Bataan and Corregidor, I bowed briefly, licked my wounds and vowed to return. I invaded Tunisia on the African shore . . . dug my nails into the sand at Anzio . . . and bounced into Rome with a flower in my helmet.

The Channel and the hedgerow could not hold me. I pushed back the "Bulge" . . . vaulted the Rhine . . . and seized the Heartland. The "Thousand-Year" Reich was dead.

From island to island, I hopped the Pacific . . . hit the beaches . . . and chopped my way through swamp and jungle. I kept my vow . . . I did return . . . I set the Rising Sun.

In Pusan perimeter I gathered my strength . . . crossed the frozen Han . . . marched to the Yalu. Along the 38th parallel . . . and around the world, I made my stand.

Wherever brave men fight . . . and die, for freedom, you will find me. I am the bulwark of our Nation's defense. I am always ready . . . now, and forever. I am the Infantry — Queen of Battle!